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ABSTRACT
Domain and Type Enforcement (DTE) is a simple and well-known access control system, 
which has been used at the microkernel level in SPIN, the  kernel level in Unix, and the user- 
space library level in CORBA. This work implem ents D TE as a Linux Security Module, and 
provides tools for the composition and analysis of policies. The goal is to bring M andatory 
Access Control in Linux to  the level of ease of use of cryptography tools and libraries.
Tools have been created to  edit DTE policies and query transitions through different 
privilege levels. A subtle m odification of the Bell LaPadula (BLP) access control m odel’s 
s ta r property, applied to  a D TE policy, results in a relation on types which perm its us to 
concisely express, and therefore verify, goals for th a t policy. Policy creation is simplified 
using composition of policy modules, and enhanced by autom atic verification of persistence 
of any desirable properties, including the modified BLP relation on types, across m odule 
application.
xv
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Access control in Unix systems, though certainly b e tte r th an  th a t in many other popular 
operating systems, leaves much to  be desired. In  particular, the combination of a tru sted  
user, lack of m andatory access control, and far too many services running under the tru sted  
user’s id, are partly  responsible for the large num ber of security-related advisories for Linux 
and other Unix systems.
Domain and Type Enforcement introduces m andatory  access control to  Linux, assigning 
labels to  subjects and objects, and enforcing an access policy for all subjects, including the 
tru sted  user. It thereby greatly increases the potential for security in Linux systems.
1.1 Contributions
Research into improved OS access control is certainly far from stagnant. However, most of 
th is is ju st th a t - research. This work addresses a deficiency in real, usable, yet complete 
m andatory access control systems.
2
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CH APTER 1. INTRO D U CTIO N  3
First, an existing and well understood m andatory access control system, dom ain and 
type enforcement (DTE) [2], is im plem ented as a run-tim e loadable m odule for Linux.
Rather than requiring even a cursory understanding of kernel compilation and installation, 
th is allows anyone to  install and begin using D TE w ith very little preparation. Furtherm ore, 
since we paid careful a tten tion  not ju s t to  correctness, bu t also to  efficiency concerns, the 
im plem entation is not only useful, b u t also does not negatively im pact performance.
Next, a  set of adm inistration tools has been implemented. This allows a system adm in­
istra to r to  control a ra ther complicated access control system w ithout having to  study the 
syntax of the policy files. A brief tu to ria l will be sufficient to  explain D TE policies and 
their adm inistration. This tu to ria l also has been created.
Finally, the adm inistration tools have been engineered so as to  aid in the validation or 
refutation of invariants.
This work therefore presents a  complete m andatory access control system, providing the 
necessary tools for system  or security adm inistrators to  create, analyze, validate and finally 
implem ent security policies.
1.2 Organization
C hapter 2 provides background on the history and sta te  of the a rt of systems security. 
C hapter 3 discusses our im plem entation of D TE for Linux. C hapter 4 discusses the per­
formance of our im plem entation. C hapter 5 presents a formal analysis of the access rights 
of dom ains as restricted  by a D TE feature, entry points. C hapter 6 discusses issues w ith 
policy adm inistration, and presents a pair of tools designed to  address specific problems
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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w ith editing a tex tual policy file. C hapter 7 presents a m ethod for formal analysis of DTE 
policies. C hapter 8 presents a tool for constructing policies from a set of small modules, and 
uses the method presented in Chapter 7 to provide automatic enforcement and maintenance 
of any security properties across m odule application.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Chapter 2
Background
2.1 Security Nom enclature
Throughout th is work, we will use the following nom enclature. Subjects are entities which 
can perform  actions. For instance, a  user is a subject. Processes started  by the user are 
also subjects. O bjects are generally file system  objects, however they can be anything to 
which a subject can receive some sort of access. Subjects can therefore also be objects, as 
subjects can have access to  each other. Security policies assign labels, representing some 
kind of security inform ation, to  subjects and objects, and determine access rights based 
upon these labels.
Most popular operating systems implem ent discretionary access control (DAC). They 
allow access rights to  objects to  be fully specified by the owners of these objects. Typically, 
an object is owned by the subject who created it. This has some m ajor shortcomings. For 
instance, it facilitates Trojan horse attacks, where code, pretending to  be friendly to  the 
user, quietly gives away the user’s access rights. Since the code is run  as the user, who has 
the power to give away access rights to objects he owns, this is perfectly legitimate.
Mandatory access control (MAC) enforces a system-specified security policy which users 
5
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cannot modify [41]. For instance, a MAC policy m ight prevent users from giving away write 
access to  their own objects. Ideally, MAC and DAC should be combined such th a t users 
can dictate access policies to their own objects, but within reasonable and safe limits.
2.2 Access Control Policies
An access control policy defines labels, subjects, objects and permissions, and dictates how 
and when labels are assigned to  subjects and objects, as well as how and when permissions 
are decided and enforced.
This section reviews some trad itional m andatory  access control policies. The earlier 
are designed for security — preventing unauthorized d a ta  access — while the later address 
integrity — preventing unauthorized users from corrupting data. This reflects the historical 
shift, caused by a shift from m ilitary to  business interests m otivating research.
2.2.1 B ell-L a P ad u la  (B L P )
Bell and La Padula[4], while using a formal model to  study  the M ultics system, introduced 
an access control policy intended to  enforce the m ilitary security policy. This policy requires 
th a t no subject may read d a ta  classified a t a higher security level th an  its own.
M ilitary systems define a security level as a pair (l , C ), where I is a security level, and 
C is a set of categories. A category can be any kind of label which is meaningful w ithin the 
context of the policy. A partial order is imposed upon security levels as follows: A security 
level L\  =  ( / i ,C i) ,  is said to  dom inate another level L2 =  {I21C2) provided th a t I2 <  h, 
and C2 C C\. This is w ritten  as L\  oc L2.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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In order to  properly enforce the  m ilitary security policy, BLP m aintains properties. The 
first property, known as the  “simple security property” , or ss-property, states the obvious 
goal:
ss-property: If subject S  is granted observe access to object O, then  L(S)  oc 
L ( 0 ) .
In other words, if S  may observe object O, then  its security clearance m ust dom inate, 
th a t is, be greater th an  or equal to, th a t of the object. By itself, th is property perm its two 
subjects Si  and S 2 to  violate the m ilitary security policy through collaboration. Assume 
there is an object Oi,  such th a t
L (S i )  oc L(Oi )  oc L ( S 2).
In this case, S 2 is not allowed to  observe Oi,  bu t Sj is. By itself, the ss-property perm its S\  
to  leak the inform ation contained w ithin 0 \  to subject S 2. To accomplish this, Si  copies 
the da ta  from Oi  into an object 0 2 such th a t
L(S i )  oc L{Oi)  oc L ( S 2) oc L ( 0 2).
This scenario is displayed graphically in Figure 2.1. To prevent this security policy 
violation, BLP also contains the *-property L
*-property: If subject Si is granted observe access to object 0 \ , and modify 
access to 0 2, then  L ( 0 2) oc L(Oi) .
1 Pronounced “star-property” .
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This property  prevents the situation  displayed in Figure 2.1 from occurring. Once Si  has 
read the  d a ta  contained in 0 \ ,  any object which it subsequently creates or modifies will 
have a security level a t least as great as th a t of Oi- S? is this not perm itted  to  read the 
d a ta  copied to O2 .
Subjects Objects Security
Level
rw
Figure 2.1: Data Leakage with BLP ss-property alone.
2.2 .2  R ings
A ring-based policy specifies N  concentric rings of protection. Privilege increases toward the 
center of the rings, w ith the center ring, known as ring 0, being the most privileged. Every 
object and subject is located w ithin a particu lar ring. Subjects may not access objects 
w ithin a deeper ring, th a t is, objects w ith a lower security level. A process changes its 
ring level by m aking a call to  a procedure w ithin a different level. However the process is 
associated w ith a lower bound, below which it may not pass. Furtherm ore, moving to  a 
lower ring level is only allowed for certain entry points. The MULTICS operating system 
used ring-based access control[48].
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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The Intel 386 architecture is also a  ring-based system, using four rings, referred to  as 
privilege levels [28, C hapter 9.5]. Popular operating systems such as Linux, however, use 
only two [7, Page 37]. Ring 0 im plem ents the kernel or supervisor mode, while ring 3 usually 
im plem ents user mode. User mode instructions are not allowed to  rew rite supervisor mode 
code. A system  call is a call to  code located in ring 0, so tha t, only for the duration of the 
system  call, the privilege level drops to  level 0. In  this way, the kernel (or the operating 
system) is protected from user software. At the same time, it gives the  kernel the power it 
needs allow m ultiple program s or processes in user-mode, while protecting them  from each 
other.
Access
Execute
Process
Entry'
-Point Object
Permitted R ing N -  
\  (user)Execute/
R ing 1''
R ing  0 
(superuser)
Permit}
Figure 2.2: Security rings
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2.2 .3  C lark-W ilson
Most early work in access control was sponsored by the military. As such, the work centered 
around secrecy, which is the prim ary concern of the  military. Clark and W ilson pointed 
out [9] th a t for the sake of commerce, integrity is a t least as im portan t as, perhaps more 
im portan t than , secrecy. They created an access control policy to  provide integrity, and 
compared its requirem ents to  those of secrecy systems.
The policy which they presented was based upon three definitions.
•  D ata  w ith whose integrity we are concerned will be called Constrained D ata  Item s 
(CDI).
•  Integrity Verification Procedures (IVP) are procedures which verify the initial state  
of a CDI.
•  T ransform ation Procedures (TP). Given a valid initial state  of a CDI, A T P  transform s 
it into another valid state.
The system  itself ensures th a t only certain  users, under certain conditions, may execute 
a given TP, and th a t only some T P s may be used to  modify a  CDI. However, a  large part 
of the policy exists outside the system, in the  form of verification th a t the T P s and IVPs 
are correct, as well as the lists of users which may invoke T Ps and lists of T P s which may 
alter CDIs. This means th a t with each software upgrade, any updated  T P s or configuration 
files m ust be revalidated, a potentially costly proposal. In contrast, in a system which has 
been verified to  satisfy the BLP policy, only an upgrade of the operating system requires 
revalidation.
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To understand  why, one m ust consider th a t, in BLP, the OS defines the entire access 
control policy. In  a  Clark-W ilson integrity control system, the T Ps, CDIs, and lists of users 
perm itted  to  use T P s and lists of T Ps perm itted  to  modify CDIs, are each a part in defining 
the policy. T h a t is, these files are a part of the tru sted  com puting base (TCB), and proving 
the correctness of any system requires verification of the TCB. We s ta rt to recognize a 
trade-off, then, between the power offered by a more malleable TCB, and the work involved 
in its verification.
2.2 .4  S trict In tegrity
Prior to  Clark and W ilson, B iba a ttem pted  to  address integrity using the inverse of BLP [5]. 
Once a subject S  reads an object Ox, it is no longer allowed to  write any object Ox : 
L{Ox ) > L (0] ) .  In  th is way, users, or program s running on their behalf, are prevented from 
contam inating d a ta  w ith  less tru sted  data.
This policy does not provide a m ethod for taking in user data. Clearly, user d a ta  must 
be considered low integrity. Raising its integrity would have to  be done by a tru sted  process. 
W hile this may sound reasonable, Clark and W ilson point out th a t a trusted  process is one 
which is outside the integrity policy. Going outside the integrity policy to  handle any type 
of user input is unacceptable. In the Clark-W ilson policy, the Trusted Procedures which 
handle this work are m ade an integral, and verified, part of the integrity policy.
2.2.5 T yp e E nforcem ent
From the work of Clark and W ilson, it may be observed th a t while security levels are best 
associated w ith subjects, integrity levels are b e tte r associated w ith program s (TPs).
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Type Enforcement was introduced by Boebert and Kain of Honeywell [6] in 1985 as a 
m ethod of im plem enting integrity systems w ithout relying on a tru sted  user. It labeled 
objects as well as subjects, and specified access from subjects to  objects, and from subjects 
to  other subjects, in two matrices. Subject labels were called domains, and object labels 
were called types. Subject to  subject access consisted of subjects transitioning to  other 
domains. Domains were associated w ith procedures. For any procedure, a  subject, which 
consisted of a procedure running in some domain, would be allowed to  execute the procedure 
and rem ain in the current domain, execute the procedure and enter another domain, or not 
be allowed to  execute it a t all.
Subject to  object access could be read, write, and execute. Type Enforcement was 
implem ented first in the Secure Ada project (LOCK), and later by TIS in Trusted XENIX 
[1]. Secure Com puting still uses T E  in its Sidewinder firewall product [10].
Assured pipelines were introduced as an aside during the introduction of Type Enforce­
ment. An assured pipeline is a non-bypassable subsystem  through which da ta  m ust flow 
between a particular source and destination. Boebert and K ain listed three requirem ents 
for dem onstrating the security of an assured pipeline.
1. The subsystem  which the pipeline a ttem pts to  enforce is indeed non-bypassable.
2. The transform ation applied by the subsystem  cannot be reversed or modified after 
the pipeline.
3. The subsystem  is correct.
Assured pipelines are useful for proving th a t the transfer of d a ta  between security or 
integrity levels (or labels) is controlled.
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2.3 Policy Representation
In  Section 2.2, we presented several access control policies. Here we present the common 
m ethods of representing access control policies in the literature and in operating systems.
2.3.1 A ccess C ontrol M atrix
In an access control m atrix  (ACM, see Figure 2.3), each row represents a user, and each 
column represents an object. A n entry located at row u  and column o specifies the access 
which u  is granted to  o. W hile conceptually simple, ACM ’s are not used in im plem entation 
because the m atrices become very large and sparse, wasting valuable memory. However, 
they are frequently used to  explain, and to  make formal argum ents about, access control 
policies.
Objects (files)
Subjects
(users)
f l f2 f30
u l r r rw
u2 rw rwx X
u7 r X X
Figure 2.3: Sample ACM for 7 users and 30 files.
2.3.2 A ccess C ontrol List
An access control list (ACL, see Figure 2.4) is an abbreviated version of an ACM. At each 
object is stored a list of all users who may access the object and the types of access perm itted
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for each. Therefore, if only one user may access an object 0 ,  then  the  list need only contain 
one subject, not all subjects defined for the system.
Objects(files)
u l,ru l,r
u2,x
ul,rw
u2,rw
u7,r
u2,rwx
f30
Figure 2.4: Sample ACL corresponding to above ACM.
2.3 .3  C apabilities
The use of an ACL can be viewed as splitting an ACM into its columns, and then  com­
pressing these. Capabilities are sometimes described as doing the  same th ing by rows.
A capability [14] is a  pair {o, r}  where r  specifies a set of access rights to  object o. A 
process has a  list of these capabilities, and the union of the pairs in the list specifies the 
full access rights of a process. See Figure 2.5 for the running example expressed in term s of 
capabilities. A process may create, destroy, modify, and grant capabilities to  other processes. 
W hile the use of capabilities makes for a very flexible and powerful system, it has some 
problems. One is the difficulty of discovering which processes posses a certain capability, 
and, by extension, of tracking the propagation of capabilities. Most real operating systems
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therefore do not use capabilities.
Capabilities are, however, used in m odern extensible systems such as SPIN [39]. In 
SPIN, capabilities are used to  provide bo th  extensibility, and security between extensions. 
Capabilities in this case are im plem ented through namespaces. Extensions call each o ther’s 
functions by raising events, and provide functionality by registering event handlers. For 
instance, a memory management extension might save information to  disk by raising an 
event which causes a  file system  extension to  save the information. By binding a new event 
handler to  this same event name, another extension can extend, or lim it, functionality. For 
instance, a compression or encryption extension could extend the file system  extension’s 
w r i te  event handler by processing the d a ta  before passing it along to  the file system exten­
sion’s event handler. An extension cannot receive functionality which cannot be requested 
by raising some event. In other words, it cannot cause actions w ithout the appropriate 
capability.
Subjects
(users)
r->f2 rw->f30r->fl
x->f30rwx->f2
r->fl
rw->fl
Figure 2.5: Capabilities representing same access rights above.
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2.4 Role Based Access Control
In discretionary access control (DAC) systems, policies are specified in term s of rights to 
objects granted to  users and groups. The user who creates an object usually owns it, and 
hence possesses all rights to th a t object. The owner may grant access rights to  o ther users.
This is not how things are usually done in real life. R ather, subjects assume certain 
roles. For instance, the originator of a docum ent may not be the author, or the owner, 
or the one who should be able to  grant access rights to  th a t document. All of these are 
normally assum ed to  be true  in com puting systems. Role based access control (RBAC) 
a ttem pts to  make com puting systems resemble real life access systems more closely [47].
Roles are used in two ways. In SELinux [33] and many other RBAC im plem entations, 
they are simply used as a “h a t” which a user wears in order to  be granted ex tra  privi­
leges. W hen m ost people speak of role based access control, they th ink  of this very simple 
interpretation.
Clark and W ilson [9] presented an access control system where roles are used to im­
plement separation of duties as required in common accounting practices. As described in 
Section 2.2.3, CDIs may only be modified by a set of TPs. The T P s m ust be executed by 
some com bination of roles. For instance, a cashier and a manager might bo th  be required 
to  be present in order to  modify the am ount in the register. This means th a t any two 
(different) people who may assume these roles may come together to  run  the TP, in order 
to  modify the  CDI, bu t neither may do so alone. This is a powerful concept. However, it is 
sufficiently complicated th a t it is implem ented only in proprietary software, aimed mainly 
a t banking institu tions. Beyond the complexity of creating the operating system itself, one
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
CH APTER 2. BACKGROUND  17
must also deal w ith m aintaining such a system. In order for this system to  be secure, the 
m em bership of all roles m ust be verified, as m ust the  list of roles required to  authorize a 
TP. Furtherm ore, each T P  m ust be verified each tim e the code might change.
2.5 U N IX
In  Unix systems, access rights to  objects are specified for users and groups, and stored w ith 
the  object. Usually, every person who will use the system  is assigned a  unique user id. Each 
user is associated w ith at least one group. The default group is listed in the user definition, 
which is found in the password file ( /e tc /p a ssw d ). A user can be placed in additional 
groups by placing the usernam e in the group definition in the groups file ( /e tc /g ro u p ) .  A 
running process carries along its real and effective user and group IDs.
2.5.1 F ile  S ystem
The UNIX file system  is based upon file descriptors, called inodes. Inodes can be uniquely 
reference by an integer, known as the inode num ber, and the file system upon which they 
are located. All file objects, including directories, devices and norm al files, are represented 
as inodes. A directory is a file associating file names w ith inodes. For instance, a directory 
might associate the following:
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File Name Inode Num ber
f i l e l 32079
f  i l e 2 32167
f  i l e 3 32254
d i r l 33152
f  i l e 4 32056
f i l e 5 32254
Notice th a t f i l e 3  and f i l e 5  are associated w ith the same inode. This file can be ref­
erenced using either name. It may also be associated w ith  other names in other directories, 
and will not be deleted until all names are removed. However, since an inode num ber is 
unique only to the file system  on which it is located, all names which are associated with 
this inode m ust be located on the same file system. Every directory contains at least two 
entries, and These always refer to  the directory itself, and the parent directory, 
respectively.
A Unix system  sta rts  w ith a particular disk partition  m ounted as the root file system 
( /) . O ther disk partitions can then  be m ounted on top  of any existing directory. M ounting a 
partition  on a directory places the root of the file system  located on the new partition  a t the 
specified m ount point. For instance, if a partition  /d e v /h d a 3  is m ounted on / u s r / l o c a l ,  
then  any request to  access a  file under / u s r / l o c a l  will look up the part of the pa th ­
name after / u s r / l o c a l  on the m ounted partition . If any files or directories existed under 
/ u s r / l o c a l  on the root partition , they are now hidden until /d ev /h d a 3  is unm ounted. 
This allows all file systems to  be viewed as one large tree.
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m nt tm phom eetc
fstab  ) cdromu ser_ l floppy tem p_file
[.cshrc ] ( .plan ) (in s ta ll.sh )
Figure 2.6: Sample Unix file system.
A sample Unix file system  tree is shown in Figure 2.6. In  th is figure, for example, the file 
/m n t /c d r o m / in s t a l l . sh  is on the  cdrom file system, yet this fact is entirely unim portant 
to  users on the system, as the file appears ju st like any other.
2.5 .2  F ile  A ccess
Unix permissions do a rem arkable job of allowing for great expressiveness using a minimal 
am ount of space. As m entioned above, a Unix system  recognizes individual user ids and 
specified groups of users. People who wish to  use the  system are assigned a user id and 
default group. Each user may belong to  several o ther groups as well. Each file is assigned 
one owning user and group. Access permissions are then  specified using 12 bits. Basic 
permissions consist of read, write, and execute permissions, specified individually for the 
user owning the file, the group owning the file, and the rest of the world. Since a file can 
be a file or a directory, these perm issions are m ultiplexed as follows. Read permission on 
a  file perm its viewing of the  file contents. Read permission on a directory does likewise, 
bu t the contents of a directory, are the names of files under th a t directory. Similarly,
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w rite perm ission on a file allows m odifying the file’s contents, whereas write permission 
to  a directory is required to  renam e, create or delete a file under th a t directory. Execute 
perm ission on a file is self-explanatory, bu t execute permission on a directory is interpreted 
as the right to  descend th a t directory — th a t is, to view the contents of files the directory 
contains, subject to  the individual file permissions. Therefore it is possible to allow reading 
a  file’s contents, bu t not its name, and vice versa.
Three more bits are used for file permissions. One is the sticky bit, which has two 
in terpretations. F irst, a program  whose sticky bit is set remains in swap after term ination. 
Second, a file under a directory whose sticky b it is set may only be deleted or renam ed by 
the owner of the file or the owner of the  parent directory, regardless of access permissions. 
The other two bits are setuid and setgid. Executing a setuid program  file changes the 
process’ effective user id to  th a t of the file owner. The setgid b it does the same for the 
process’ group.
2.5 .3  Signal A ccess
Unix processes can communicate by sending each other signals. Some signals force a process 
to  be suspended or killed, while others can be ignored or handled by the process’ own signal 
handlers. A process is allowed to  send signals to other processes owned by the same real 
or effective user id. Under Linux, a signal may also be sent to  any process under the same 
process session, th a t is, between processes sharing the same controlling term inal.
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2.5 .4  Superuser
There is, in m ost systems, the notion of a  superuser, nam ed root in Unix systems. The 
superuser may access any file, send any signals, and change any permissions. In  order to 
lim it dam age due to  the compromise of a system, superuser file access can be lim ited for 
rem ote file systems, but, for ease of rem ote adm inistration, it often is not. Obviously, the 
compromising of superuser on a system  renders the system entirely untrustworthy, as the 
attacker can do anything he likes, including replacing system m onitoring tools w ith versions 
hiding his own activity. Patching the  vulnerability exploited by the attacker is insufficient 
since anything else may have been damaged, so the only solution is to  rebuild the system 
from original m edia and backups predating the attack. Unfortunately, more and more 
services are offered by most machines, and these usually require access to  privileged files or 
services. If any of these services are compromised, the attacker becomes the superuser and 
hence owns the system.
2.5 .5  P O S IX  C apabilities
The natu re  of the  superuser, th a t one either has all its powers or none, is a m ajor problem. 
PO SIX capabilities [25] a ttem p t to  solve th is by splitting  the superuser’s powers into a set 
of distinct capabilities, such as the ability to  open a  restricted port (<  1024), modify the 
network configuration, or trace any process. A process is created w ith a set of perm itted  
capabilities, and may further restrict these a t will before starting  a new process. For 
example, the talkd service may only need access to  restricted network ports, so th a t it may 
be started  w ith only the CAP_NET_BIND-SERVICE capability. If talkd is later compromised, 
the attacker’s privileges on the system  are still very limited, despite being root on the
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system.
PO SIX capabilities are sim ilar to  Dennis and Van Horn’s classical capabilities [14] in 
the way they relate to  a process and can be granted or given up individually. They differ 
in th a t PO SIX  capabilities do not designate rights to  objects, b u t ra ther specify generic 
subsets of the superuser’s powers.
Linux partially  supports POSIX capabilities [30]. Processes carry three bitm aps, rep­
resenting the Inheritable, Perm itted , and Effective capabilities. Executable files will also 
carry capabilities, bu t the Linux VFS does not yet support them . In the meantime, a file’s 
capability sets are assumed to  be empty, barring two exceptions. If the user executing the 
file is root, then  the file’s Inheritable set is full, and the file’s Perm itted  set is full except 
for CAP_PSET, which perm its granting capabilities to  other processes. The same is done 
if the file is setuid root, and, in addition, the  file’s effective set is full.
Equations 2.1 through 2.3 show how capabilities are com puted upon file execution. Here 
p X  denotes a  process a ttrib u te  X, and f X  denotes a file a ttribu te  X. W hile p X  denotes the 
a ttrib u te  before the file execution, p X '  denotes the  same a ttrib u te  as it was recom puted 
during file execution, and as it will be applied for the rem ainder of this execution. The 
a ttribu tes are P  for the perm itted  set, E  for the effective set, and I  for the inheritable set 
of capabilities.
p i '  =  p i  (2.1)
p P ' = f P V  ( f l  A p i )  (2.2)
p E ' = p P ' A f E  (2.3)
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Clearly capabilities cannot be computed correctly until file capabilities are implemented. 
In the meantime, however, the code supporting capabilities is implemented in the rest of 
the kernel, and th is code is now used for im plem enting other features. For instance, calling
se tu id (O )
currently sets all capabilities for the calling process, and a  process which a ttem pts to  use 
n ic e  to  adjust the  scheduling priority for another process is checked for the CAP23YS JJICE 
capability, ra ther th an  for the effective uid of 0 [7, Pages 556-558].
2.5.6 D om ain  and T yp e E nforcem ent
Domain and Type Enforcement was first presented by O ’Brien and Rogers [37], and was 
an extension of Type Enforcement, presented in Section 2.2.5. It differed from T E  in part 
by specifying policies in an  intuitive policy language ra ther th an  using two matrices. TIS 
based the first Unix im plem entation of D TE [2] on O SF/1 MK4.0. Their dom ain transition  
semantics were somewhat different from those in TE. A domain transition  in T E  occurs 
every tim e a dom ain executes a file for which the security policy m andates a transition. 
In  DTE, a second, voluntary type of transition  is added. The m andatory transition  is 
called an au to  transition , while the voluntary transition  is called exec. If a dom ain D\  
has auto access to  D 2, and a process under D \  executes a file which is an entry point to 
D 2 , then  the process is autom atically switched into dom ain D 2. If dom ain D \  has exec 
access to  D 2, and a process under D \  executes an en try  point to D 2, the process by default 
remains under dom ain D \.  However, if it so requests, it may, on the same execution, be 
switched to  D 2. Voluntary transitions are useful for programs, such as lo g in  or sshd , which 
may need to  switch to  one of several domains, depending upon the credentials presented.
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M andatory transitions are useful bo th  for restricting untrusted  programs, and for fitting 
legacy program s into a  D T E policy w ithout requiring any rew riting or recompilation.
D TE is designed to  fit, elegantly w ith the concepts of UNIX. Object labels are assigned 
hierarchically, in a struc tu re  m irroring the file system tree. Types are assigned to pathnam es 
using either explicit or recursive rules. An explicit type assignment rule assigns the type 
only to  the pathnam e, whereas a recursive type assignment rule assigns the type to  all the 
pathnam e’s descendants.
At the same tim e, a clean separation is m aintained between the UNIX DAC and D T E ’s 
MAC. The policy type assignm ent rules interpose a layer between D TE types and UNIX 
files. Domains transitions are performed only a t file execution, and have nothing to  do w ith 
UNIX users. C reating relationships between users and domains is thus left to  user-space 
programs, such as lo g in  and su, or PAM modules acting on their behalf. W hile some see 
th is as a deficiency [38], we believe th a t leaving the am ount and m ethod of cooperation 
between MAC and DAC to the system configuration is one of D T E ’s strengths.
D TE was developed w ith the purpose of m ediating access between users, files, and 
network traffic. The underlying concepts of D TE have also been applied a t other levels. 
SPIN used D TE to protect kernel extensions from each other [39], while OO -DTE [35] 
applies D TE to a d istribu ted  object framework, CORBA.
2.6 Linux File System  Architecture
Linux abstracts away file system  specific details behind the V irtual File-System Switch 
(VFS). Applications call VFS functions, which in tu rn  know how to deal w ith the real file
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system.
Every file and directory in use is represented by a  VFS inode, which holds the relevant 
m etadata , such as file size and access permission, as well as pointers to  file system  specific 
functions to operate on the file or directory. In th is way, the VFS need know nothing about 
how to actually open a  file on the  file system  in use. In fact, a file system  can be provided as 
a module, simply telling the Linux kernel w hat functions to  call for applicable operations.
An inode is the operating system ’s representation of file m etadata. A process, however, 
needs to  have its own representation of files, able to  store some d a ta  which may be different 
from another process’ for the same file. The file structure  includes a  pointer to  the inode, 
as well as da ta  regarding access permissions w ith which the file was opened, and a pointer 
into the file representing the current position.
The inode has a pointer into the directory cache. The directory cache is a hash table 
of structures called dentries, each of which contains a pa th  com ponent’s name, as well as 
pointers needed to  construct pathnam es, such as the parent directory and, if this is the root 
of a  m ounted file system, the covered directory.
A vfsmount structure  contains d a ta  regarding a m ounted file system or VFS sub-tree, 
including pointers to  the m ount point and root of the m ounted file system, and other mounts 
of the same file system. It is the glue which holds together one tree constructed from many 
file systems, as well as folds w ithin itself (as will be seen later). A superblock contains 
inform ation about a block device containing a m ounted file system, and pointers to  the 
vfsm ounts which m ount this device.
Figure 2.7 shows the use of some of these structures when the cdrom on /d ev /h d c is 
m ounted under /mnt/cdrom, and contains files README and FILES in its root directory. The
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s_m ounts
/dev/hda2
m nt_sb
mnt.
mnt
cdrom
m nt_m ounl
/dev/hdcm ounts
m nt_sb
m nt_root
README FILES
Legend:
vfsmount <^> 
superblock 
dentry
Figure 2.7: Linux VFS-related kernel structures.
links represent pointers between the  various structs. For instance, the  dentry representing 
/m nt/cdrom  has a  d_vfsmnt pointer set, indicating th a t a file system  is m ounted on top of 
the dentry. The value of the pointer is the address of the vfsmount struc t representing the 
m ount instance of device /d ev /h d c . The vfsmount struct in tu rn  points back to  the dentry 
on which it is mounted.
2.7 Stackable File System
As noted above, every VFS inode in Linux contains pointers to  the file system specific 
operations to  be used on the associated file. Stackable file systems increase the levels of
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indirection, allowing program m ers to  introduce a feature to any file system  in the form 
of filters ra ther th an  by having to  modify the file system itself. Zadok has introduced 
stackable file systems to Linux as well as FreeBSD and Solaris [17]. The most obviously 
useful application of stackable file systems is the transparent im plem entation of encrypted 
file systems. Figure 2.8 dem onstrates the use of stackable file systems. On receiving a write 
request, the  kernel calls the stackable layer first, which, in this case, encodes the file d a ta  in 
some way. I t could also encode the filename or file attribu tes. After this, the write function 
for the file system  upon which the file is located is called. A read is performed in the reverse 
order, calling the file system  specific read function first, then calling the filter specified by 
the  stackable file system to  decode the d a ta  read from disk.
Traditional VFS
Stackable fs
[emacs
wiite()
encode:data
inode encrypt_data
ext2_write
F igure  2.8: An example of a stackable file system.
A stackable file system can be m ounted in one of two ways. It can be m ounted as 
an overlay, such th a t the m ountpoint of the decoded file system is on top of the encoded 
file system. In th is case, after the m ount command, the encoded file system  is no longer 
visible. The stackable file system  can also be m ounted at a different m ountpoint. In this
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case files can be accessed either decoded, through the new m ountpoint, or encoded, through 
the original m ountpoint.
Increasing the power of stackable file system s even further, FiST, a new language for 
defining stackable file systems, allows things such as fan-in and fan-out, where one block 
seen by the VFS could correspond to  m any blocks on the underlying file system, or vice 
versa [57]. This could be used, for instance, to  implem ent a RAID file system layer, or a 
file system compression layer.
2.8 Networking
It is taken for granted today th a t com puters should be networked to  allow comm unication 
(between people), d a ta  sharing, and often sharing of processor and memory power. For far 
too long, however, network security has been m ostly dependent upon the goodwill of users. 
For instance, it has been only recently th a t ssh, or secure shell, has begun to  replace telnet 
for connecting to  rem ote machines, even though telnet sends passwords in plain tex t, so th a t 
any user able to  listen to  network packets m eant for other processes and other machines 
can read these passwords.
Type Enforcement and D TE have been applied to  network packets as well as files [10, 53]. 
Every network packet is labeled w ith a type. This type can be determ ined by the dom ain 
from which it was generated, or, for firewalls, by the network (card) from which it comes. 
TIS used this to  implem ent D TE-enabled NFS. The NFS server, then, can determ ine the 
type of files it exports, ra ther th an  rely on the client’s policy to be synchronized w ith its 
own.
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2.9 Other Projects
Much recent work in system s security implements very simple security policies. An example 
of this is LOMAC [22], which is basically a two ring system (see Section 2.2.2) intended 
to  separate services under Linux from user processes. Another example is the HP Trusted 
Linux system  [13], which com partm entalizes services such th a t they cannot interact. In this 
way, compromised services have no ability to  compromise one another.
O ther systems security projects offer versions of existing OS distributions which have 
been modified to  address particular known weaknesses. Examples of these are the Imm unix 
System [18], a version of RedH at Linux offering protection against stack smashing attacks 
and form at bug exploits, as well as an enhanced ability to  restrict system access by services, 
and Open Wall, which does not offer its own distribution, bu t a set of patches to  protect 
against very specific vulnerabilities [15].
In the following sections, we discuss a few recent and current projects in more detail.
2.9.1 L inux-ACL
Unix file permissions can only specify read, write and execute permissions for the owning 
user, the owning group, and the rest of the world (see section 2.5.2). The Linux-ACL project 
[26] does not elaborate on the types of access, bu t allows access specification for additional 
users and groups. This allows a user, for instance, to  provide w rite access to another user 
w ithout having to  request a new group containing the two users, or having to  give write 
access to  a larger group or the rest of the world. Linux-ACL is now being implem ented on 
top of extended a ttribu tes, which perm it specification of arb itrary  types of access by name.
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ACLs (and extended a ttribu tes) present several problems, because they are not a part 
of the original file system. Neither backup utilities nor tools such as t a r  are able to  pre­
serve ACLs. However, the  ACL inform ation can be extracted into separate files and then  
reapplied.
Linux-ACL rem ains useful on a D TE system. Domain and Type Enforcement is designed 
to  be a m andatory access control system and, as such, does not allow users to  control the 
dom ain to  type access allowed. ACLs allow a very convenient m ethod for quickly and 
precisely specifying the needed access control to  a user’s files.
2.9 .2  LIDS
The Linux Intrusion D etection System [56] aims to implement m andatory  access control and 
improve intrusion detection through increased and improved kernel logging. Im plem entation 
of MAC may appear a separate problem  from IDS, however w ithout MAC any log created 
by the IDS is vulnerable to  attack, rendering the IDS itself useless. Since intrusion detection 
is usually accomplished through logging, and minimal access reduces file vulnerability, LIDS 
adds append as a possible type of file access.
The contributions of LIDS sit between those of capabilities (see section 2.3.3) and DTE. 
Access rights may be specified by subject and object. The object can be a file or directory. 
The subject may be om itted, in which case the access rights apply for the whole system, or 
the subject may be an executable. These access rights may descend down the file system 
tree. Processes, however, do not inherit access rights from their parents, and access rights 
may not be passed to other processes as capabilities can, which lim its the power of LIDS. 
For instance, since access rights are associated w ith an executable, different users starting
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/ b in /b a s h  will receive the same access rights, whereas DTE or classical capabilities allow 
different situations to associate different access rights w ith instances of the same executable. 
However, as a quick tool to  protect sensitive files or implement more robust logging, LIDS 
is very useful.
2.9 .3  T E  and D T E
O ther team s are working on im plem entations of Type Enforcement and DTE. Secure com­
puting still sells its Sidewinder firewall project which uses Type Enforcement [10]. TIS, now 
a part of Network Associates (NAI), still m aintains its BSD-based D TE system [2], and is 
rum ored to  be starting  a FreeBSD im plem entation. Finally, a project a t Science Appli­
cations International Corporation (SAIC) has been working to  implem ent D TE in Linux, 
although it appears either progress is slow, or updates are not being announced.
2 .9 .4  SELinux
SELinux is a joint project of NAI, the Secure Com puting Corporation (SCC), and the 
National Security Agency (NSA), to  implement the Flask [46] security architecture in Linux. 
The goal of Flask is to  support a wide variety of security policies. It separates access 
control into two separate services. The Security Server stores access control policies and 
makes access decisions. The O bject M anager enforces the policies. On an object create 
request, for instance, a client asks the Object M anager to create an object, who in tu rn  
forwards the request to  the Security Server. Policies implemented under SELinux include 
Type Enforcement, Role Based Access control (RBAC), and M ulti Level Security (MLS). 
This project is im portant for many reasons. F irst, it shows th a t the government is
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serious abou t system security. Second (resulting from the first), it should cause kernel 
developers to  take improved access control more seriously. Third, since th is appears to  be a 
high level access control system — th a t is, it facilitates the im plem entation of access control 
policies, ra ther th an  dictating one —  it will be a  useful stepping stone for the NSA as well 
as others to  continue research into security and access control.
However, its practicality rem ains to  be seen. W hereas LIDS errs in being too simple 
and too lim ited in its ability to  express security policies, SELinux may go too far the  other 
way. System  adm inistrators should not need to  spend weeks learning how to use a  system 
to  protect against a new talkd exploit. Hopefully, D TE will fit nicely between these two 
extremes.
2 .9 .5  H P -L X
H P has developed a d istribu tion  of Linux designed to  minimize damage due to compromise 
of system  services. They argue explicitly th a t, regardless of due diligence, systems will 
be compromised. HP-LX [16] provides features in order to contain bo th  file access and 
comm unications by processes. This appears to  be based upon the com partm entalization 
offered by their previous T rusted Linux [13] implem entation. It also includes TripW ire [21] 
to  ensure the integrity of im portan t system files; a  script which performs several functions 
to  ensure a safe system, such as remove suid /sg id  b its from executables; and a secure audit 
daemon, which is protected w ithin a com partm ent.
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2.10 Other Work in Security Policies
Very little  work has been published regarding security policies. Most systems security work 
has been aim ed toward im plem entation of security enhanced systems, w ith little  or no 
thought given to  policy creation, analysis, and maintenance. A recent SELinux paper [44] 
explains the syntax of various tex tual policy configuration files in great detail, bu t does not 
offer any assistance beyond the tex tual policy specification. Another SELinux paper [34] 
presents a specific policy, and discuses its m eeting several specific criteria, such as confine­
ment of the  sendmail service. It does not offer any formal specification of these criteria or 
the policy.
Eraser and Badger performed autom ated analysis of D TE policies [23] in order to  allow 
safe updates to  a  running D TE system ’s policy. This is the best example of formal policy 
analysis to  date, and we base some of our work upon this paper.
It is clear from the above review of recent and current work in systems security th a t 
there is a  shortage of research into the subject of security policy configuration. This work 
aims to  address th a t shortage.
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DTE
This chapter discusses our D TE kernel m odule im plem entation in detail. Since a goal of 
our project was to  provide a m andatory access control system  which is bo th  easy to  install 
and to adm inister, it naturally  m ust be im plem ented for current kernels. Since Linux is a 
very quickly evolving operating system, this requires constant vigilance. Operations upon 
which an im plem entation is based at one moment can become wholly meaningless w ithin a 
few kernel versions.
A prototype of our D TE im plem entation was presented at the A tlanta Linux Showcase 
(ALS)[27]. Many of the details in the im plem entation still hold true. However much has 
changed. This chapter presents the current im plem entation of DTE. Section 3.1 discusses 
the new framework upon which the D TE im plem entation is based. Section 3.2 discusses 
the fundam ental decisions concerning the im plem entation. Section 3.3 introduces some 
im portant da ta  structures, while Section 3.4 presents algorithm s for fundam ental DTE 
operations. Next we show the configuration file syntax and the D TE API in Sections 3.5 
and 3.6, respectively. The chapter closes w ith a dem onstration of the effectiveness of D TE 
in stopping real-world attacks against otherwise vulnerable systems.
34
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The Linux Security M odule (LSM) project is a response to Linus Torvalds’ call [51] for a 
general framework to  support security extensions. Responding to  a paper [33] presenting 
the SELinux access control system, Torvalds announced th a t he would not accept any such 
patches into the kernel. R ather, he asked the security community to  provide a set of tru ly  
generic security patches. These patches should allow all, or a t least many, of the existing 
security projects to  work as Linux modules, w ithout requiring any further kernel patching. 
This would absolve Torvalds of having to  make any decisions on a single appropriate access 
control policy.
Crispin Cowan took the  initiative [11] in creating the LSM project [50, 54], which was 
joined by other notew orthy people such as Stephen Smalley and David Wagner. Many 
groups working on projects to  extend access control in Linux were represented, including 
SELinux [33], Im m unix [19], and projects by HP and IBM. Clearly, each of these groups had 
developed its own m ethods of dealing w ith certain problems. Every issue to  be addressed 
by LSM, therefore, raised much discussion and required a great deal of compromise.
The LSM architecture, as recommended by Torvalds, became a structure  containing 
pointers to functions which perform  various security checks, as well as da ta  initialization 
to  support these checks. By default, the functions pointed to by this structure are dummy 
functions which default to  permissive behavior. W herever the kernel performs a sensitive 
operation, for instance opening a file w ith write permissions, a call to  an LSM function is 
first made. If the LSM function retu rns an error, then  the  modification is not performed. 
A security module, when loaded, may redirect any or all of the LSM function pointers to
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its own functions, in order to  accomplish its goals.
Clearly these functions, and the places whence they are called, will affect w hat sorts 
of policies can be used. A significant part of the design of D TE for Linux 2.5 consisted of 
taking part in the LSM project in order to ensure th a t it was able to  support DTE as a 
module.
3.1.1 LSM  D esign
As described above, the overall design of LSM is modeled after the design of other Linux 
subsystems such as the VFS [29]. The active security policy is represented by a  set of 
function pointers. These function pointers are dereferenced and called throughout the 
kernel to  make policy decisions. Inserting a new security policy therefore consists merely of 
redirecting these function pointers. A few other design decisions bear discussion, however.
First, since security policies are now loaded as modules, the question may be raised of 
w hat sort of policy is needed, or wanted, in the base kernel. On the one hand, we want the 
LSM project to  minimize intrusion into the existing kernel code. This will maximize the 
chances of LSM being accepted into the m ainstream  kernel, which is, of course, the m ain 
purpose of this project. On the o ther hand, by simplifying the  base Linux kernel’s security 
policy, performance will improve. This will be a particular advantage for embedded Linux 
systems. In  th is case, the allure of this performance increase outweighed the increased code 
intrusion. PO SIX capabilities [30], which have been a part of the Linux kernel since version 
2.2, were removed from the kernel and are now provided as an LSM module. The Linux 
base security policy under LSM is therefore the simple “root is everything” which most 
sysadmins prefer.
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An issue which has undergone much discussion was th a t of m odule stacking. The naive 
first impulse is to  ask for the ability to  load combinations of a rb itrary  modules. For instance, 
it would be advantageous to  load the capabilities m odule along w ith the D TE module. 
However, a rb itrary  composition of security policies is not possible [24], LSM’s solution is 
to  allow policies to  define the  r e g i s t e r  and u n r e g i s t e r  functions. Some LSM module 
will be the  first to  be loaded. Subsequent m odule insertion requests will be handled by 
th is module. Therefore, if the au thor of the first m odule is aware of another module, and 
finds the other m odule to  compose nicely w ith his own, then  his m odule may perm it the 
second m odule to  load. If the second m odule implem ents an in o d e_ p e rm iss io n  function, 
for instance, then the first m odule’s in o d e_ p e rm iss io n  function may first call the second 
m odule’s function. Provided th is function perm its the requested action, the first module 
may perform  its own check.
A nother issue which the LSM project faced was comm unication of modules w ith user- 
space programs. Most existing enhanced access control policies, since they required patching 
the  kernel anyway, simply introduced system calls. However, LSM could not simply reserve 
a large block of new system calls so th a t all LSM modules could have their own. In addition, 
the currently preferred m ethod of providing communication between the kernel and user 
levels is to implement a small pseudo file system  [31].
The solution implem ented by LSM was to  reserve a single system  call, called simply 
s e c u r i ty .  This system call takes three argum ents. The first is an integer named id , 
which identifies the LSM m odule w ith which the user-level program  wishes to  interact. The 
second is another integer variable c a l l ,  which identifies the particu lar system call of the 
LSM m odule which the user-level program  wishes to  invoke. The th ird  argum ent is a v o id
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pointer, which may contain any d a ta  the m odule wishes to  accept, plus buffers for re tu rn  
data. In  general this will be a structure , which will itself point to  several argum ents. For 
an  example of how this is used, see the  details on the D TE A PI in Section 3.6.
3.2 DTE Design Decisions
3.2.1 E ntry  T ypes
D TE facilitates restricting file system  and signaling access to  precisely th a t needed for 
processes to  accomplish their tasks. Further protection is afforded through entry points. 
E ntry  points are binaries whose execution may trigger or allow transitioning to  another 
domain. A dom ain may be entered only while beginning execution of one of its entry 
points.
O ur prototype D TE im plem entation, as well as the DTE im plem entation by TIS, spec­
ified en try  points as lists of binaries. O ur LSM D TE module, however, uses lists of entry 
types instead. There are several reasons m otivating this switch. F irst, we no longer need 
to  reconstruct the executable’s filename to  confirm its being an entry point. This in itself 
provides two benefits. The consideration of how m ounting activity such as m ultiple mounts 
and per-process namespaces affects the  actual filename is left entirely up to  the file-type 
resolution subsystem, ra ther th an  needing to  be duplicated locally a t the D TE a u to  and 
exec decision algorithms. This bo th  reduces the am ount of code, and therefore the risk 
of dangerous bugs, and increases performance. It also prevents tim e of check to  tim e of 
use races [45], where an attacker, or valid activity, is able to change an object between the 
permissions check, and the use of the object.
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Additionally, the use of entry types is beneficial to  policy adm inistration for two reasons. 
W hen creating a new dom ain under the  prototype D TE system, for instance lo g in _ d , it is 
tem pting, and perm itted , simply to define / b i n / l o g i n  as the entry point w ithout giving it 
any further thought. Most likely, its type will be the same as th a t of all o ther files under 
/b in .  This is the location of many binaries which are frequently updated. W rite access 
under / b i n  will therefore likely be quite liberal.
By requiring the definition of an entry type, we require the separate specification of 
access to  the lo g in  binary, which encourages providing m inimal access to  entry points, if 
only on account of laziness — providing more liberal access than  needed provides no benefits 
and takes more work th an  providing the m inim al access. Doing so also rem inds the policy 
adm inistrator of the im portance of the entry  points which, in the case of lo g in _ d , will 
likely encourage him  to move / b in / lo g i n  to  / sb in , since no one should have create access 
to / s b in ,  b u t such access under / b in  is, again, likely to  be granted more freely.
Finally, in chapter 8, we will introduce a  relation on types which provides a quick glimpse 
of the secrecy and integrity properties of types. W hen specifying entry types instead of 
entry points, the presence or absence of integrity for entry types, which is crucial to  domain 
security, becomes im m ediately obvious. This inform ation is of course also available when 
entry points are used, bu t obtaining it requires more work. A policy adm inistrator would 
have to  look up the type of each entry point to  a dom ain and determ ine i t ’s place in the 
type relation. This ex tra  work interferes w ith the concept of interface zen [8], by placing 
needless obstacles in the way of obtaining information.
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3.2.2 F ile  T yp e R eso lu tion
DTE assigns types to  files hierarchically. A D TE policy contains a set of type assignment 
statements. Each statem ent is of the form
a ss ig n  -e  ty p e l p a th l
a ss ig n  -u  type2 path2
a ss ig n  - r  type3 path3 path4
and binds a typenam e to  one or more pathnam es. The option indicates the type of binding. 
If  it is “-e” , for “explicit” , then  the type is assigned only to the specified pathnam e itself. If 
“-u” , for “under” , then  the pathnam e is assumed to  be a  directory, and the type is assigned 
to  descendants of th is directory, b u t not the directory itself. The option “-r” , as shorthand 
for “-eu” , is also perm itted .
T IS’ im plem entation of D TE used the policy’s type assignment statem ents to  initialize 
the type assignments. However, a running system  did not consult the type assignment 
statem ents when assigning types to  newly created files or files which were moved. W hen a 
file was moved, it retained its original type, in effect creating a new type assignment rule. 
W hen a file was created, it was assigned a default type based upon the creating dom ain [3].
Our im plem entation of D TE works somewhat differently. We consider the above system 
to be too complex. In many cases there may be no way to predict the type assigned to 
a particular file. To discover the type, we m ust either know the entire history of file sys­
tem  activity, or query the D TE system. In our prototype D TE im plem entation, the type 
assignment rules were always followed. Therefore, the type assigned to  a file was always 
predictable, given only the pathnam e. This presented two im plem entation challenges. The
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first was a performance issue on a directory move. Since each descendant of the directory 
may be assigned a new type as a result of the directory move, the types cached for any 
descendants had to  be forgotten. For a large directory tree, th is could be tim e consum­
ing. However, since the values can simply be NULL’ed, and reloaded when needed, the 
performance im pact was seldom noticeable.
The second im plem entation challenge was the result of hard  links. As discussed in 
Section 2.5.1, Unix presents all files, devices, and directories as files. Files themselves are 
usually a set of d a ta  blocks, bu t always organized by a  descriptor called the inode. Inodes 
are simply referenced by a num ber unique on the file system. A filename, then, points to 
an inode number. Many filenames can point to  the  same inode number. Each filename is 
called a “link,” and a  file is not tru ly  deleted until the last rem aining filename referencing 
the inode is deleted.
W hen a D TE system  opens a file whose D TE type is not cached, it uses the provided 
pathnam e to  determ ine the D TE type. Clearly, since more th an  one name can refer to 
a file, the actual type assigned to  a  file depends on the name first used to  open the file. 
Subsequent open system  calls for the same inode will not recalculate the typenam e so long 
as the type inform ation rem ains cached, even though a  different process, under a different 
domain, may use a different pathnam e to  open the file. The solution which our prototype 
implem ented was to  use one file for each file system  to specify inode numbers pointed to 
by more th an  one name, along w ith the pathnam e which should be used to  determ ine the 
inode’s type. On an open call, if the inode being read was listed in this file, the pathnam e 
listed in the file was appended to the file system ’s m ountpoint, and this pathnam e was used 
to  determ ine the file’s type, ra ther th an  the pathnam e provided by the user.
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In the LSM D TE im plem entation, directory moves still incur the  overhead of uncaching 
the  type inform ation for all descendants. The file system  specific hard  link file, however, 
is no longer supported, as the  problem  w ith hard links is solved by support for extended 
attribu tes.
As of Linux kernel version 2.4, the run-tim e hierarchical assignment of types to  files 
m et w ith another challenge. A file system can now be m ounted more th an  once on the 
same system. Assume a  file system  containing a file nam ed f i l e l  is m ounted under bo th  
/m n t / f s l  and / s c r a t c h l .  D T E handles this in several ways. By default, D TE stores the 
first location under which a file system  is mounted. If the  file system is m ounted under a 
second location, D TE will continue to  use the first m ount location as the base of pathnam es 
under th a t file system, even if the first m ount instance is removed. Only when all m ounts 
of the file system are removed, will this information be released. Alternatively, the D TE 
policy may specify a pretend  m ount location for a device. W hen the file system stored on 
th is device is m ounted, D T E will always pretend it was m ounted under the pretend path , 
regardless of the actual m ount location. Finally, the D TE policy may forbid m ounting of 
a  device under any location other th an  one which is specified. This location is called the 
restrict location.
3.2 .3  E xten d ed  A ttr ib u tes
The LSM D TE im plem entation supports file-type bindings through extended attributes. 
Each file system w ith persistent inodes may contain a file at its root named d t e e a f . This 
file is initialized using D T Eedit, the policy creation tool presented in Section 6.1. It specifies 
the type for every inode num ber up to  the maximum allowed inode num ber on the file
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system. Since th is num ber is often very large, we conserve space by creating a table for 
each file system relating the type nam e to  an index, which can be as small as 1 byte 1. By 
reserving space for nonexistent inodes, we eliminate the need to  search for an inode entry 
in the file. R ather, we can calculate the  position of an entry in constant tim e as
p  = t + s x  i,
where t  is the offset of the beginning of the  inode table, s is the size of an index entry, either 
1 or 2 bytes, and i is the inode num ber. Furtherm ore, when a new file is created, there is 
no need to  shuffle existing entries to  keep the table sorted.
Since extended a ttribu tes establish a  correspondence between types and inode numbers, 
ra ther th an  between types and pathnam es, the hard link problem  is autom atically solved. 
Extended a ttribu tes are purely optional. If the file d te e a f  exists a t the file system  root, 
then  the extended a ttribu tes table is autom atically read and m aintained. If not, then  we 
rely on the trad itional hierarchical m ethod of type assignment.
W hile extended a ttribu tes are a useful enhancem ent to the D TE implem entation, we 
wish to  m aintain the strictly  pathnam e based type assignment. Therefore, when a new file 
is created on a file system supporting extended a ttribu tes, its type is determ ined in the 
same way as for a  file system which does not support extended attribu tes. The calculated 
type is then  stored in the d te e a f  file.
'T h is is dependent only upon whether there are fewer than 128 defined types.
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3 .2 .4  P o licy  U p d ates
A user friendly system  would allow unloading of the D TE module, rereading of the policy 
configuration file, or loading of policy updates. However, each of these options may be 
unsafe. If an attacker is able to  update  the security policy, the system  cannot be tru ly  
secure. There may be situations where updates are acceptable. For instance, if it can be 
proven th a t updates can only be loaded by someone sitting at console in a locked room 
under heavy guard, th is may be acceptable.
TIS studied the safety of updates to  a live D TE policy [23]. However, their work was 
aimed a t updates intended only to  extend  a  policy. U pdates which violated current secrecy 
or integrity properties were refused. This was useful in their situation, where a project team  
would provide a  policy update  which increased control over objects (and subjects) which 
they already controlled. For instance, they m ight increase control over their own CVS root.
The updates which most people would like to  apply would most likely violate existing 
security properties. For instance, while configuring a new login service, such as SRP [55], 
one might find one had forgotten to  provide w rite access to  the utmp file. A policy update  
to  grant th is access would most likely be refused by T IS ’ update system.
We believe refusing policy updates or removals is the responsible choice. For the case 
of testing a new service, as in the above example, or testing an entirely new policy, our 
D TE im plem entation provides a verbose mode which reports, bu t does not reject, access 
violations.
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3.2 .5  N etw ork ing
The TIS im plem entation of D TE assigned types to  network packets [2]. D TE systems 
explicitly sent the  type, as well as the dom ain of the originating process, along w ith network 
packets sent to  other D TE systems. Network d a ta  from non-DTE systems are assigned types 
based upon the address of the originating host.
This D TE im plem entation does not m ediate network access. On a secured network, 
between D TE systems whose policies are closely synchronized, the ability to  have the D TE 
subsystem  assign dom ain and type inform ation, and m ediate access accordingly, may be 
useful. In m ost cases, however, there are several reasons why this is not trustworthy. F irst, 
any discrepancy between the D TE policies on two machines can make it unsafe for one 
machine to  tru s t the D TE inform ation assigned to  network da ta  by the other machine. 
Second, provided the  network is not secure, an insidious machine could im personate a valid 
machine, in order to  either observe or corrupt sensitive data. Clearly additional security 
measures can be added in order to make the D TE inform ation on network packets. However, 
the resulting security does not justify  the additional complexity a t the operating system 
level.
D TE is b e tte r applied to  network security by using DTE to protect encryption and 
signature keys on the local system, and using these keys to  authenticate and encrypt network 
data.
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3.3 D ata Structures
Most d a ta  structures used by D TE are static, set up at the parsing of the configuration file. 
Two arrays are filled w ith null-delimited lists of names, one w ith names of types, and the 
other w ith pathnam es. All structures which reference types or pathnam es will point into 
these structures, reducing a  great num ber of string comparisons to  pointer comparisons.
The specification of each dom ain is represented in memory by a  dte_dom ain_t structure. 
Every process’ t a s k - s t r u c t  points to the dte_dom ain_t structure representing the dom ain 
under which it is running. The dte_dom ain_t s tructu re  contains lists representing all of 
the dom ain’s access to  types and domains. Access to  a type is represented by a s tructu re  
containing a bitm ask indicating the type of access, and a pointer into the list of typenam es. 
Storing dom ain access is more complicated. F irst we store the  list of entry types, th a t 
is, the names of types which may be executed to  enter this domain. Next we create a 
list of structures containing bo th  a pointer to  other domains, and an indication whether 
a u to  or exec access is allowed to the other domain. Third, we store a list of structures 
indicating which signals may be sent to  processes running under other domains. Finally, in 
order to  speed up the  search for m andatory dom ain transitions, which m ust be performed 
on every file execution, we store an altered version of the dom ain transition  list which 
we call the list of gateways. A gateway lists a dom ain name along with the name of one 
of its entry types. The list of gateways out of each domain contains an entry for each 
entry type to  every dom ain to  which the source dom ain has a u to  access. The gateways 
are stored on a hash list. In our prototype im plem entation, th is setup allowed m andatory 
dom ain transition  checks to be performed in constant tim e w ith respect to the policy size
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and structure. W hile the  struc tu re  has rem ained the same, the  switching from entry point 
to  entry type specifications will doubtless affect the running time. Since the prototype 
needed to  recalculate the  executable’s pathnam e, whereas the current version can pick the 
typenam e from the inode, running tim e should be reduced even further.
Every inode structu re  contains a pointer to the name of the type assigned to  the file. 
Consistent w ith the term inology presented in Section 3.2.2, the  pointer to the inode’s own 
type is called the e ty p e , while the pointer to  the default type for all i t ’s children is called 
the u type . As discussed in Section 3.2.2, the file’s type can be decided in two ways.
M AP N O DES INODES
•NULL -root_t
•NULL
-root_t
>NULL etcvar
-NULL
( adm )
, “—*-log_t-NULL
var
adm
# extract from the sample policy:
default_rt root_t
assign -e u  log_t /var/adm
Figure 3.1: Inodes and corresponding mapnodes.
If the file is being created, or if there is no extended a ttribu tes file, then  the policy’s 
type assignment rules are used to  assign a type to  the inode. Type assignment rules are 
stored in memory by a  tree of mapnodes. The m apnode tree structure mimics the file system 
tree. Figure 3.1 depicts a  set of m apnodes alongside the associated inodes. W hen reading a 
m apnode for the first tim e, type assignment proceeds as follows. F irst we initialize bo th  the
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e ty p e  and u ty p e  to  the parent inode’s u type . Next we search for a m apnode corresponding 
to  the current pathnam e. To find the m apnode corresponding to  / e t c ,  for instance, we look 
for a m apnode corresponding to  the parent inode, and, if th is exists, search i t ’s children 
for one nam ed e tc .  If no m apnode corresponds to  / e t c ,  we reta in  the initialized values 
for the u ty p e  and e ty p e . If  a  m apnode does exist, we link the  inode to the m apnode for 
future reference, and overwrite the  e ty p e  an d /o r u ty p e , provided the values stored in the 
m apnode are non-NULL. Since we m ust represent the file system  tree in m apnodes down to 
the deepest level specified in any type assignment rule, there will likely be m apnodes acting 
only as placeholders, not representing any type assignment rules themselves. In these cases, 
bo th  e ty p e  and u ty p e  would be NULL.
Alternatively, an inode’s D T E type can be read from an extended attributes file. The 
file pointer for this file is stored in the file system ’s sup erJb lo ck , along w ith the table re­
lating typenam es to  indices for th is file system. The file’s e ty p e  is read from the extended 
a ttribu tes  file. Unfortunately, we m ust compute and store the hierarchical type assignment 
inform ation, th a t is, the u ty p e  and m apnodes, for inodes even if we used extended a t­
tribu tes to  compute the e ty p e . This is because we may create a file, or m ount a file system, 
underneath  this inode. In  either case, we will need the inode’s m apnode and u ty p e  infor­
m ation. This completely negates the performance advantage which extended a ttribu tes are 
supposed to provide. However, extended a ttribu tes rem ain useful for their resistance to the 
hard  link, mounting, and namespace problems.
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3.4 Algorithms
Following are some of the algorithm s used by the current DTE im plem entation. The un­
derlying design decisions are described above. The LSM functions are grouped according 
to  the kernel functions to  which they relate.
All D TE functions begin w ith  a check for a variable called d t e _ i n i t i a l i z e d ,  which is 
set to true  only when the security fields for all DTE-controlled kernel objects have been 
initialized. This is necessary because LSM binds the D TE functions before it gives D TE a 
chance to  initialize the security fields on DTE-controlled kernel objects.
3.4.1 M ount
There are several m ount-related LSM hooks. The first is initially called to  ensure th a t the 
requested m ount action is in fact allowed. D TE forbids m ounting only if the policy file has 
specified a m ount restriction for the device being mounted, as discussed in Section 3.2.2. 
This condition is checked by the dte_check_sb function:
i n t  d te_ ch eck _ sb  ( s t r u c t  vfsm ount *mnt, s t r u c t  n am eid a ta  *nd)
{
s t r u c t  su p e r_ b lo c k  *sb = m nt->m nt_sb; 
s t r u c t  d te_ m n tr * r ;
i f  (d te  i s  i n i t i a l i z e d )  {
r  = g e t_ m o u n t_ re s tr ic t io n ( s b -> s _ d e v ) ; 
i f  ( r )  {
p a th  = pathnam e of m oun tpo in t; 
i f  ( r -> p a th  != p a th  && r  i s  a s t r i c t  mount) { 
r e t u r n  -EPERM;
>
i f  ( r -> p a th  == p a th  && r  i s  a  p r e te n d  mount) {
/ /  s e t  " r e a l"  p a re n t  p o in te r s ;  
sb _ se c -> m n t.p a re n t = m n tg e t(n d -> m n t); 
sb_sec-> m oun tpo in t = d g e t( n d - > d e n try ) ;
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}
}
}
r e t u r n  0;
>
The dte_check_sb function also m ust perform  a part of the hierarchical D TE informa­
tion setup. Most of this is performed later, since we need information gathered during the 
rem aining m ount operation to complete it. However, in the case where the m ounted device 
is associated w ith a  pretend m ount rule, b u t is being mounted in the specified pretend loca­
tion, waiting until after the m ount completes means th a t, when using the pretend location 
to specify the real parent vfsmount and m ountpoint, the new device is already m ounted 
on the pretend  location. In  this case, therefore, we m ust set up these pointers prior to  the 
m ount operation.
The post_addm ount LSM function is called after the m ounting of most file systems. The 
sole exception is the root file system, whose m ount is followed by post_m ountroo t. As these
two functions do much the same thing under D TE, we present only post_addm ount.
v o id  d te_post_addm ount ( s t r u c t  vfsm ount *mnt, s t r u c t  nam eid ata  *nd)
{
/*  s e t  up e x te r n a l  a t t r i b u t e s  f i l e  in fo  * / 
d te _ se tu p _ e a f ile (m n t-> m n t_ s b , m n t) ;
/*  s e t  up h i e r a r c h i c a l  in fo rm a tio n  * /  
h ie r a r c h ic a l_ s e tu p ( m n t ) ;
>
As discussed in Section 3.2.3, D TE handles file type resolution in two distinct ways. 
One is based upon the file system hierarchy. The other is based upon an external a ttribu tes 
file. Some initialization for each m ethod is required a t mount time. These are handled by 
the h ie r a r c h ic a l_ s e tu p  and d te_ se tu p _ eaf i l e  functions.
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v o id  d t e _ s e t u p _ e a f i l e ( s t r u c t  su p e r_ b lo c k  * sb , s t r u c t  vfsm ount *mnt)
{
s t r u c t  d te _ sb _ se c  *sb_sec  = s b - > s _ s e c u r i ty ;
i f  ( s b _ s e c - > in i t ia l iz e d )
r e t u r n ;  /*  T h is  d e v ic e  h a s  p r e v io u s ly  been  m ounted * /
fp  = open f i l e  " d te e a f"  on t h i s  f i l e  system ; 
sb _ se c -> n ty p e s  = re a d  number o f ty p e s  from  fp ;  
f o r  ( i= 0 ; i< s b _ s e c -> n ty p e s ; i++) {
sb _ se c -> ty p e _ c o n v [i]  = r e a d  n e x t ty p e  name from  fp ;  
s b _ s e c - > in i t i a l i z e d  = 1;
s b _ s e c -> o f f s e t  = lo c a t io n  o f s t a r t  o f typename l i s t  i n  fp ;
If the file has not been previously m ounted, d te_se tup_eaf i l e  checks for the existence 
of an extended a ttribu tes file. If th is exists, then  it builds an array binding integer indices 
to  typenam es, as specified by the file. I t  also records the offset of the s ta rt of the actual 
listing of extended attribu tes, b u t does not begin to  read in types for any inodes. Finding 
the type for a  particu lar inode num ber can now be done in constant tim e by adding the 
inode num ber, m ultiplied by the size of a type index in the extended a ttribu tes file, to  the 
offset.
The hierarchical setup function also retu rns early if the file system has previously been 
mounted.
v o id  h i e r a r c h i c a l _ s e t u p ( s t r u c t  vfsm ount *mnt)
s t r u c t  su p e r_ b lo c k  *sb = m nt->m nt_sb;
s t r u c t  d te _ sb _ se c  *sb_sec  = s b -> s _ s e c u r i ty ;
i f  ( s b - > in i t i a l i z e d )  
r e t u r n ;
This function m ust set up the pretend  m ount location. This is done by setting two
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pointers in the superblock’s security field. 2 This function m ust also insert the inode for the 
root of the m ounted file system into the m apnode tree (see Section 3.3). This is the  infor­
m ation which is will be used to  determ ine how the file system fits into the type assignment 
tree.
As m entioned above, if the device is m ounted on its pretend location, then  dte_check_sb 
will have set the pretend  m ount location on the  superblock before m ounting completes. In 
th is case, we need only insert the inode into the m apnode tree.
i f  (sb -> m n t_ p aren t h as  a lr e a d y  been  s e t  up) { 
c o p y _ d te _ d a ta (m n t-> ro o t_ in o d e ,
sb _ se c -> m o u n tp o in t-> in o d e ) ;
}
If no pretend  m ount location is specified for th is device, then  we set the pretend location 
to  the m ount point. If th is device is m ounted a  second tim e, then  h ie r a r c h ic a l_ s e tu p  will 
shortcut, and the  pretend  m ount location will continue to  point to  th is first m ount point.
i f  (no p r e te n d  mount r e s t r i c t i o n s  f o r  t h i s  d e v ic e )  { 
sb _ sec -> m n t_ p aren t = m n t-> m n t_ p aren t; 
sb_sec-> m oun tpo in t = m nt-> m nt_m ountpoin t; 
c o p y _ d te _ d a ta (m n t-> ro o t_ in o d e ,
sb _ sec -> m o u n tp o in t-> in o d e) ;
}
Finally, if the device is associated w ith a pretend  location, bu t is being m ounted else­
where, then  we set up the  pretend location here. The reason we cannot also handle th is case 
in dte_check_sb is th a t we m ust perform  a pa th  lookup to  obtain  the (d en try , vfsm ount) 
pair corresponding to  the  pathnam e. We cannot do th is in dte_check_sb because th a t
2T wo pointers axe needed because a pathnam e in the Linux kernel is uniquely identified by a 
(dentry,vfsm ount) pair. In fact we are only after one thing, the pathnam e, but no such thing exists in 
the kernel.
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is called holding a  lock which m ay not be held for the pa th  lookup function. The path  
lookup is not needed in d te_check_sb because we already have the m ount po in t’s (d en try , 
vfsm ount) pair.
e l s e  {
p a th _ lo o k u p (p re te n d  p a th  name, &nd2); 
sb _ sec -> m n t_ p aren t = nd2 .m nt; 
sb _ sec -> m oun tpo in t = n d 2 .d e n try ;  
c o p y _ d te _ d a ta (m n t-> ro o t_ in o d e ,
sb _ se c -> m o u n tp o in t-> in o d e ) ;
>
>
3.4 .2  F ile  T yp e R eso lu tio n
File type resolution is accomplished using the m apnodes, as described in Section 3.3. By 
properly setting m apnode inform ation on root inodes a t m ount tim e, we do not need to 
worry a t all about the issues of m ultiple m ounts or directory binding at inode lookup time. 
The following algorithm  is im plem ented as d te_ re a l_ p o s tlo o k u p , which is called by LSM 
after any inode is first read from disk, th a t is, the first tim e a file is read.
The hierarchical type assignment inform ation m ust be m aintained even if we use ex­
tended attribu tes, in case a  file system  not using extended a ttribu tes is m ounted at a lower 
level. Barring any contradictory type assignment rules, bo th  the e ty p e  and u ty p e  are 
inherited from the parent directory’s inode.
s t a t i c  i n l i n e  v o id  d te _ re a l_ p o s tlo o k u p  ( s t r u c t  inode * in o , 
s t r u c t  d e n try  *d, i n t  c r e a te )
{
s t r u c t  d te _ in o d e _ se c  *p, *c;
/*  a s s ig n  ty p e s  u s in g  th e  h i e r a r c h i c a l  scheme * / 
c = in o d e - > s e c u r i ty ; 
p = in o d e - > p a re n t- > s e c u r i ty ;
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c-> u ty p e  = c -> e ty p e  = p -> u ty p e ; 
c - > i n i t i a l i z e d  = 1;
c->map = m apnode_getkid(p->m ap, d->nam e); 
i f  (c->map != NULL) {
c->map = m apnode_getkid(p->m ap, d ->nam e); 
c -> e ty p e  = c-> m ap-> etype; 
c -> u ty p e  = c-> m ap-> utype;
>
The function returns if the device does not have an external a ttribu tes  file. It also returns 
if the inode is of a newly created file. This is because DTE uses type assignment rules to 
determ ine the type of files which are created on a file system using an  external a ttribu tes 
file. This contrasts to  SELinux’ T E  and T IS ’ DTE, which use the creating process’ dom ain 
and the type of the parent directory to assign a type.
If the file is not new, and the  file system  uses external a ttribu tes, then  the file’s types 
are taken from the external a ttribu tes file:
i f  ( c r e a te  I I
t h i s  d e v ic e  h a s  no e x te r n a l  a t t r i b u t e s  f i l e )  { 
r e t u r n ;
}
buf = re a d  ty p e  index  from  ea  f i l e  a t  o f fs e t+ in o d e  #; 
c -> u ty p e  = c -> e ty p e  = c o n v e rt bu f to  ty p e  name;
}
We now show informally how this algorithm , combined with the above m ount algorithms, 
correctly handles m ultiple m ounts and directory binding.
To show th a t we correctly handle m ultiple mounts, we will access a file d i r l / d i r 2 / f  i l e ,  
which is located on a file system  m ounted at least twice. If the file system  stores typenam es 
as external a ttribu tes, then, as there is no ambiguity in inode num bers, the same type will 
be returned  for d i r l / d i r 2 / f i l e  regardless of file system m ount activity. We therefore
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assume there is no external a ttribu tes  file. The d te_ re a l_ p o s tlo o k u p  function bases the 
types of files (and directories) based upon the  m apnode tree inform ation stored at the parent 
directory, using the following excerpted pseudo code:
c->map = m apnode_getkid(p->m ap, d->nam e);
i f  (c->map != NULL) {
c->map = m apnode_getkid(p->m ap, d->nam e); 
c -> e ty p e  = c-> m ap-> etype; 
c -> u ty p e  = c -> m ap-> utype;
}
Therefore the types returned  for d i r l / d i r 2  and d i r l / d i r 2 / f  i l e  depend purely on the 
correct insertion of d i r l  into the m apnode tree. This is done a t m ount time.
The dte_post_addm ount function calls h ie r a rc h ic a l_ s e tu p , which first performs the 
following check:
i f  ( s b - > in i t i a l i z e d )  
r e t u r n ;
In other words, if the superblock is already initialized, which means th a t th is device has 
been previously m ounted, then  we do not continue. Therefore, the first pa th  under which 
the device was m ounted will continue to  be th a t used for file type resolution, as it should 
be. The simple case of m ultiple m ounts is therefore (trivially) correctly handled.
Later, h ie r a r c h ic a l_ s e tu p  contains the following code:
i f  (no p re te n d  mount r e s t r i c t i o n s  f o r  t h i s  d e v ic e )  {
c lo n e  s e c u r i ty  f i e l d  on m n t’ s ro o t  inode  from  
th e  m oun tpo in t d e n try -> d _ in o d e .
} e l s e  {
p a th _ lo o k u p (p re te n d  p a th  name, &nd2);
c lo n e  s e c u r i ty  f i e l d  on m n t’ s ro o t  inode from  
n d 2 . d e n try -> d _ in o d e ;
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Cloning an  inode’s security field also copies its pointer into the m ap node tree. If the 
D TE policy configuration file specifies a pretend  m ount location for th is device, the m apnode 
for th a t location is used for the root inode of the newly m ounted file system. Otherwise, 
the  m apnode for the specified m ountpoint is used.
Finally, looking again a t the d te_ re a l_ p o s tlo o k u p  function, when d i r l  is looked up, 
we will look a t the parent inode’s m apnode for a child m apnode by d i r l ’s name. If this 
does not exist, we copy the parent inode’s u ty p e  to  d i r l ’s e ty p e  and u ty p e . Since the 
parent inode is the inode for the file system ’s root dentry, and since we have shown th a t 
this inode’s security field is correctly assigned a t m ount time, m ultiple m ounts are correctly 
handled by the  file type assignment algorithm .
Directory binding is a rem ount of a  specific directory w ithin an already m ounted file 
system, on top of a  new m ountpoint. The very act of reading the directory as p a rt of binding 
it, ensures th a t the security field for the  inode for this directory is already initialized. This 
is not a p a rt of the D TE code, bu t occurs w ithin the doJoopback function at the line
err  = path_lookup(old_nam e, L00KUP_F0LL0W, & old_nd);
It will therefore have been correctly set before it was ever bound. We refrain from explicitly 
constructing the obvious inductive proof.
3.4 .3  Inode P erm ission
Since type names are set a t the tim e when inodes are first read from disk, the D TE inode 
perm ission function is quite simple. It consists only of a few safety checks, followed by 
a  check through the current dom ain’s list of type accesses for the requested access to  the 
inode’s type. Checks for file execute perm ission are delayed until after a  dom ain transition.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
CH APTER 3. D TE 57
s t a t i c  in l in e  in t  d te_ re a l_ in o d e _ p e rm iss io n (str u c t inode * inode, in t  mask) 
{
s tr u c t  d te _ ta  * ta ; /*  a d te  type a c c ess  s tr u c tu r e  p tr  * /
t a  = search  fo r  type a c c ess  from current domain to  in o d e -> e ty p e ;
i f  ( ! t a )
r e tu r n ;
i f  (S_ISDIR (inode->i_m ode)) {
i f  ( (mask&MAY_EXEC) kk  ! (d te _ d e sc e n d _ a c c e ss (ta -> a c c e ss )))  
DENY_ACCESS("d ir  x");  
i f  ( (mask&MAY_WRITE) kk  ! (d te _ c r e a te _ a c c e s s (ta -> a c c e s s )) )  
DENY,ACCESS("dir w"); 
i f  ( (mask&MAY_READ) kk  ! (d te _ r e a d d ir _ a c c e ss (ta -> a c c e ss ) ))  
DENY,ACCESS("d ir  r " ) ;
}  e l s e  {
i f  ( (mask&MAY_WRITE) kk  ! (d te _ fw _ a c c e ss (ta -> a c c e ss )))  
DENY_ACCESS( " f i l e  w"); 
i f  ( (mask&MAY_READ) kk ! (d te _ fr _ a c c e s s ( ta -> a c c e s s ) ) )  
DENY_ACCESS("file r" );
}
retu rn  0;
>
3.4 .4  E xecve
Section 2.5.6 details the two types of dom ain transitions allowed under DTE. These are 
called au to  and exec transitions. A process m ust request an exec transition. This is done 
using a new system  call:
s t a t i c  lo n g  d te_ d o _ e x e c (v o id  * d a ta )
The pointer sent to  this function m ust reference the following struct:
s t r u c t  d te _ e x e c _ s tru c t{  
c h a r  *fnam; 
c h a r  **argv ; 
c h a r  **envp; 
c h a r  *domain;
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The system  call begins by reading this struc tu re  from user space. It searches the  D TE
exec rules for one perm itting  the current dom ain to  transition  to  data->dom ain. 
t s  = c u r r e n t - > s e c u r i t y ;
i f  ( !d te_ m ay _ ex ec_ to (ts -> d te_ d o m ain , d e s t ) )  {
lo g C 'd te :  domain 7.s may n o t exec to  domain 7 ,s .\n " , 
ts-> d te_dom ain -> nam e, d e s t-> n am e );
e r r  = -EACCES; 
g o to  o u t_ p u tf ;
We next back up the current domain, set the new domain, and begin execution of the 
requested file using the  standard  execve system  call. We m ust tem porarily store the old 
dom ain for three reasons. F irst, since the executable file da ta -> fnam m ay  not yet have been 
loaded from disk, we wait until we are certain the  file’s type has been calculated in order 
to  determine w hether th is file is an entry point to  the  destination domain. If  it is not, then  
the process m ust be retu rned  to  its original domain. Similarly, if execution fails early on, 
we m ust also reset the  domain. An example of such a  failure would be the file da ta -> fnam  
not existing on the file system. Third, since an auto  transition  overrides an exec transition, 
we will need the old dom ain in order to  ensure th a t no auto transition  existed for the old 
dom ain and the new executable file.
Finally, if the execve system  call fails, we reset the  original domain.
t s -> d te _ b a c k  = ts-> d te _ d o m ain ;
ts -> d te _ d o m ain  = d e s t ;
e r r  = e x e c v e (e s .fn a m , e s .a r g v ,  e s .e n v p ) ;
i f  ( ts -> d te _ b a c k )  {
ts -> d te _ d o m ain  = ts -> d te _ b a c k ; 
ts -> d te _ b a c k  = NULL;
}
The execve system  call calls the function prepare_binprm , which calls the LSM function 
b p rm _ se t_ se c u rity  in order to  set security m odule information. In  D TE, this function
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handles b o th  auto dom ain transitions, and the final entry point check for exec transitions. 
It begins by checking for an au to  transition, using the  d te_ au to _ sw itch  function. If such 
a  transition  is required, it takes place, potentially overriding a requested exec transition. 
Otherwise, if an exec transition  has been requested, we ensure th a t the file being executed 
is an entry point to  the new domain.
i f  ( !d te _ a u to _ sw itc h (s -> e ty p e ))  {
/*  Log th e  m andatory  domain sw itc h  * /
> e l s e  i f  (ts-> d te_b ack  &&
!dte_dom ain_has_ep(ts->dte_dom ain, s -> e ty p e ))  {
/*  t h is  domain t r a n s i t io n  i s  not a llow ed  * /
lo g C 'd te : type */,s i s  not ep to  domain 7 ,s .\n " ,
s -> e ty p e , ts-> d te_ d o m ain -> n am e); 
ts -> d te _ d o m ain  = ts -> d te _ b a c k ; 
ts -> d te_ b a .ck  = NULL; 
r e t u r n  -EACCES;
>
Next execution is a ttem pted . If it fails, the process’ original dom ain is reset. Otherwise, 
the process begins execution of the new file under its new domain.
r e t  = d te_ch eck _x(ts-> d te_d om ain , s -> e ty p e ) ; 
i f  ( r e t )  {
/*  n o t a llo w ed  * /
logC 'd te : domain 7,s may not execu te  type °/,s.\n", 
ts->dte_dom ain->nam e, s -> e ty p e ) ; 
i f  (ts-> d te_b ack ) {
ts -> d te _ d o m ain  = ts -> d te _ b a c k ; 
ts -> d te _ b a c k  = NULL;
}
retu rn  r e t ;
>
ts -> d te _ b a c k  = NULL; 
r e t u r n  0;
}
Section 3.3 explains th a t a list of gateways is created for each domain. The function 
dte_auto_sw itch, called from the D TE version of bprm.set .s e c u r ity , searches the list
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of the source dom ain’s entry  types for the type assigned to the  file being executed. If it
is found, then  d te_ au to _ sw itch  returns 0, indicating th a t an au to  dom ain transition  is
required. Otherwise, it returns 1. Since the check for an auto transition  is reduced to one
hash calculation, performance im pact is minimized despite d te_ au to _ sw itch  being called
for every file execution.
s t a t i c  i n t  d te _ a u to _ s w itc h (c h a r  * ty p e)
{
t s  = c u r r e n t - > s e c u r i t y ; 
c u rd  = ts-> d te _ d o m ain  
i f  ( ts -> d te _ b a c k )  {
/*  in  a  d te _ e x e c , we want to  u se  th e  o r ig i n a l  domain * /  
cu rd  = ts -> d te _ b a c k ;
>
i f  (cu rd  h as  no gatew ays) 
r e t u r n  1;
gw = e n tr y  in  gatew ay h ash  t a b l e  f o r  ty p e ;  
i f  (gw) {
i f  ( ts -> d te _ b a c k )  {
lo g  o v e rr id d e n  exec t r a n s i t i o n ;  
ts -> d te _ d o m ain  = gw->domain;
} e l s e  {
ts -> d te _ b a c k  = ts-> d te _ d o m ain ; 
ts -> d te _ d o m ain  = gw->domain;
}
r e t u r n  0;
>
r e tu r n  1;
3.4.5 D T E  M odule In it
The switch to  LSM involved allowing D TE to be installed as a m odule after system boot had 
completed. Im portan t kernel structures have already been created, w ithout D TE security 
inform ation attached, and im portan t inform ation has already been lost. For instance, while 
we have access to  the  process tree, processes may have already reparented themselves. More
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
CH APTER 3. D TE  61
im portantly, for processes which have performed sequences of execve, only the filename of
the  latest execve invocation is available. This means th a t we cannot know how to assign
dom ains to  processes correctly. To cope w ith this situation as best we can, we use the
following algorithm:
in t  setup_dte_m odule(void)
{
/*  read d te  c o n fig  f i l e  . . .  * /
/*  a ss ig n  a s p e c if ie d  d e fa u lt  domain to  a l l  p r o c e sse s :  * /  
lo c k _ k e r n e l( ) ; 
fo r_ ea ch _ ta sk (ta sk p ) {
ta sk p -> se c u r ity  = k m a llo c (s iz e o f (s tr u c t  d te _ ta s k _ s e c ) , 
GFP.KERNEL);
ta sk _ sec  = ( s t r u c t  d te_ ta sk _ sec  * ) ta s k p -> s e c u r ity ; 
task_sec->dte_dom ain  = default_dom ain; 
task _sec-> d te_b ack  = NULL;
}
/*  Set up th e  ro o t o f th e  f i l e  s y s te m .. .  * /
/ *  And walk th e  e n t ir e  f i l e  system  tr e e  loaded so f a r ,  a ss ig n in g  
DTE ty p es: * /
d te_w a lk _d cach e_ tree_ fu ll(roo t_m n t, r o o t_ sb -> s_ r o o t) ;
3.5 Configuration File
W hen a D TE system boots, it reads a policy from the configuration file, which is located 
a t / . d t e / d t e . c o n f .  This file is s tructu red  as follows. It begins w ith a  declaration of the 
types and domains used in this policy. Next it defines the default dom ain, which is assigned 
to  the first process. It also defines the e ty p e  and u ty p e  for the root of the file system. This 
is followed by dom ain specifications and type assignment rules.
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< dte_con fig>  ::=
typ es <type_name> { <type_name> } 
domains <domain_name> { <domain_name> }  
d e fa u lt_ d  <domain_name> 
d e fa u lt_ e t  <type_name> 
d e fa u lt_ u t <type_name>
<domain_spec>
{ <domain_spec> >
<type_assignm ent>
{ <type_assignm ent> }
Each dom ain specification lists, in order, the  entry types, the dom ain’s access to  types, 
its perm itted  and required transitions to  o ther domains, and the signals which it may send 
to  other domains. Each dom ain access may be auto or exec. Type access may be any 
com bination of “r ” for file read, “w” for file write, “x” for file execute, “1” for directory read 
(lookup), “c” for directory write (create), “d” for directory descend, or “a” for file append. 
Enforcement of file append is, however, not yet implemented. The signal in a  signal access 
rule may be a  comm a-delim ited list of signal num bers, or “0” for “any signal.”
The list of type assignments follows. A type assignment statem ent may associate several
paths w ith one type. Each statem ent binds the  pathnam es as “-e” for explicit, “-u” for
under, or “-eu” or “-r” for both. Their meanings are discussed in Section 3.2.2.
<domain_spec> ::=  spec_domain <domain_name>
(<number> -[ <entry_type> } )
(<number> { < type_access>  })
(<number> { <domain_access> } )
(<number> {  < sig n a l_ a ccess>  >)
<type _a s s ignment> ::=  a s s ig n  <assign_op tion>  <type_name> <path_name>
{ <path_name> }
Each of the above statem ents m ust adhere to  a very specific syntax. Their specifications 
follow.
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< a ss ig n _ o p tio n >  : :=  " - e " |" - u " |" - r " I " - e u "
< en try _ ty p e>  : 
<ty p e _ a c e e s s > 
<dom ain_access> 
< s ig n a l_ a c c e ss>  
< s ig n a l_ a c c e ss>  
<name>
<type_name> 
<domain_name> 
<path_char>  
<path_elem ent>  
<path_name> 
<number>
< type_acc_ token>  
<ty p e _a c c _ p ie c e > 
<dom ain_acc_token>
<type_name>
= <type_acc_token> <type_name>
= <domain_acc_token> <domain_name>
= <number> "0"
= <number> <domain_name>
= < le t te r >  {  < le t te r >  I < d ig it>  }
= <name>
= <name>
= < le t te r >  I < d ig it>
= <path_char> {  <path_char> }
= "/" <path_elem ent> { <path_name> }
= < d ig it>  ■[ < d ig it>  >
;= <type_acc_piece>  {  <type_acc_piece>  > 
:= »r » | »w» | » xm| « i n | n C"|»d"|"a"
::= "auto" I "exec"
A few notes follow which are not expressed in the BNF specification. F irst, to  continue 
any statem ent onto the following line, the line m ust be ended w ith a \ .  Second, in dom ain 
specifications, the num bers preceding each of the  type, dom ain and signal accesses m ust be 
the exact num ber of access specifications following.
3.6 DTE A PI
DTE multiplexes the LSM s e c u r i ty  system  call to  provide three ways of interacting with 
the DTE subsystem. Since these three are provided through one system call, they are 
not themselves true  system  calls. However, as they allow user-space programs to  interact 
w ith the kernel through a kernel trap , and since they m ost closely resemble system calls in 
purpose and function, we will nevertheless refer to  them  as syscalls.
The three D TE syscalls are called g e t_ ty p e , get_dom ain, and dte_exec. They are 
invoked by calling the s e c u r i ty  system call and sending the integer code 10 as the first
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
CHAPTER 3. D TE  64
argum ent, in order to  specify th a t these are directed toward the D TE subsystem; an integer 
between one and three as the second argum ent to  identify the specify D TE syscall; and a 
pointer to a  structu re  as the  th ird  argum ent. The structu re  in the  th ird  argum ent contains 
the actual argum ents being used by the D TE syscall.
The code snippets below explain the usage of these syscalls.
• get-typ e
This call is used to  learn the type assigned to  a file. I t  receives a string containing 
the pathnam e to  be queried, as well as a  buffer and an integer specifying the buffer 
size. The type nam e is stored in the buffer.
s tr u c t  d te _ g t_ s tr u c t  { 
char *fnam; 
char * b u f; 
in t  b u flen ;
>;
in t  s e c u r i t y ( in t  id=10, in t  c a l l = l ,  s tr u c t  d te _ g t_ s tr u c t  *gt) ;
• get-domain
This call is used to  learn the dom ain under which a process is running. It receives 
an unsigned integer representing the process id, as well as a buffer and an integer 
specifying the  buffer size. The dom ain name is stored in the buffer.
s tr u c t  d te_ g d _ stru ct { 
unsigned  in t  p id ;  
char *b u f; 
in t  b u flen ;
>;
in t  s e c u r i t y ( in t  id=10, in t  c a ll= 2 , s tr u c t  d te_gd _stru ct *gd) ;
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• d te_exec
This call requests a  voluntary transition  to  a new dom ain while beginning execution of 
a n e w  f i le .  It is sent the  pathnam e to be executed, the dom ain to  which to  transition, 
as well as the lists of argum ents and environm ent variables. If  execution of fnam 
triggers a m andatory  dom ain transition, then execution proceeds under the required 
domain, and the  requested dom ain transition  does not occur.
s t r u c t  d te _ e x e c _ s tru c t{  
c h a r  *fnam; 
c h a r  **argv ; 
c h a r  **envp; 
c h a r  *dom ain;
>;
i n t  s e c u r i t y ( i n t  id= 10 , i n t  c a l l= 3 , s t r u c t  d te _ e x e c _ s tru c t  *de) ;
3.7 Effectiveness
To show the effectiveness of our D TE im plem entation, we picked a high-profile vulnera­
bility, namely the buffer overflow in wu-ftpd[49\, and showed how our im plem entation of 
D TE can prevent an attacker from obtaining a root shell. O ur goal was to  show th a t we 
could protect the system  from the wu-ftpd vulnerability (the posted exploits as well as fu­
ture or hand-crafted ones) w ithout modifying the binary. In order for ftp to  retain  its full 
functionality, it would need to  be m ade DTE-aware so th a t it could, like login, allow ftp 
to  transition  into the dom ain associated w ith a user being authenticated. We did not do 
this, b u t set protections such th a t users can retrieve files from, if not deposit files onto, the 
server. Anonymous ftp  was fully functional.
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The policy shown in Figure 3.2 prevents dom ain f tp d A  from executing any system  bi­
naries other than  / u s r / s b i n / i n . f t p d  and binaries located under " f t p / b i n /  (lines 19-21). 
These files are defined to be of the  type f tp d _ x t (lines 29 and 30), which the dom ain ftpdA. 
may execute bu t not write (line 20). Only ftp d A  may execute th is type (lines 9-21), and 
root-d autom atically switches to  ftp d A  on execution of / u s r / s b i n / i n . f t p d  (line 12), since 
th a t is an entry point to  ftp d A  (line 19). The exploits to be found on the internet to 
take advantage of this vulnerability will therefore fail, as they expect to  be allowed to run  
/b in / s h .  Nor can a script be w ritten  to  upload and run  a  T rojan horse, since the only 
types which ftp d A  is allowed to  w rite may not be executed by anyone.
The script which we tested was w uftpd2600, which can be found at the Security Focus 
website [20]. It connected to  our test machine, and exploited the buffer overflow. However, 
the  DTE-enabled kernel refused to  allow the f tp d A  dom ain to execute / b in / s h .  The script 
therefore hung, and the system  was not compromised. The error messages in Figure 3.3 
were sent to  syslog. In  contrast, the plain 2 .3 .2 8  kernel happily provided a root shell.
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01 # ftpd protection policy
02 types root_t login_t user_t spool_t binary_t lib_t passwd_t shadow_t dev_t \
03 config_t ftpd_t ftpd_xt w_t
04 domains root_d login_d user_d ftpd_d
05 default_d root_d
06 default_et root_t
07 default_ut root_t
08 default_rt root_t
09 spec_domain root_d (/bin/bash /sbin/init /bin/su) (rwxcd->root_t \
10 rwxcd->spool_t rwcdx->user_t rwdc->ftpd_t rxd->lib_t rxd->binary_t \
11 rwxcd->passwd_t rxwcd->shadow_t rwxcd->dev_t rwxcd->config_t \
12 rwxcd->w_t) (auto->login_d auto->ftpd_d) (0->0)
13 spec_domain login_d (/bin/login /bin/login.dte) (rxd->root_t rwxcd->spool_t \
14 rxd->lib_t rxd->binary_t rwxcd->passwd_t rxwcd->shadow_t rwxcd->dev_t \
15 rxwd->config_t rwxcd->w_t) (exec->root_d exec->user_d) (14->0 17->0)
16 spec_domain user_d (/bin/bash /bin/tcsh) (rwxcd->user_t rxwcd->shadow_t \
17 rwxcd->spool_t rxd->lib_t rxd->binary_t rwxcd->passwd_t rwxd->root_t \
18 rwxcd->dev_t rxd->config_t rwxcd->w_t) (exec->root_d) (14->0 17->0)
19 spec_domain ftpd_d (/usr/sbin/in.ftpd) (rwcd->ftpd_t rd->user_t rd->root_t \
20 rxd->lib_t r->passwd_t r->shadow_t rwcd->dev_t rdx->ftpd_xt \
21 rd->config_t rwcd->w_t d->spool_t) () (14->root_d 17->root_d)
22 assign -u /home user_t
23 assign -u /tmp spool_t
24 assign -u /var spool_t
25 assign -u /dev dev_t
26 assign -u /scratch user_t
27 assign -r /usr/src/linux user_t
28 assign -u /usr/sbin binary_t
29 assign -e /usr/sbin/in.ftpd ftpd_xt
30 assign -r /home/ftp/bin ftpd_xt
31 assign -e /var/run/ftp.pids-all ftpd_t
32 assign -r /home/ftp ftpd_t
33 assign -e /var/log/xferlog ftpd_t
34 assign -r /lib lib_t
35 assign -e /etc/passwd passwd_t
36 assign -e /etc/shadow shadow_t
37 assign -e /var/log/wtmp w_t
38 assign -e /var/run/utmp w_t
39 assign -u /etc config_t
Figure 3.2: A DTE policy to protect from wu-ftpd, with line numbers added.
Aug 4 13:12:03 wicked kernel: do_exec: d_t_check_x returned l(exec denied). 
Aug 4 13:12:03 wicked kernel: do_exec: domain ftpd_d type root_t.
Figure 3.3: Error messages resulting from attempted wu-ftpd exploit.
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Performance
We began the  performance analysis of LSM and D TE by using the LMBench [36] benchm ark 
suite. Some of the LMBench benchm ark a ttem pts to  measure hardware performance, and 
therefore was not relevant. We present and discuss the relevant LMBench results in Sec­
tion 4.1. For those areas which the benchm ark showed were significantly affected by DTE, 
we analyze the  cause of the performance im pact in more detail in Section 4.2 by directly 
tim ing the  kernel operations involved. T h a t section also investigates some performance hits 
which we expect, bu t which LMBench does not measure. Finally, in Section 4.3 we perform 
a  m acro-benchm ark to  analyze the overhead perceived by users of the system.
All benchm arks were performed on a 400 MHz Pentium  II class system  w ith a 2.51 
nanosecond clock and 128M ram. LMBench calculated the actual clock speed as 398MHz 
(1/2.51). Therefore, for all tests which m easured clock cycles, we report results in microsec­
onds calculated by dividing by 398. Background processes were kept to a minimum  by not 
starting  services such as X windows, lpd  and cron.
68
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4.1 LM Bench Results
The LMBench suite was executed ten  tim es on each of an unaltered 2.5.6 kernel, an LSM- 
enabled 2.5.6 kernel w ith no modules loaded, an  LSM kernel using only the capabilities 
m odule, an LSM kernel w ith the D TE m odule loaded, and an LSM kernel w ith the capa­
bilities m odule stacked on top of the D TE module. The means and standard  deviations 
are presented in A ppendix B. In our discussion, we will m ainly compare the stock 2.5.6 
kernel, the LSM kernel w ith the capabilities m odule loaded, and the LSM kernel w ith the 
DTE m odule loaded. The capabilities m odule rarely m ade a significant im pact on the  re­
sults. However, we use it ra ther th an  LSM w ith no modules, because the stock kernel uses 
capabilities. W hereas capabilities significantly enhance the security of the stock kernel, the 
D TE kernel can be made secure w ithout the aid of the capabilities module. We therefore 
consider the  m ost appropriate comparisons to  be of the stock kernel, the LSM kernel us­
ing the capabilities module, and the LSM kernel using only the D TE module. Section 4.1.1 
presents file system  and v irtual memory performance. Section 4.1.2 presents process-related 
performance. Since the context switch and memory latency results are strictly  hardw are 
m easurements, we do not discuss them  here.
4.1.1 F ile  S ystem  and V M  Perform ance
4.1.1.1 Mmap
Counter-intuitively, m m ap latency improved in LSM, and improved even more for the D TE 
module. The difference am ounted to  less th an  0.5%. Nevertheless, mmap is an im portant 
m ethod of file access, and the lack of performance im pact due to  either LSM or D TE is a
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pleasing, if expected, result.
70
4.1.1.2 File Creation
File creation involves the following LSM hooks from inode_ops: c r e a te  ( ) ,  p o s t_ c re a te  ( ) , 
and a call to p e rm is s io n O  for each parent directory contained w ithin the pathnam e. In 
DTE, the c r e a t e () call is empty, while the p o s t_ c r e a te ( )  call performs the same tasks 
which would be needed if the file were read from disk for the first time. This includes 
determ ining the appropriate  D TE types and, if necessary, hooking into the m apnode tree. 
If  extended a ttribu tes are in use, then p o s t_ c re a te  () m ust also write the newly determ ined 
type for this inode into the  extended a ttribu tes file.
The LSM code introduced a  2-3 microsecond overhead for creation of any size file. The 
DTE code introduced an  additional six to  eight microseconds.
4.1.1.3 File Deletion
File deletion involves the  following LSM hooks: inode_ops—^ p e rm iss io n !)  for EXEC per­
mission a t the parent inode, followed by inode_ops—M m linkO . The u n l in k () function is 
em pty for DTE. Any ex tra  cost incurred by D TE over LSM is, therefore, the same as if we 
were simply accessing the file. Figure 4.1 shows the relevant measurem ents for the file dele­
tion benchmarks. The first column shows the size of files being deleted, the second column 
shows the deletions per second, and the th ird  column shows the tim e (in microseconds) to 
delete a  file. Note th a t the  similar times for lk  and 4k file deletions are accounted for by 
the file system ’s 4k blocksize. The D TE overhead appears to be about 2.9 microseconds 
above the LSM time.
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At this point a note about precision is in order. W hile the 95% confidence interval
for 10 runs of our LMBench file deletion results was 0.15 microsecond, a subsequent trial,
on the same hardw are bu t a  rebuilt system, returned  num bers which differed by as much
as 4 microseconds from the  first run, bu t again exhibited a  95% confidence interval of
0.15 microsecond. This suggests the possibility th a t the overhead depends greatly upon
particular conditions in the  file system ’s free inode and free block bitm aps.
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4 .1 .2  P ro cess-R ela ted  Perform ance
4.1.2.1 Null Call
A system  call allows user code to  interact w ith the operating system. To obtain  a mea­
surem ent of the tim e to  perform  a  null system call, th a t is, the tim e required for only the
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Figure 4.1: LMBench results for file deletion
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operating system  overhead involved in performing a system call, LMBench uses a  call to 
sy s_ g e tp p id . This is a  short system  call, into which LSM fortunately inserts no hooks. 
Therefore it rem ains a  good null system  call test for us. It is m entioned here only be­
cause of the  unexpected result of the LSM kernel outperform ing the  plain kernel, w ith all 
com binations of inserted modules. This would appear to  be an artifact of the ex tra  LSM 
inform ation in memory, purely by accident, resulting in be tte r d istribu tion  of d a ta  in cache.
4.1.2.2 Stat() and O pen()/C lose()
For our purposes, these benchm arks are closely related. This is because bo th  open() and 
s t a t O  call open_nam ei(), which calls p e rm is s io n ()  and postJL ookupO  for each pa th  
element leading up to  the filename. Provided the file’s dentry inform ation is cached, as it 
is when the same file is repeatedly opened and closed, no other LSM hooks are called.
The D TE overhead is significant, adding 33% to the stock kernel’s tim e for s t a t O  
and 29% for o p e n ( ) / c lo s e ( ) ,  as opposed to  the 4% increase for s t a t O  and 2% increase 
for o p e n ( ) / c lo s e () imposed by the capabilities module. The D TE p e rm iss io n O  and 
post_ lookup  functions are quite short, and do not seem to account for this overhead. We 
therefore analyze th is further in section 4.2.1.
4.1.2.3 Signals
T he tim e to  install a signal handler was not affected by either LSM or DTE. However, 
the tim e to send a signal, as expected, was affected. The capabilities module introduced
0.1 microsecond overhead over the stock kernel, and the DTE m odule added an additional 
microsecond. This represents the  cost of a single LSM function call, which involves two
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pointer dereferences, the saving of the  re tu rn  value, and the following test of the re tu rn  
value. The hook being called, for bo th  the dum m y and capabilities module, does only a
r e t u r n  0;
The benchm ark sends a signal only to  itself. Since DTE shortcuts for any signal sent 
to  a process w ithin the same dom ain, th is is not a good test of the D TE signal code. 
Therefore, m icro-benchmarks to  further investigate D TE signal performance are developed 
in Section 4.2.3.
4.1.2.4 Fork
The tim e to  fork a  new process did not differ significantly between kernels. Indeed, forking 
and exiting a  process introduce only three LSM hooks, each of which consists of simply
r e t u r n  0;
for the dum my and capability modules. In  D TE, the overhead is constant, always consisting 
of one memory allocation, two conditionals, and four simple assignment statem ents.
4.1.2.5 Fork and Exec
The addition of an e x e c ()  call introduces a much larger am ount of work for the DTE 
module. The kernel m ust now check the D TE policy for m andatory dom ain transitions, 
which will depend upon the current dom ain and the type of the file being executed. The 
D TE m odule did not perform  significantly worse th an  the DTE-free LSM kernel. This 
result confirms the validity of using a hash table of gateways (see Section 3.3) to  speed up 
the search for required autom atic dom ain transitions. Under the D TE policy used during
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these tests, the  user_d domain, under which the  benchmarks were run, had auto transition  
rights to  4 domains, through 4 gateways. However, a poor hash table im plem entation could 
cause the  cost of checking for dom ain transitions to  increase as a function of the num ber of 
gateways. Therefore, Section 4.2.2 will analyze th is cost in more detail.
4.2 Micro Benchmarks
LMBench is designed as a general benchm ark to  test OS and hardw are performance. We 
now present more detailed tests of some parts  of the D TE code. We chose to  profile any 
code involved in suspicious or disappointing results from LMBench, as well as any code 
which we felt was not adequately profiled by LMBench.
4.2 .1  P erm ission ()
As m entioned in the LMBench results, the d te_ in o d e_ p erm iss io n () function appears to  
take an inordinate am ount of time. This function only calculates the hash value of a  type 
name, steps through the list of hash collisions to  find the requested type name, and performs 
a  few comparisons to  determ ine w hether to  grant access. An obvious potential bottleneck 
is therefore the hash function, which we investigate first.
The hash function we use is th a t used by the Linux directory cache, or dcache. The 
dcache takes pathnam es, descends the directory tree, and returns a file’s inode number. 
Its  hash table has therefore been thoroughly examined [32] and optimized. However, in 
order to  minimize memory usage while accom m odating for the fact th a t the num ber of 
hash entries will vary, we simply used a  hash table of the exact size needed to  store the 
num ber of entries. To m easure the im pact of this memory optim ization on performance, we
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calculated the m axim um  depth  of any dom ain to  type access specification in the chain of 
hash collisions, for each dom ain specification. In  our stock kernel, the mean m axim um  over 
all domains was 6.2 ±  2.6. By switching to  hash tables containing twice the needed num ber 
of entries, we reduced the average of m axim a to  5.1 ±  2.6. It appeared worthwhile to  make 
this same change to  the  hash tables storing entry points, signal accesses, dom ain accesses, 
and gateways, and investigate the resulting perform ance impact. However, doing so gave 
mixed results, as some LMBench results grew worse.
Our next step was to  tim e the open_namei () call, the d te_ in o d e_ p erm iss io n () function 
as a whole, and two pieces of the d te_ in o d e _ p erm iss io n () function. In particular, we 
tim ed the actual calculation of the hash value of the  type name, and the subsequent search 
through the list of collisions. Outliers 1 were removed from the d a ta  sets, as these generally 
reflected disk reads, which are far slower th an  the  action being tim ed, and render da ta  
meaningless by m aking the (already large) s tandard  deviation far larger th an  the mean. 
O ur results come from three separate runs. The first tim ed open_namei ( ) ,  the second tim ed 
d te_ in o d e _ p e rm iss io n () , and the th ird  tim ed the  hash operations. We ran  the LMBench 
file system latency test each time. The separate runs were necessary since openjnam ei () 
calls p e rm is s io n ( ) ,  and p e rm is s io n !)  contains the hash operations, so th a t the action of 
logging deeper tim ing results would affect the calling functions.
The D TE kernel’s d te_ in o d e_ p erm iss io n () function took an average of .64 ±  .005 
microseconds. The perm ission function m ainly calculates the hash value of the typenam e, 
and searches through hash collisions for the correct hash table entry. Calculating the hash
1 We defined outliers as those numbers which were at least an order of magnitude larger than the numbers 
which were not outliers. A significant gap existed between those numbers which we removed, and those which  
we retained.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
CHAPTER 4. PERFO RM ANCE  76
value took .367 ±  .002 microseconds, while stepping through collisions took .21 ±  .0005 
microseconds.
The file which was being accessed by LMBench during the open ( ) / c lo s e  () test was 
/u sr /tm p /lm b e n c h . This causes p e rm iss io n O  to be called 4 times, accounting for 2.4 of 
the 3.3 microseconds of overhead in itself. In addition to  this, we m ust add the function 
call overhead, as well as the  overhead for post_ lookup . A lthough each of these is small in 
itself, we have a t least accounted for the m ajority of the overhead, which appears to  stem  
from the actual hash calculation.
We also did a simple tim ing of all calls to  open_name(). However, as this function is 
called for all pathnam e accesses, ranging from quick reads from cache, to  reads from disk, 
to  file creations, the num bers varied far too much to  be of any use in comparing the small 
differences arising from the  LSM and D TE performance hits. Severe outliers, which were 
an order of m agnitude greater th an  the majority, were again removed, bu t variance was still 
too great for the num bers to  be very informative. T he open_nam ei() function averaged 
125.85 ±  .96 microseconds under a  plain LSM-free kernel, and 134.31 ±  .98 microseconds 
under D TE. Many calls, however, completed in less th an  7.5 microseconds. Clearly, in order 
to  garner meaningful inform ation about the D TE overhead, we would have to  use a more 
intrusive m ethod of tim ing open_nam ei() to  allow us to  choose the instances tim ed. This 
intrusion, of course, would itself affect the results. Since we have m easured the parts  of 
open_namei () which will individually constitute D TE overhead, we did not perform  further 
profiling.
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4 .2 .2  E x e c v e ( )
On file execution, the D TE kernel m ust search for a rule sta ting  th a t the current dom ain 
m ust enter a  new dom ain upon executing the new file. As th is search was feared to  become 
a  trem endous bottleneck to  D T E  performance, the a u to  dom ain transition  inform ation is 
stored on a hash table for each domain. Therefore an issue which m erits investigation is 
whether the am ount of D TE overhead for file execution is constant, as should be the case 
w ith  a  hash table, or w hether it grows as a  function of the num ber of gateways out of 
the  current domain. We created 10 domains, containing an increasing num ber of gateways 
from 0 to  100 in steps of 10. We then  created a  directory containing 100 differently named 
versions of hello world, none of which were actually gateways. In  order to  prevent console 
ou tpu t from skewing our results, we closed standard  outpu t before executing hello world. 
Under a modified kernel which reports the run-tim e for fs /ex ec .c :ex ecv e ( ) ,  we entered 
each of these domains, and executed a  script which ran  each of the 100 programs 10 times. 
Note th a t th is is a very artificial test m eant to  find bugs or suboptim al code. In  reality, the 
use of entry types, as opposed to  entry points, means th a t few domains will ever need more 
then  two entry types.
Table 4.2 lists the m ean execution tim e and standard  deviation for the execution times. 
Clearly, the num ber of gateways does not affect execution tim e. Combined with the LM­
Bench results showing little overall performance im pact of D TE on file execution times, this 
proves the efficacy of our design.
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File Execution Times For Varying Numbers Of Gateways
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Figure 4.2: File execution times for varying numbers of gateways.
4 .2 .3  Signal
D TE only controls signals which are sent to  processes running under a different dom ain than  
the  process sending the signal. Therefore, the D TE function controlling signals shortcuts 
for signals which do not cross dom ain boundaries. The LMBench results m easured only this 
shortened code path . We inserted profiling into the D TE signaling code in order to  obtain 
more satisfying measurements. For signals which are not sent to  a different domain, our 
tests m easured an overhead of .86± .07  microseconds. This is a little  less th an  the LMBench 
results. However, as it does not include the  tim e for a context switch while calling the DTE 
signal hook, the numbers do appear to  agree. For signals crossing dom ain boundaries, D TE 
takes 2.40 ±  .21 microseconds.
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4.3 Macro Benchmark
All of the above benchm arking and m icro-benchmarking is very useful in finding coding 
errors or code paths which may benefit from optim ization. However it is far less reliable 
as an indicator of the to ta l im pact of D TE (and LSM) on real com putational tasks. We 
therefore finish our performance evaluation w ith the commonly accepted standard  for macro­
benchm arking, namely a kernel compile. Under each of a plain 2.5.6 kernel, an LSM kernel 
w ith the capability m odule loaded, and an LSM kernel w ith the D TE m odule loaded, we 
perform
make c le a n  
make bzImage
We tim ed only the actual compilation, not the ’’make clean” . The first compilation 
under every kernel took 1007 seconds. However, the test machine had sufficient memory to 
keep all source code in memory after the  first compile, so th a t new file creation and deletion 
became much more im portant. Under the  plain kernel, subsequent compilations took 995 
seconds. Under the LSM kernel w ith capabilities loaded, these took 996 seconds. Using 
the  D TE module, they took 997 seconds. A performance impact of 0.1% certainly seems 
negligible in re tu rn  for a robust and flexible MAC system.
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Access Rights of Domains
A feature of D T E  systems which is too often ignored in analysis is the ability of entry points 
to  restrict a dom ain’s access rights. Here we a ttem p t to  gain a greater understanding of 
the effects which an entry point can have on a  dom ain’s real access rights. We begin with 
a few simple definitions.
D e f in it io n  5 .0 .1  R W ( d ) represents domain d ’s immediate type accesses under some D T E  
policy.
Note th a t R W  (d) is im m ediately available from a D TE policy file.
D e f in it io n  5 .0 .2  T{d) represents the set of domains to which d is allowed to transition.
W hether the transition  is a u to  or exec is irrelevant to  T(d).  The purpose of the  au to
transition  right is to  accom modate legacy applications which are not DTE-aware. It is a
useful architectural feature, bu t can be ignored here. Note tha t, if a file / i  leads to  an au to
transition  from one dom ain d\ to another dom ain d2 , the same functionality could be coded
into another file of a different type, and executed under dom ain d\. Therefore au to
transitions do not lim it the access rights of d\, except in the rare case wherein d\ cannot
write or replace any files which it can execute. In  any case T(d)  is not affected.
80
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D e fin it io n  5 .0 .3  A(d) represents the full set of type accesses which a process under domain  
d can exploit.
We say th a t a  process can exploit a  type access if it is able to  execute arb itrary  instruc­
tions taking advantage of this type access. For instance, to  exploit the type access r -> x _ t ,  
a process m ust be able to  read any files of type x _ t a t any time. Obviously, a process under 
dom ain d\ can exploit R W {d \) .  If a process under d\ is subverted, then  the attacker can 
execute arb itra ry  code taking full advantage of any type accesses in R W (d \) .  If  d\ can 
transition  to  d2, the  same process may or may not be able to exploit R W (c/2 ). W hether or 
not it can will depend upon the entry points to  d2. The same is true  for R W  (da), where 
c?3 G T ( d 2). If all dom ains under some system  have a  shell as an entry point, then  the full 
set of access rights of any dom ain is:
A x io m  5.1
A{dx) = R W { d x) U {Mdi G T(di)  : A(di))
As an example, consider a policy wherein d% G T ( d 2), d2 G T (d i) , ta\ £ R W (d i) ,  
ta\ fz R W (d 2)1 bu t ta\ G RW(d-^). In this case, a process under d\ could execute the 
following call:
t r a n s i t i o n ( d 2 ,  " /b i n / s h  - c  V 't r a n s i t i o n  d3 / b in / s h  -c  W V'rm f l \ \ \ " \ " " )
This call would cause a dom ain transition  to  dom ain d2 on execution of a shell. The 
argum ents provided to  this shell would in tu rn  request a transition  to  dom ain d,2 on execution 
of another shell. T h a t shell, in tu rn , could request removal of a  file whose removal requires
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type access ta \. In  th is way, a process running under dom ain d\  can, a t any tim e, exploit 
R W ( d 3).
We can prevent th is by using stricter entry points. If d% can be entered only though 
a  program  which can only re tu rn  the current tim e, and which cannot itself be subverted, 
then  a process running under c?i cannot force d-i to  execute a shell under ds w ith arb itrary  
argum ents.
In order for a process under d to  fully exploit R W ( d n) where dn is a dom ain to  which 
d can transition, one of the  following m ust be true:
• d can overwrite the  entry point to dn
• d  can exploit a  security vulnerability of an entry point to  dn
• The entry point to  dn allows a rb itrary  instructions to be executed. For instance, it is
a shell.
We now begin to  address the problem  a t hand:
D e f in it io n  5 .0 .4  Ai,{d) represents A(d) as limited by the entry point of d.
In order to  safely take into account the effect of entry points on a dom ain’s access rights, 
we m ust ensure two things:
1. All entry points m ust not be w ritable or movable by anyone. If anyone is able to 
overwrite or replace an entry point, then we can no longer count on this entry po in t’s 
restrictions to lim it a  dom ain’s access.
This can be verified autom atically by a generic policy analysis tool, as it is simply a 
feature of the D TE policy itself.
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2. The code for all entry points m ust be verified to perform  correctly. It takes only a 
single buffer overflow against an entry point to  render all its protection useless.
This must be performed on a case by case basis. Henceforth, when we state an entry 
po in t’s functionality, we assume th a t this verification has been correctly performed.
Clearly it pays to  have a small num ber (preferably one) of entry points, and to  make 
th is (these) as simple as possible, so as to ease its verification.
We need a way of expressing the  effect of an entry point on a dom ain’s rights. However, 
an  entry point will take into account some inform ation which we can only glean from the 
actual process, such as a password offered by a user.
In the following, P  represents a user process. We trea t it as an object, dereferenced using
. For instance, P.d  returns the dom ain label for process P , while P.pwd  is interpreted 
as a password provided by the process and, presumably, by a  user to  the process. In the 
interest of brevity, we allow A ( P )  to  be used as shorthand for A(P.d),  T (P )  for T(P .d),  and 
R W { P )  for R W (P .d ).  W hereas T (d)  returns a list of domains to  which d may transition, 
T (P )  returns a list Cj =  (G’i , . . . ,  Cn ) of processes, one for each dom ain to  which P.d may 
transition.
D e f in it io n  5 .0 .5  d.C is a function representing the entry point to d. I t  behaves as follows:
•  d .C (R W  (P)) returns a subset of R W (P ) ,  containing all elements of R W {d) which the
entry point to d, given the information stored under P , does not expressly forbid.
•  d .C (T (P ))  returns a subset o f T ( P ) ,  containing all elements o f T ( P )  which the entry 
point to d, given the information stored under P , does not expressly forbid.
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Finally, before we give a form ula representing the access rights of a  dom ain as lim ited
by its en try  points, we wish to  rephrase a caution mentioned above more formally.
A x io m  5.2 I f  a domain d has more than one entry point, or the entry point may be over­
written or replaced by any other domain, then
A L ( d ) = A ( d ) .
That is, the entry points may not be assumed to limit the access of d. This also means
that
d .C (R W {d )) =  R W ( d ) (5.1)
d.C(T(d)) = T{d)  (5.2)
L e m m a  5.1
A l {P) = P .d .C (R W (P )) U (J A d C j ) .
VCj<=P.d.C{T(P))
P ro o f :  We use D* to  represent the set of domains consisting of D  and all its descendants.
This equation simply expands Axiom 5.1 to  account for lim its imposed by entry points. 
We therefore show its correctness by showing th a t the only two cases in which A A d )  differs 
from A(d),  are correct.
F irst, according to  Axiom 5.2, if there exists more than  one entry point to P.d , or the
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entry point is unverified, then  we substitu te
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P .d X (R W (P .d ) )  = RW (P .d) (5.3)
P .d X (T (P .d ) )  = T(P.d) (5.4)
into the  above equation, which then  collapses back to  th a t of Axiom 5.1.
Now let us assume th a t for some dom ain Q G D*, there is only one, verified, entry point, 
and it restricts P .d ’s access such th a t rw x -> ro o t_ t ^  R W (Q ).  There are two possibilities. 
If no o ther dom ain in D* may receive rw x -> ro o t_ t access, then  clearly P  cannot ever 
receive th is access right.
Alternatively, some dom ain R .d  G D* does have rw x -> ro o t_ t access. Then this access 
will be contained in R . d X ( R W (R .d )), so th a t A l {P), into which R .d X ( R W (R .d ) )  is union- 
ed, will also contain rw x -> ro o t_ t.
The argum ent for the validity of £ (T (P .d ))  takes the exact same form as th a t for
It seems likely th a t, in most cases, the entry point will simply act as a barrier. Cer­
tainly th is would be the safest behavior, least likely to be subject to program m ing errors. 
Equations 5.5 and 5.6 are an example of C  acting as a barrier.
C (R W (P .d)) . I
0  if P.pwd /  “god:
R W  (P ) otherwise£ ( R W ( P ) )
(5.5)
C (T (P ))  =  |
0 if P.pwd ±  “god' 
T ( P )  otherwise
(5.6)
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We see th a t careful analysis of entry points can provide more precise values of R W  (d ) 
and T(d).  We will take advantage of th is feature in Section 6.2 in order to  decrease the 
num ber of false positives when searching for dangerous transitions.
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Policy A dm inistration Tools
The configuration language read by the LSM D TE m odule is defined in Section 3.5. It is 
modeled after T IS ’ DTEL D TE policy language [2], which is very intuitive, well organized, 
and concise, such th a t one can reasonably understand a  policy by reading its definition. 
However, the policy m ust specify a large num ber of relations between various domains, and 
between domains and types. Therefore, no m atter how well the policy definition language is 
thought out, there will be certain  problems w ith dealing w ith the policy files directly which 
cannot be surpassed.
• R epetitive typing
For any policy which segments the file system into a reasonably large num ber of types, 
access will likely need to  be specified from most domains to  most types. This involves 
retyping each typenam e up to  |D | times, along w ith as many somewhat cryptic yet 
repetitive access types, such as rx ld .  Furtherm ore, each typenam e is listed once in 
the type enum eration line, and m ust be bound to  real objects a t least once among the 
type assignm ent lines. Clearly, the probability of making a typographical error is not 
insignificant. In the best case, such an error will result in an unbootable system. In 
the  worst case, it will result in a system which runs fine, b u t under an erroneous and
87
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dangerous security policy.
• Dense text
The policy language is very concise. This allows a  quick scan of a  portion of the 
policy file to  give a  good feel, for example, for the  structure  of a domain. However, 
providing a large am ount of inform ation in a small am ount of space can serve to  mask 
a syntactic or semantic error. For instance, a  missing \  to  continue to the next line 
might be easily missed, or a missing or extraneous d among the r x l  type access can 
be hard to  spot. An alternative would be to  make the policy language very verbose. 
For instance, a  dom ain definition could be
domain lo g in _ d  b e g in
e n tr y  ty p e s  b e g in
lo g in _ e t
e n try  ty p e s  end
ty p e  a c c e s s  b e g in
r e a d ,w r i t e , exec to  lo g in _ e t
ty p e  a c c e s s  end 
domain lo g in _ d  end
However this could serve ju st as well to  mask errors. Most domains definitions would 
likely be split among several pages, preventing related keywords from being seen to ­
gether. This makes it harder to  m atch b e g in  and end statem ents. Perhaps more 
im portantly, the expansion of dom ain definitions would make it much harder to  un­
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derstand a domain. This is bo th  because the num ber of keywords begin to overwhelm 
the num ber of m eaningful identifiers, (access types, typenam es, and dom ain names), 
and because the process of looking through several pages to  find inform ation to  define 
a  single dom ain interferes w ith w hat is known as interface zen [8]. In  other words, 
by forcing a policy adm inistra tor to  look through several pages, the tra in  of thought 
which was working toward understanding the policy is being interrupted.
•  Visual presentation
Clearly a  tex t file can provide exactly one visual presentation. By setting up macros in 
a  text editor, it is possible, for example, to  autom atically follow a  dom ain transition  
definition to the definition of the destination domain. However, several more ideal 
presentations come quickly to  mind.
The D TE policy defines new classes of subjects and objects, namely types and do­
mains, and defines relations between these, as well as between these and existing 
subjects and objects. For instance, between domains are connections indicating al­
lowed a u to  and exec dom ain transitions, as well as connections indicating perm itted  
intra-dom ain signals. There exist also connections from dom ains to  types indicating 
which types may be executed to  enter a domain, and more dom ain to  type connections 
indicating which types a  dom ain may read, modify or execute. One m ust consider a 
com bination of these connections in order to  analyze how domains may affect each 
other.
U nderstanding a policy requires understanding all of these connections. Different 
views of a policy, therefore, may show different sets of connections, from different
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viewpoints.
An intuitive way to  th ink  about a  policy is as a directed, labeled graph. The nodes 
represent domains, types, and files. Edges may represent four types of entities. Edges 
from domains to  other dom ains are labeled “auto ,” “exec,” or w ith a  set of signal 
num bers, and represent either a perm itted  dom ain transition  or signal rights. The 
dom ain transition  edge labels m ight optionally refer to the entry  types which may be 
used to  effect the transition. Edges from domains to types may be labeled “e” for 
en try  type, as well as any subset of “rwxlcda” to  describe dom ain to type access as 
described in Section 3.5. Edges from types to  files represent “-e,” “-u,” or “-r” type 
assignm ent rules. Finally, Edges may exist between files, representing the file system 
layout. An edge from file f i l e l  to  f i l e 2  tells us th a t f  i l e 2  is a child of f  i l e l .  The 
last type of edge is only partially  a result of the policy — as a result of the “pretend” 
m ount rules described in Section 3.2.2 — bu t is certainly a p a rt of a complete policy 
representation.
We define F  as the set of files, T  as the set of types, and V  as the  set of domains. The 
graph Q =  (V, E ),  where V  =  ( D U T U F ) ,  and E  contains the  edges we described. 
Formally:
E  =  (Vdi,G?2 G L),l  G (auto,exec, (0 . . .  31)*)) : (di,d,2 ,l)
U(Vd € T>, t £ T, z  € {r, w, x, 1, c, d, a, e}) : (d , f, z*) 
u ( V / 1, / 2 e f ’) : ( / 1, / 2) _
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Displaying a D TE policy in this form at would be far more useful to  policy analysis 
th an  the  policy file itself. However, the full graph would be overwhelming. The 
policy adm inistrator m ust be allowed to  look at subsets of this graph which emphasize 
particu lar connections or sets of connections. One of the tools which we will present 
does ju st this, presenting subsets of th is graph which we have ourselves found useful 
in policy analysis.
• E rror patterns
As discussed above, a D TE policy defines many connections between subjects and 
objects. In some cases, connections of two or more types should not exist sim ultane­
ously. However, these connections may be defined in different sections of the policy, 
m aking them  hard  to spot. Or, the  sheer num ber of these connections may make it 
im practical to  spot an inappropriate pair by eye. Consider th a t, if we have ten  connec­
tions of some type, bu t one pair of connections is not appropriate, we m ust consider 
E®=1* =  45 pairs. In Section 7.4, we will present a very m inimalistic policy, providing 
only enough detail to support an intelligent login daemon. Even in this policy, shown 
in A ppendix A .1.1, the num ber of dom ain to  type access rules is 86, each of which 
specifies between one and seven type accesses taken from the set {r, w, x, 1, c, d, a} as 
described in Section 3.5.
In  building D TE policies, we have found several error patterns resulting from such 
interactions of connections. W hile they are hard  to  spot by eye, they are simple to 
find autom atically.
1. Conquering
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We say th a t a dom ain D \  can conquer another domain D 2 provided th a t
(a) D \  m ay transition  to  D 2
(b) e is an entry point to D 2
(c) D \  m ay write or replace e
Clearly, in th is case, we can say of the privileges of D \
T ( D i )  = T ( D 1) U T ( D 2) 
R W { D i ) =  R W { D i ) 0 R W { D 2 )
since any actions which £>2 is allowed to  perform, D \  could also perform, by 
w riting the  instructions into e, and requesting a dom ain transition  to  D 2 upon 
execution of e.
2. Trojan
E ntry  points are a dom ain’s only means of protection from untrusted  code. For 
some domains, protection from un trusted  code is moot, since they are m eant 
to  run  shells and user-compiled or user-w ritten code. The u se r_ d  dom ain pre­
sented in Section 7.4 is an example. However, many domains will be designed 
to  tem porarily  expand a user or daem on’s access rights while performing a  spe­
cific, restricted  task. In  such cases, the dom ain’s entry points m ust be designed 
such th a t the dom ain’s privileges cannot be used for any unintended purposes. 
An attack  wherein a system  is tricked into executing untrusted  code is called a 
T rojan horse attack.
For domains whose entry points are untrusted, we may wish to  check for any
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pathnam es to  which the dom ain has execute access, and which the dom ain my 
itself replace. Since replacing the pathnam e can mean overwriting the file itself, 
or w riting to  any of its parent directories, th is is clearly a check best perform ed 
autom atically.
3. Insufficient entry type access
A dom ain which cannot be entered is a useless domain. A dom ain cannot be 
entered if it cannot execute its own entry points, or if it cannot descend the file 
system  tree down to  the entry points. This will cause denial of service to  either 
user dom ains or system services. Furtherm ore, we have pointed out the danger 
of vulnerability to  Trojan attacks. The usefulness of Lemma 5.1 depends entirely 
upon carefully considered entry types, which m ust not be vulnerable to  attack. 
Any dom ain w ith insufficient entry type access likely has not been sufficiently 
analyzed. For these reasons, autom ated checks for sufficient entry type access 
for all dom ains is desirable.
Our policy analysis tool will detect the presence of these conditions. In the following 
sections we present D T Eedit and DTEview, which, together address each of the above 
concerns. A th ird  tool, D TEbuild, will be presented in the  next chapter.
6.1 DTEedit
DTEedit is a G tk-enhanced graphical user interface for creating and editing D TE policies. It 
is mainly intended to  address the excessive typing and dense tex t problems associated w ith 
editing policies in tex t form at. Typing is dram atically reduced by asking the user to enter
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type and dom ain names exactly once, to  inform DTEedit of their existence. Thereafter, 
specification of access to  or from any dom ain or type is by list selection, as is selection 
of type of access (rw x lcda  for type access, and a u to  or exec for dom ain access). W hen 
entering type assignment rules, pathnam es can be selected by browsing the file system using 
a file selection dialog, or by typing the pathnam e. Figure 6.1 dem onstrates specification of 
exec dom ain transition  access from lo g in _ d  to  ro o t_ d .
From domain: login_d
To domain:
daemon d
boot_d
root_d
u s e r d
l og i nd
0  auto
O  exec
Commit
Cancel
F igure 6.1: Adding new domain specification rule in DTEedit.
The problem  of dense tex t is solved simply by presenting only a small piece of a policy
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a t once. In Figure 6.2, for instance, we see only the domain transitions perm itted  out of 
dom ain log in_d . Furtherm ore, syntactical symbols are not necessary, so the -> separating 
access specification from dom ain name, and parentheses, are not necessary, as they are 
replaced by the structu re  of the dom ain specification table.
Intro | File savWloid | type* | domains [domain s p e c  | typa assigns | type tree  [ Assign Ext Attr |
Entry Points | Typo A ccess | Domain A ccess [Signal A ccess
daemon d Transition) Domainboot d
exec root_d
exec user d
root d
user d
□EL
Figure 6.2: Viewing a domain specification in DTEedit.
For the most part, DTEedit is not helpful in presenting the  policy in new formats. A 
dom ain specification is still entered and viewed as a set of entry  types, a set of dom ain 
transitions, a set of type accesses, and a set of signal accesses. One exception is for viewing 
type assignments. A long list of type assignm ent rules is simply not useful in understanding 
the  resulting type assignment tree. Therefore, DTEedit provides a file m anager which walks 
the host m achine’s file system, and displays the results of applying the  currently entered 
type assignm ent rules to  the file system.
DTEedit is m eant to  provide a safer alternative to  m anually typing policies. Many 
people far prefer typing to  excessive use of the mouse. Nevertheless, the use of DTEedit is 
strongly encouraged for the sake of reduced typographical, syntactic, and semantic errors, 
as well as a  b e tte r understanding of the policy during construction.
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6.2 DTEview
D T Eedit addresses our first two concerns w ith usage of text-file policies for editing and 
analyzing policies. The la tter two concerns are addressed by DTEview. DTEview is a 
P e rl/T K  tool which begins by detecting any error patterns discussed on page 91, and 
w arning the adm inistrator if they are present. Two of the error patterns, namely insufficient 
entry point access and conquering, are always warned against. The th ird , the ability by a 
dom ain to  overwrite and execute a  type, is acceptable in very many cases, so th a t warning 
of all instances would provide enough false positives th a t a policy adm inistrator would likely 
ignore all such warnings. Therefore, the  adm inistrator may tell DTEview of any domains 
about which he is concerned. This is done by adding them  to an array called @paranoid_wx 
in the file r e s t r i c t i o n s . p l .  Any dom ains listed in this array will be checked to  ensure 
th a t there is no type which they can b o th  overwrite and execute. Figure 6.3 shows such a 
DTEview warning.
Pci/anoid v/tite/e^ec
Jftpd_dcan w rite /rep lace &ND execute type ftpd_xt.
Dismiss J
Figure 6.3: An error pattern popup warning in DTEview.
DTEview goes on to  provide three ways of viewing the policy. The first presents a tool 
acting like a file-manager, bu t showing the D TE type information for files and directories. In 
addition, th is tool displays the pathnam e which D TE would actually use for typenam e res­
olution. Recall th a t due to  m ounting activity and m ount restrictions, th is may be different 
from the  given pathnam e. Figure 6.4 shows the file-manager view in DTEview.
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P a th :  /h o m e /f tp  
R e a l  P a th :  /h o m e /f tp
e t: f lp d _
n c o m in g
n c o m in g et: f tp d _
ut: flpd .
atr
|/h o ro e /ftp " "
Enter Path: 
Path:
Figure 6.4: The file-manager tool in DTEview.
The second view presented by DTEview is a dom ain transition  analysis. I t  begins w ith 
the first process ( / s b i n / i n i t )  running under the default domain. It also displays all domain 
transitions perm itted  from this dom ain, and all entry types through which the transitions 
may occur. The resulting type/dom ain  pairs are shown as children of the first process 
in a  tree. Prom here, a t any level, one dom ain may be chosen to  be expanded, showing 
either the perm itted  dom ain transitions, or the perm itted  type accesses. Clearly, we are 
presenting a  restricted view of the full policy graph Q. Another way this could be presented 
would be to  keep the graph structure. In fact, another tool which was created presented 
a 3-D fly-through universe view of a policy. However, while perhaps more amusing than  
the dom ain transition  tree view of DTEview, it was no more informative, and quite a bit 
more confusing. Again, we wish to  present simplified, clearer views of the policy. The 3-D 
universe policy view would be much more useful as an initial policy view. After gaining an
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initial understanding of the policy in th is way, the  user could select a focused view, like the 
dom ain transition  tree, to  concentrate on a particu lar feature or problem.
Since the num ber of type accesses is typically very large, when type accesses are dis­
played, DTEview offers a b it of help. F irst, type accesses are sorted by typenam e. Second, 
any write or create accesses are flagged in red. This highlights the more dangerous accesses 
which an adm inistra tor is likely interested in. T hird , middle-clicking on a type will bring 
up a list of all paths to  which this type is assigned. Finally, DTEview is able to  present a 
filtered view of the type accesses. For instance, the  adm inistrator may request only those 
type access containing rwa, th a t is, read, write, and append, access. Figure 6.5 shows the 
domain analysis view, w ith type accesses out of daemon_d filtered to  show only types to 
which daemon_d has full (rw xlcd) access.
d a e m o n _ d
rxld
: Back to init
c i e y jbin„t c o n f_ tb a s e _ t
/s b in / in i t
b o o t_ d
Figure 6.5: Domain transition analysis in DTEview
The th ird  view is based upon reachability queries. There are two types of queries. The
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first searches through Gi-
Qi = (V ,E {)
E \  =  (Vc?i,d2 G V , I E (auto, exec)) : (d i ,d 2,l)
For the query Q (di E V , d 2 E T>,n E I) ,  DTEview returns all paths from d\ to  d,2 
containing fewer th an  n  edges. This corresponds to  all the ways in which a process under 
dom ain d\ can make a t m ost n  dom ain transitions to  end up in dom ain d2. The second 
type of query searches the  larger graph G‘i-
G2 = ( V U T ) , E 2)
E 2 — (yd E V , t E T, at E {r, w, x, 1, c, d, a}) : (d, f , a\ )
A query Q(d E T>,t E T , n  E I ,  at E {r, w, x, 1, c, d, a}) returns paths originating at d and 
term inating at any dom ain d2 representing a dom ain which has type access at to  type t.
DTEview finds all paths satisfying a query and displays the sequence of dom ain transi­
tions for the first pa th . An example is shown in Figure 6.6. The user can step through all 
the paths, and may, a t any point, click on the displayed pa th  to  bring it up in the dom ain 
transition  analysis view for further analysis. W hile working back in the dom ain transition  
analysis view, the user may right-click on a dom ain to  select it as the source domain, or on 
a  type to select it as the  target type, in the reachability query. In this way we a ttem pt to 
offer simplified views of the policies, while still allowing quick switching from one view to  a 
place of interest in the other.
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Trace: to access
/b in / lo g in sh e l l_ t
From Process: ro o t_ d
To Access
[rc w x d
Type:
[ r o o t j
n
Pick NextPrev
Figure 6.6: A reachability query in DTEview.
Normal queries take into account only the  D TE policy file. Queries therefore calculate 
access rights of domains according to  Axiom 5.1. Lemma 5.1 lim its the access rights of 
domains based upon the properties of entry points to  other domains. DTEview assertions 
provide the same power to  queries.
An entry point is a file whose execution may be used to  trigger a dom ain transition. 
W hile the D TE policy specifies w hether a  dom ain transition  from d\ to  d,2 is perm itted , the 
entry point(s) to  d2 may consider additional system  param eters. Based upon these, it may 
choose to  refuse entry, allow restricted entry, or allow full access. 1 A DTEview assertion 
is intended to  describe an entry po in t’s behavior. The assertion takes the form:
{ d : in d :o u td " , <ACTI0N>}
xNote that it may only restrict access using U N IX  features. The set of D T E  access rights for d-2 is not 
malleable, but the entry point to  d2 can sim ply refuse to  execute system  calls leading to  violation of some 
set of rights.
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where in d  is the source domain, o u td  is the destination domain, and d indicates th a t this 
assertion perta ins to  dom ain transitions. “<ACTI0N>” may be one of the following:
<ACTI0N> : :=  IGNORE
<ACTI0N> ::=  IGN0RE_SAY <STRING>
<ACTI0N> ::=  SAY <STRING>
<ACTI0N> ::=  REJECT
Some transitions likely should be entirely forbidden. For example, since we do not tru st 
the binary / u s r / s b i n / i n . f t p d ,  we do not wish it to  enter the roo t_d  dom ain under any 
circumstances. The R E JE C T  action is intended for such a situation. R E JE C T  strings are 
checked and warned against when DTEview s ta rts  up. These will become far more useful 
in the next few chapters, when we begin to  build policies from components which are joined 
using generic access rules.
On the other hand, if we search for dangerous transitions, we may not wish to  be 
d istracted by transitions which we know to be safe. For instance, the binary / s b i n / l o g i n  
may be a  modified version of / b in / lo g in ,  whose code has been verified not to  allow root 
logins unless the login occurs on console, in a locked room  under heavy guard. In  this case, 
we may wish for transitions from / s b i n / l o g i n  into the roo t_d  dom ain to  be ignored.
Clearly, an ignore action { d : in d :o u td : IGNORE} should be used only when it is known 
th a t o u td  ^  in d X (T (in d ) ) . An action which we believe more useful is IGNORE_SAY. 
W hen this action is tied to  a transition  from dom ain in d  to dom ain ou td , any paths 
containing this transition  are still shown. However, STRING will be printed above the 
arrow representing the transition. STRING is m eant to  be a  brief description of in d .E .
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For instance, if C has been verified to  allow logins only from a physically secure local console, 
then  STRING m ight be
V e r if ie d  denied  u n le s s  on lo c a l  con so le
The policy adm inistra tor may choose whether the rem aining th rea t is relevant to  his 
current query. If  not, he may ignore it. Else, he may study  it. W hile an SAY action labels 
the associated transition  w ith the specified string, an IGNORE_SAY action also changes 
the color of the edge to  indicate th a t th is transition  m ay most likely be ignored, subject to 
the  condition specified in the  string.
Before adm inistrators use th is mechanism to analyze security policies, it m ust be shown 
th a t  proper use of these assertion labels will not cause a query to  re tu rn  incomplete results. 
We begin w ith a ra ther obvious axiom:
Axiom 6.1 Let Q be a dom ain transition graph representing som e policy. Let d\ and efo be 
any two d istinct dom ains in the policy, such that d\ m ay not transition to d.2 ■ That is, no 
edge from  d \ to d,2 exists in Q. Let X  be the set of assertions relating to Q, and let £ G X  
be an assertion relating to a transition from  d \ to c?2 - Then any query made under X  will 
produce the sam e results as the sam e query made under X  — £.
In other words, an assertion on a dom ain transition  which the policy does not allow, 
will not affect the outcome of any queries.
In the following theorem , we continue to  define the graph of all dom ain transitions as Q. 
The graph containing the dom ain transitions as allowed by Uvdex> ^ a t  ^ ie graph 
containing all dom ain transitions which are allowed by the entry points, is Q'. X  is the set 
of assertion labels read by DTEview, and £ is an individual assertion label in X .
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Theorem 6.1 A query fo r  transition paths from  domain d \ to dom ain  e?2 containing few er 
than n domain transitions, with assertion labels in X  correctly reflecting C fo r  all entry  
points, w ill return all possible paths from  d \ to cfe in Q'.
Proof:
We will prove this by induction over the num ber m  of assertion labels. O ur base case: 
We take it for granted th a t, in the  absence of any assertions, DTEview will correctly 
re tu rn  all paths from d\ to  containing fewer th an  n  transitions. This is a m atter of 
correctly coding a simple graph algorithm .
Inductive Step: Assume th a t for a query under m  — 1 assertions, DTEview returns all 
paths in Q' . Then for a  query under m  assertions, DTEview returns all paths from d\ to  da 
in Q'.
As defined above, an assertion can be of the following types:
1. R E JE C T:
A rejection is only checked at the  s ta rt of DTEview. It does not affect the search for 
paths to  satisfy a query.
2. SAY:
This type of assertion only returns ex tra  information, displayed above certain dom ain 
transitions. It cannot prevent a  p a th  from being returned in response to  a query.
3. IGNORE:
If an  ignore for a  transition  from dom ain da to <4 is correctly applied, th is means the 
following:
(a) da has only one entry point
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(b) The entry point to  da cannot be overw ritten by any domain.
(c) The code of the entry point to  da m ust be verified such th a t, while the transition  
from da to  <4 may in fact be perm itted  by the policy,
<4 g da.C (T(da)). (6.1)
Another way of saying this, is th a t the edge from da to  <4 is not in Q', although 
it may exist in Q.
Since Q' does not contain an edge from da to  <4, then, by Axiom 6.1, any query made 
under X  — £ will re tu rn  the  same results as the same query made under X .  Since 
\X  — £ | = m  — 1, we know, by induction, th a t DTEview will re tu rn  this set of paths 
correctly.
4. IGNORE_SAY:
This case could be treated  two ways. F irst, since paths including a transition  tied 
to  an IGNORE_SAY assertion are not excluded from query results, as paths which 
include a  transition  tied to  an  IGNO RE assertion are, we could trea t IGNORE_SAY 
as a SAY assertion, which is trivially shown to be safe. However, we would like to 
show th a t the adm inistrator can take the IGNORE_SAY action at its word, in effect 
becoming a part of D TEview’s behavior, and tru st the results.
The proof of safety for IGNORE-SAY is much like th a t for IGNORE. The difference 
is tha t, a t Equation 6.1, we m ust take the process and system  sta te  into account. 
Equation 6.1 becomes:
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db i  P.d.C{T(P.d)). (6.2)
T here are now two cases. If the sta te  of P  is such th a t P.d.C  allows the  transition, 
then  correct application of the assertion label means th a t the adm inistrator does not 
ignore the transition. The assertion is therefore trivially safe. If the sta te  of P  is such 
th a t P.d.C  does not allow the  transition , then  Equation 6.2 collapses to  Equation 6.1. 
In  th is case, we can revert to  the proof of safety for IGNORE labels.
To make th is more concrete, a  quick example. In  the case of an assertion
{d:da:db:IGN0RE_SAY " V er ified  den ied  u n le ss  on lo c a l  con so le" }
the adm inistrator m ust decide w hether logins on local console fall into the th rea t 
which he is currently assessing. If so, then  he will study paths including transitions 
from da to  db. If not, then  he ignores these paths.
I
In Lemma 5.1, we see th a t the o ther function of C is to lim it R W (d ) .  Therefore, we 
would of course like to  use the following type of label as well:
{ t : in d :a c c e s s ,o u t t" , <ACTI0N>}
However, this is dangerous. Recall Axiom 5.1, which states:
A l (P) =  P .d .C (R W (P ))  U |J  A L{Cj).
vCjeP.d .c {T(P) )
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For instance, assume th a t we created the label { t : i n d : r w - > t l : IGNORE}. Now, even though 
the label is presum ably correct, such th a t in d  is in fact denied rw -> tl ,  th is only lim its 
P .d .C {R W (P )).  In  order to obtain  the full A l (P), we must union this w ith access rights 
for all dom ains which may be reached through P.d. The IGNORE, IGNORE_SAY, and 
SAY labels are therefore not safe for type access assertions. However, we do support the 
R E JE C T  action. This is, again, a simple and useful way of ensuring some basic properties 
about a complex policy which could be the result of autom ated composition of several pieces.
This chapter presented tools designed to  solve some of the obvious problems encountered 
while editing and viewing policies. These tools have not gone beyond the trad itional con­
cepts of D TE. The next two chapters present m ethods for analyzing and creating policies, 
culm inating in a  novel m ethod for policy composition.
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Chapter 7
Analysis o f DTE Policies
In chapter 6, we presented DTEview as a tool designed to  aid the analysis of D TE policies. 
We now present some further m ethods for analyzing policies.
In a  paper [23] about the safe run-tim e extension of D TE policies, TIS presented the  idea 
of analyzing D TE policies using simpler, well-understood access control policies. Since the 
policies expressible by D T E policies are a superset of those expressible by many trad itional 
access control policies, it is possible to  search for properties of those trad itional policies 
which are exhibited in a particu lar D TE policy. TIS used this concept by asserting th a t 
any such properties exhibited in the D TE policy m ust not be violated by modifications to 
the policy. We feel th is concept is also useful for the analysis of a static  D TE policy.
We will begin in the next section by showing how searching for properties of the Bell-La 
Padula access control policy in a D TE policy can yield useful information. Section 7.2 will 
discuss the lim itations of th is first a ttem pt, and section 7.3 proposes a far more powerful, 
yet still very simple, extension of the Bell-La Padu la  policy. Here we prove th a t this 
modified BLP policy is capable of expressing the Clark-W ilson and pipeline policies. Finally, 
section 7.4 applies th is idea to  several D TE policies.
107
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7.1 Using the BLP ^-Property
T he Bell La Padula access control system, discussed in section 2.2.1, m aintains two access 
rules. The simple security rule relates the security level of objects to  those of subjects. 
We only use BLP to relate objects, and therefore ignore this rule. The second rule is to  
m aintain the ^-property, which dictates th a t if a  subject may observe object O i, and also 
may modify object O2 , then  the security level of 0 \  is less th an  or equal to  th a t of O2 . If 
th is is not the case, then  the subject is able to  leak inform ation from a  higher security level 
to  a lower security level. A second subject, perm itted  to  observe O2 bu t not 0 1 , can then 
access inform ation in Ox w ith the aid of the first subject.
We will use the ^-property to  introduce a partial relation on types in a  D TE policy. 
Figure 7.1 shows the algorithm  used to  calculate the BLP less th an  relation from a policy 
file.
l e q l i s t  = {>;
fo r  each domain D do
fo r  each type T1 which D can read do
fo r  each type T2 which D can w r ite  do 
add "T1:T2" to  l e q l i s t
done
done
done
fo r  each s tr in g  in  l e q l i s t  do 
p r in t  s tr in g
done
F igure  7.1: Algorithm to calculate BLP < relation
We define observe access as r, or a  simple file read. T ha t is, we do not consider directory 
read or directory descend to  be observe accesses for this analysis. However, we define modify 
access as file write (w), file append (a), and directory create (c). In addition, modify access
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to  any parent directory of a file f  constitutes modify access to  f  itself, since f  can be 
replaced w ith an entirely new copy.
We would like to  consider w hat information may be gleaned from the BLP relation 
applied to  the types of a D TE policy. The three strongest results which we may find for a 
type in the context of a  given policy are th a t it is unrelated to  all other types, th a t it is 
strictly  less th an  all other types to  which it is related, or th a t it is strictly  greater th an  all 
o ther types to  which it is related. Each of these cases can be shown to convey im portant 
inform ation regarding the security or integrity properties of the  type.
1. Type T\  is unrelated to all other types.
In th is case there exists no dom ain perm itted  to  access bo th  T\  and any other type. 
Therefore no one is able to  corrupt the d a ta  in T\  using d a ta  from any other type, 1 
and no one may leak the  d a ta  from T\ to  any other type.
T he integrity claim may not prevent subjects from erasing d a ta  from Ti, or replacing 
the d a ta  w ith all l ’s. However, T rojan horse attacks, as a particu lar example, are 
nearly impossible, as the T rojan horse cannot be read from any other types. The 
attack  is possible only if the  T rojan horse is hard-coded into the sub ject’s source code. 
Verification of entry points, and assurance th a t entry points cannot be replaced, will 
prevent th is final Trojan horse attack.
2. Type T\ is strictly less than all other types to which it is related.
There exist domains which may read type T i, as well as modify other types T t. There-
’Note that, in Unix, all devices are files, and hence even random data (from /dev/random ) must come 
from files of som e type.
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fore d a ta  from T\  can be leaked to  T,t. However, there exists no dom ain which may 
w rite T\  and also read another type. Therefore, da ta  may not be moved from any 
o ther types to  T\. We consider T\  to  be of high integrity.
3. Type T\ is strictly greater than all other types to  which it is related.
There exist no domains which may read T\  and write other types. Inform ation from 
Ti cannot be leaked to  any o ther types. This is a strong secrecy claim. However, 
there exist domains which m ay modify T\ while reading o ther types. The integrity of 
T\  is therefore shown to be suspect.
By imposing a BLP relation onto a D TE policy, and searching the  relation for the above 
three conditions, we hope to  provide some autom ated analysis of D TE policies.
7.2 Limitations of BLP
The BLP policy is a  simple one. This is useful in th a t it allows us to  introduce a simple 
relation on types. However, a  consequence of its simplicity is a lack of expressiveness. BLP 
works well if we can keep security domains completely segregated. By this we m ean th a t 
no domains are provided access to  the same types. Consider a top secret type T$, to  which 
only one dom ain D$ has read access, and no domains have w rite access. This dom ain may 
need to  warn other domains of certain  conditions, for instance corrupted d a ta  under T s ■ 
This requires write access to  some type T w ,  to  which other domains have read access. By 
BLP,
Ts < Tw-
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If there exist any dom ain which has read access to  T\y, then, by transitivity, T s  < Ti 
for all types Tt to  which these other dom ains have write access. Consequently, inform ation 
can be leaked from T s  to  each such T,. In  order to  prevent this, we m ust prevent all other 
domains from having write access to  any Tj : T s  <  Tj. In other words, we are segmenting 
D s  such th a t  all types to  which it can w rite are unreadable by all other domains. A graph 
of the BLP relation for the types of a  D TE policy which segments a dom ain D s  in such 
a way, is shown in figure 7.2. In  th is particu lar case, the types TS, TX and TY may not be 
accessed by any domains other th an  D s ,  which itself may not access any types other than  
these three. 2 The dotted  arrow from u s e r _ t  to  TS indicates th a t D s  may have modify 
access to  TS and observe access to  u s e r_ t .  In  th a t case, the integrity of the s e c re t_ g ro u p  
group is affected, bu t not its secrecy.
secret group
TX TY
user tproc_t
base t
Figure 7.2: BLP for policy excerpt with disjoint type group.
Let us assume there is a type, Ts,  whose secrecy properties we would like to  analyze. It 
is possible to  create a dom ain which may read Ts,  bu t may not w rite any of the common
2This is not strictly necessary. In fact, other domains are restricted only in that if they have observe 
access to  TS,  T X  or TY,  they may not have m odify access to other types, and vice versa.
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types, such as files under /p ro c  and /dev . However, such access may be required. As 
Lemma 5.1 shows, the dom ain’s access rights may also be lim ited by a single effective, 
verified entry point. In this case, we can label th is dom ain a tru sted  domain. This means 
th a t the dom ain exists outside the BLP policy. Due to  B L P’s lack of expressiveness, th is is 
the only way to  express th is concept. However, by completely exempting the dom ain from 
the  BLP policy, the  dom ain becomes far too powerful.
Consider the  assured pipeline (see Section 2.2.5) shown in Figure 7.3. If sy s lo g _ d  is 
allowed to w rite d e v _ t,  then, since it may read in _ lo g _ t ,  in _ lo g _ t  <  d e v _ t, instantly  
lowering it to  the  same security level as m ost types on the system.
If we define sy s lo g _ d  as a tru sted  dom ain, in _ lo g _ t  becomes strictly  greater th an  all 
other types, since all other domains may write to  it, while reading common types. However, 
we now lose much useful inform ation regarding sy slog_d . For instance, we may have 
another assured pipeline, whose inform ation is transform ed by another domain. By defining 
bo th  domains as trusted , we can no longer identify cross-talk between these pipelines. 
Furtherm ore, we cannot express the concept th a t sy s lo g _ d  should not be able to  write its 
entry points. The complete resistance of entry points of sy s lo g _ d  to  subversion will surely 
be a condition of any tru s t we place in sy slog_d .
7.3 M odified BLP
We have shown the  need to  increase the expressiveness of the BLP relation, as well as the 
insufficiency of tru sted  users as a means of addressing this deficiency. We now present a 
more powerful way of expressing concepts such as assured pipelines in BLP. O ur modified
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BLP, or MBLP, will be m ade more expressive th an  BLP through the addition of two simple 
concepts: secrecy w ith exception, and integrity w ith exception. These concepts will be 
implemented in analysis by a set of two types of statem ents, which are to  be read alongside 
a D TE policy. The two statem ent types are:
s e c r e t  < ty p e l>  e x c ep t from  <dom ain_l_l>  [,<dom ain_l_n>]
and
p r o te c t  <type2> e x c e p t from  <domain_2_l> [ , <domain_2_n>]
These provide four hints for analysis. The first is our explicitly intended purpose. 
Namely, when building our list of types which dom ain dom ain_ l_ l may read, we do not 
add ty p e l  to  the list. This means th a t, if dom ain_ l_ l has write access to  some type 
type_lw , then  we will ignore the BLP ^-property, and we will not use this fact to define 
ty p e l  <  type_ lw . O f course, it does not prevent us coming to  th is same conclusion through 
some other dom ain’s type accesses.
Second, they indicate th a t a separate check should be made to  ensure their correctness. 
The D TE policy should deny all dom ains (except dom ain_ l_ l through dom ain_l_n) read 
access to  ty p e l .  Likewise, all domains (except dom ain_2_l through domain_2_n should be 
denied modify access to  type2 . If this is not the case, a warning flag should be raised.
T hird, as a  consequence of the previous two hints, while building the read list for any 
dom ain, we can ignore ty p e l  altogether. If we find th a t a dom ain has observe access to 
ty p e l ,  then  there are only two possibilities. E ither the domain is listed as an exception 
to  t y p e l ’s secrecy, in which case we are instructed  to  ignore it. Otherwise, the dom ain is 
not listed as an exception. In  th is case, the  dom ain is in fact not allowed to  read ty p e l ,
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a  condition we have already enforced under the second hint. Therefore, we know th a t any 
case wherein a dom ain is allowed to  read ty p e l  is irrelevant to  the M BLP <  relation.
Finally, since the dom ains listed as exceptions to  security and integrity declarations are 
being provided an ex tra  m easure of tru st, we wish to  ensure th a t they are worthy of such 
trust. We therefore check th a t the  entry points to  all such domains, in addition to  all 
tru sted  domains, are themselves protected, and inform the policy adm inistrator th a t the 
code of the entry points m ust be verified.
[ all domains ]
auditor_d
redd
append
■ , syslog_d .m _log_t -------------- -— - -------------   out_log_t
Figure 7.3: Sample Assured Pipeline
A precise definition of the  M BLP < relation follows.
Va; G V  and a, b € T  : m r (x ,  a) A m w (x ,  b) =>• L(a) < L(b) (7.1)
where
m r ( x ,a ) =  r(x , a) A re(x, a) A id(x)  A it(a)  (7 -2 )
m w (x ,a )  = w(x, a) A we(x, a) A id(x)  A it(a) (7 .3 )
Here re(x, a) means th a t dom ain x  is on the read exception list for type a. Likewise, 
r w ( x ,a ) means dom ain x  is on the w rite exception list for type a, while id(x)  and i t  (a) 
mean th a t dom ain x  and type a, respectively, are tru sted  (i.e., to  be ignored).
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7.3.1 M B L P  Enforces C lark-W ilson C D Is
The s e c r e t  and p r o te c t  keywords are in the spirit of trusted  users in BLP and ring policies. 
However, they can also be used to  implement Clark-W ilson and assured pipeline policies. 
We show the former here, and the la tte r in Section 7.3.2.
To show th a t Clark-W ilson policies can be implemented using these two rules, we begin 
by describing a policy excerpt whose purpose is to  enforce a Clark-W ilson policy. We 
then  show a  set of rules which allows us to  express the required properties. As described 
in Section 2.4, a Clark-W ilson policy specifies constrained d a ta  item s (CDIs), which are 
d a ta  which may be modified only by certain sets of transform ation procedures (TPs). We 
will implem ent this as follows. For each of the n  CDIs, we will define a  type c d i_ t i  £ 
( c d i _ t l . .c d i_ tn ) ,  and a  dom ain c d i_ d i  £ ( c d i_ d l . .cd i_ d n ) . The entry points to  each 
dom ain will be the T P s which are allowed to  modify the CDI. The policy excerpt is shown 
in Figure 7.4
ty p es  . . .  c d i_ t l  . . .  cd i_ tn  c d i_ d l_ e t  . . .  cd i_dn_et . . .  
domains . . .  cd i_ d l . . .  cdi_dn . . .
spec_dom ain c d i_ d l (1 c d i_ d l_ e t)  ( . . .  w -> c d i_ tl)  (0) (0)
spec_dom ain cd i_dn  (1 c d i_ d n _ e t)  ( . . .  w -> cd i_ tn ) (0) (0)
Figure 7.4: Policy excerpt defining Clark-Wilson policy.
We specify the following n  M BLP rules to check for the security of Clark-W ilson CDIs: 
p r o te c t  c d i_ t l  ex c ep t from  c d i_ d l
p r o te c t  c d i_ tn  e x c ep t from  cd i_dn
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We m ust show th a t two properties hold. Namely, th a t each CDI may be modified only 
by the  associated TPs, and th a t the  T P s may only be executed by authorized subsets of 
users.
T h e o r e m  7.1 Each CDI may be modified only by the associated TPs.
P ro o f:  Only dom ain c d i_ d j can modify c d i_ t j ,  and it can be entered only through its
entry points, which are the T P s allowed to  modify c d i_ t j .  Note th a t M BLP is only 
enforcing the dom ain to  type access, not entry  points. Since the code for all entry points 
m ust be meticulously verified anyway, we consider this sufficient. I
T h e o re m  7.2 TPs may only be executed by certain subsets of users.
P ro o f :  This second restriction requires policy adm inistrators to  review the T P  code on
a case by case basis, in order to  ensure th a t (a) only the authorized users are allowed 
to  complete execution, and (b) authorized users cannot cause the T P  to  run  any other 
(unauthorized) code. However, Clark and W ilson found no more autom ated way of enforcing 
th is restriction, and acknowledged th is as a  weakness of their policy, as well as of, perhaps 
the  integrity problem  as a  whole. In  other words, this is a  feature of CD I’s, ra ther th an  a 
weakness of DTE. 1
7.3 .2  M B L P  E nforces A ssured  P ip e lin es
An assured pipeline, introduced in Section 2.2.5, perm its the control of d a ta  flow through 
a  system. To show th a t s e c r e t  and p r o te c t  statem ents can express assured pipelines, we 
begin w ith the D TE policy excerpt in Figure 7.5. The pipeline is im plem ented as domain
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
C H APTER 7. A N A LYSIS OF D TE POLICIES  117
p ip e_ d  w ith a single restrictive (and verified) entry point. It flows d a ta  from type s r c _ t  
into type d e s t_ t .  We define the following two rules:
p r o te c t  d e s t_ t  ex c ep t from  p ip e_ d  
s e c r e t  s r c _ t  e x c ep t from  p ip e_ d
Showing th a t this policy implem ents an  assured pipeline requires proving the following 
three statem ents, m entioned in Section 2.2.5.
T h e o re m  7.3  Data may not flow from  s r c _ t  to d e s t_ t  except by passing exclusively 
through p ipe_d .
P ro o f:  We know th a t cwa —»• dest_t R W (d i)  for all domains other th an  p ipe_d , whose
entry point im plem ents the pipeline’s functionality. If this were not so, an M BLP analysis
would detect and warn of another dom ain’s w rite access to  d e s t_ t .  I
T h e o re m  7 .4  The pipeline’s results cannot be reversed or modified.
P ro o f:  The policy ensures th a t cwa -»■ dest_t ^  R W (d i ) for all domains except p ipe_d . 
T he policy adm inistra tor m ust verify the entry point to  d e s t_ t  to  ensure th a t it cannot 
be used in order to  rewrite results of already completed transform ations. Since p ip e_ d  is 
listed as an integrity exception, an M BLP analysis program  would warn of any domains
which could overwrite or replace the entry point, so th a t once the entry po in t’s code has
been verified, the  entry point rem ains trustworthy. I
T h e o re m  7.5 Subsystem is correct.
P ro o f:  This is proven by the im plem enter of the entry point to  p ipe_d , or the policy
adm inistrator, on a case by case basis. I
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Of course, while s e c r e t  and t r u s t e d  statem ents are very expressive, we still wish to 
allow labeling dom ains as fully trusted , The type accesses allowed such a  dom ain will not 
affect the calculation of the BLP < relation. For instance, the following line would be added 
to  the h a l t  domain:
t r u s t e d  domain h a l t_ d
Now the fact th a t h a lt_ d  is able to  read and w rite all domains will not necessarily cause 
all types to  be of equal security level, as it would w ithout either this statem ent, or large 
num ber of s e c r e t  and t r u s t e d  statem ents. One side-effect of declaring a dom ain as tru sted  
should be for the policy analysis program  to declare the trusted  dom ain’s entry types as 
protected w ithout exceptions, and warn the policy adm inistrator to  verify the code of all 
executables which are assigned these entry types.
ty p e s  . . .  s r c _ t  d e s t_ t  p ip e d _ e t . . .  
domains . . .  daemon_d p ip e_ d  . . .
spec_dom ain daemon_d ( . . . )  ( . . . )  (au to -> p ip e _ d ) ( . . . )  
spec_dom ain p ip e_ d  (p ip e d _ e t)  ( . . .  w -> d e st_ t r - > s r c _ t )  ( . . . )
a s s ig n  - e  p ip e d _ e t /s b in /p ip e d _ e x e c u ta b le
Figure 7.5: Policy excerpt implementing an assured pipeline.
The algorithm  to  calculate our modified BLP relation is shown in Figure 7.6.
7.4 Examples of Analysis Using M BLP
We are now ready to analyze several policies using the modified BLP relation. W hen 
discussing the  partia l relation induced on types by the modified BLP, we will relate it in
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fo r  each se c r e t  type t  do
i f  u n tru sted  domain d may read t
ensure d i s  an ex cep tio n  to  t ’ s secrecy  
fo r  each p r o te c te d  typ e t  do
i f  u n t r u s te d  dom ain d may w r i te  t
ensure d i s  an ex cep tio n  to  t ’ s p r o te c t io n  
fo r  each u n tru sted  domain d do 
r e a d l i s t  = NULL 
w r i t e l i s t  = NULL 
fo r  each type a c c ess  from d do
i f  access==read  and not s e c r e t ( ty p e )  
r e a d l i s t  .= type;  
i f  a c c e ss= = w r ite |r e p la c e  and not p r o tec te d (ty p e )  
w r i t e l i s t  .= type; 
fo r  each r e a d e l in  r e a d l i s t  do
fo r  each w r ite e l  w r i t e l i s t  do
d e fin e  "readel <= w r ite e l"
Figure 7.6: Algorithm to calculate the modified BLP relation
the  form of a directed graph. Nodes in th is graph will be types, or sets of types. An edge 
from node V\ to  node Vj indicates th a t V\ < V^. In general, we will combine types which 
are equal into one node, so th a t, for the most part, an edge from V\ to  V2 will actually 
indicate V\ < V2 . W here this is not the case, the cycle will be m ade obvious.
We begin w ith w hat we will call our base policy, shown in Appendix A .1.1. Figure 7.7 
shows the associated BLP relation graph.
In the base policy, the  level of most types is equal. The only types which are not 
equal to  all others are base_t, d isk_t, ge tty_x t, lo g in _ e t, sb in_t, sh e ll_ t . We have no 
inform ation to relate any of these types to  each other, however all are less th an  the group 
of all o ther types.
Now let us analyze a  more complicated policy, which implements a passw_d dom ain to 
which users can switch to  safely change passwords. This policy is shown in A ppendix A .1.2.
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base t
disk t
getty_xt
login_et
sbin t
Conglomerate
shell t
F igure  7.7: BLP less than relation graph for base policy.
If we do not specify any secrecy or protection rules, the result is the  ordinary BLP relation, 
shown in Figure 7.8. The entry type passw _et cannot be overw ritten by anyone, and is 
therefore strictly  less th an  or unrelated  to all other types. However, passw _t and shadow_t 
are bo th  equal to  most o ther types, since passw _d may read and write bo th  these types in 
addition to  lo g _ t, which is equal to  the m ajority of types in the policy.
base t
disk t
getty_xt
login_et
Conglomerate
passw_et-
shell t
sbin t
F igure  7.8: BLP less than relation for password policy.
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Now let us define some protection rules to  be taken into account while calculating the 
modified BLP. We will use the following set of rules:
s e c r e t  shadow_t e x c ep t from  passw _d, lo g in _ d  
p r o te c t  passw _t ex c ep t from  passw _d
By m aking lo g in _ d  and passw _d exception domains, we autom atically cause our algo­
rithm  to  add the following rules:
p r o te c t  passw _et 
p r o te c t  lo g in _ e t
This will provide some bit of assurance th a t these domains, which have been granted 
unusual power, will not easily be subverted.
T he resulting BLP relation is shown in Figure 7.9.
base t-
disk_t-
1ogin_et-
passw_et-
passw_t
shell_t
sbin t-
Conglomerate ) " shadow_t
F igure  7.9: Modified BLP less than relation for the password policy.
Now type shadow_t is strictly  greater th an  all other types. This is because shadow_t 
may only be read by passw_d, which is listed as a  secrecy exception. Consequently, during
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calculation of the M BLP < relation we say th a t no domains may read shadow_t. However, 
since we did not list any integrity rules regarding shadow_t, it was listed in the write 
set for passw_d. Since passw _d could read l i b _ t ,  while it could w rite shadow_t, the BLP 
calculation algorithm  found th a t l i b _ t  <  shadow_t. Note th a t if we had used the following 
rule:
p r o te c t  shadow_t ex c ep t from  passw _d
then  shadow_t would have been unrelated  to  all other types.
The modified BLP also relates passw _t as strictly  less th an  all types to  which it is 
related. This is because, the only dom ain which may write to passw _t is listed as a write 
exception, causing passw _t not to  be placed in its w rite set. The type is therefore not 
placed in any w rite sets, and therefore is never calculated to  dom inate any other types. 
T he com bination of the passw _t protection rule, and the  resulting BLP relation, provide 
us more inform ation about who may w rite to  passw _t than  we would have either using 
straight BLP, or by listing passw _d as a  tru sted  domain.
C hapter 6 provided straightforw ard tools for editing and viewing D TE policies. This 
chapter presented more intricate techniques for policy analysis. The next chapter will 
similarly expand upon the creation of policies. The work of this chapter will also become 
more practical as it is integrated into the  process of policy composition.
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Construction of D TE Policies from  
M odules
C hapter 6 presents tools to  create, edit, and analyze D TE policies. However, when working 
w ith large policies, pa tterns begin to emerge. Policies typically consist of several sets of 
domains and types. The entities w ithin a set work together to achieve some goal. However, 
the  sets often interact very little. For instance, in the ftp  policy presented in Figure 3.2, the 
dom ain f tp d _ d , and the types f tp d _ t  and f tp d _ x t ,  work together to  protect the system 
from an unsafe binary. By removing these entities, and all references to  them , the rem aining 
policy becomes simpler. We will call th is collection of domains, types, and all access rules 
pertain ing to  them , a  module. The F tp  m odule is shown in Appendix A .2.3. The rem aining 
base m odule is shown in Appendix A.2.1.
Allowing policies to  be composed from simple, meaningful, and coherent pieces, will serve 
several purposes. F irst, creation of policies will become far more efficient. For instance, 
when adding a  new dom ain to  an existing policy, one might have to  enter hundreds of type 
accesses in order to  get it properly interacting w ith the current policy. In contrast, modules 
allow dom ains and types to  be grouped at several levels, and access to  be specified using
123
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any of these groups.
Second, adding a feature to  a  policy, such as a new m ethod of controlling access to  the 
shadow file, or protection from a critical binary in which an as-yet unsolved vulnerability 
has been found, will become a simpler task. The m odule can be w ritten  entirely from its 
own point of view. Furtherm ore, in researching the state  of the current policy, in order 
to  understand how to  properly insert a new feature, one need only look at those modules 
which can affect the  new functionality.
Third, modules may be helpful in simplifying the analysis, and proof of invariants, of 
policies. For instance, several modules may be trivially  shown to be irrelevant to  the ability 
of the in e td  daemon, if remotely exploited, to  erase the  utmp log file.
Finally, because a  m odule generally encodes domains, types, and access rules which work 
together toward some end, it is a na tu ra l way to  express the security policy changes necessary 
for a new piece of software. Software companies and free software groups, therefore, could 
d istribute policy m odules along w ith software packages.
We begin by describing the behavior of the  D T E Policy Compiler (dpc), which we have 
w ritten  to  construct a  policy from modules. Next, we describe in detail, and prove the 
correctness of, m ethods to autom atically ensure certain  properties will m aintained after 
module application. Finally, in order to  show the usefulness of th is idea, we will present 
several modules which, while simple and clean in  themselves, will compose into a very 
powerful policy.
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8.1 Policy Compiler File Formats
This section provides syntax specifications of the dpc control file, modules files, and patch 
files.
8.1.1 C ontrol F ile  Sp ecification
T he D TE policy compiler takes its instructions from a  single control file. By default, this 
file is called c o n tr o l ,  although another file can be nam ed on the command line. The sample 
control file shown in Figure 8.1 applies the F tp  m odule and a set of service modules to  the 
base modules. In  th is section, we provide the BNF specification of the dpc control file, 
interspersed w ith fu rther explanations.
< c o n tr o l_ f i le >  : :=  <command_line> *
<command_line> : :=  <read_cmd> I
<load_policy_cm d> I 
<apply_cmd> I 
<patch_cmd> I 
<write_cmd>
<load_policy_cm d> : :=  lo a d _ p o lic y  <policy_m odule> <policy_nam e>
The lo a d _ p o lic y  statem ent causes dpc to  load a Policy Consistency Package, or pep. 
Section 8.2 will describe this feature in detail. A pep is implem ented as a Perl module, 
meaning th a t the pep nam ed BLP m ust be located in the  file BLP. pm. The <policy_m odule> 
is the name of the Perl m odule which implem ents the pep. The <policy_nam e is the name
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which dpc will assign to  th is pep. The assertion statem ents discussed in Section 8.1.2 will 
associate themselves w ith pep using th is name.
<read_cmd> : :=  r e a d  < file _ g lo b >
This causes dpc to  read a  m odule file or set of m odule files from disk. Simple filename 
globbing is supported. For instance, line 3 in Figure 8.1 causes all files under directory 
S e rv ic e  to  be read. A m odule file may contain any num ber of modules, none of which 
need reflect the filename. Each m odule is stored separately in  memory. They are not yet 
combined.
<apply_cmd> : :=  ap p ly  <module_glob>
Instructs dpc to  apply a specified m odule or list of modules to  the current policy. Ap­
plying a m odule means th a t its types and domains are added to  the policy, and access 
rules between the types and dom ains of all applied modules are resolved. The algorithm  
for doing so is discussed in detail in Section 8.1.2. The m odules m ust have previously 
been read using the r e a d  command. Modules may be specified by m odule name, or by 
namespace hierarchy. The namespace hierarchy is delimited by Appending to  a 
m odule name indicates all modules a t th is level level should be applied, while a  “+ ” in­
dicates all descendants m ust be applied. For instance, line 4 of Figure 8.1 would cause 
modules nam ed “System .base.types” and “System .base.dom ains” to  be applied, bu t not 
“System.base.security.passw” . Line 6, however, would cause “Service.daemons.sshd” as 
well as “Service.daemons.security.login.sshd” to  be applied.
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All modules specified in a single apply directive are applied simultaneously. See the
discussion of dom ain and type grouping in Section 8.1.2 for details of how this affects the
tim ing and, therefore, the results of group expansion.
<patch_cmd> ::=  patch  <file_nam e>
This feature allows patching the  final policy w ith simple changes for the sake of policy 
testing. A patch file can specify addition or removal of type assignment statem ents, dom ain 
transition  rules, dom ain signal rules, entry points, and domain to  type access rules.
<write_cmd> ::=  w r ite  <file_nam e>
This instructs dpc to  w rite the  policy as calculated thus far to  the  specified filename. 
Specifying the name std ou t directs dpc to  w rite to  standard  ou tput. Line 8 in Figure 8.1 
causes dpc to  write the policy to  the  file d te .c o n f. Any num ber of w rite commands may 
occur throughout the control file, allowing the saving of policies a t various stages of module 
application.
The rem aining lines complete the above definitions.
< file _ g lo b >  ::=  < file_ ex p >  +
< file_ ex p >  ::=  <pathname> I <pathname>.
<module_glob> ::=  <module_exp> +
<module_exp> ::=  <module_name> I <module_name>." .*"  I
module_name.".+"
# In o th er  words, th e se  are b a s ic  s tr in g s :
<module_name> ::=  [a -z A -Z ][a -z A -Z \-_ 0 -9 .]+
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<path-name> ::=  <file_nam e> [ /  <file_nam e> ]*
<file_nam e> ::=  [a -z A -Z ][a -z A -Z \-_ 0 -9 .]+
<policy_name> ::=  [a -z A -Z ][a -z A -Z \-_ 0 -9 .]+
<policy_m odule> ::=  [a -z A -Z ][a -z A -Z \-_ 0 -9 .]+
01. lo a d _ p o lic y  blp_mod blp
02. read System /Base
03. read S e r v ic e /*
04. apply System .b ase .*
05. apply S e r v ic e .f tp
06. apply S erv ice.daem on s.+
07. patch  f t p .a s s e r t
08. w r ite  d te .c o n f
8.1 .2  M odule F ile  Specification
Here we discuss the structu re  of a m odule file. We will use the F tp  m odule shown 
A ppendix A .2.3 as an example. The m odule syntax specification follows.
<m odule_file>  ::=  <module>+
Figure 8.1: Sample dpc control file.
<module> ::=  Module <mod_name>
[<domain_def> |< typ e_d ef> I<group_def>]+
end
<domain_def> ::=  domain <dom_name>
<dom_line>+
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end
A m odule file may contain more th an  one module. Each m odule may contain several 
domain, type, and group definitions, as well as the access rules pertaining to them .
<dom_line> ::=  e n tr ie s  <type_name>+ I
[a b so lu te ] s ig n a l  [ in  I out] <gen_dom> <sig_num> I 
[a b so lu te ] domain [ in  I out] <gen_dom> [auto I exec I none] I 
[a b so lu te ] type <gen_type> <type_acc> I 
a s s e r t  <policy_name> <data>
DEFAULT_DOMAIN
The dom ain definitions declare a (unique) name for the domain, a set of entry types, 
and a set of access rules pertaining to  the  new domain. Domain transition  or signal access 
rules may be “in” , in which case they specify access from other domains to  the new domain, 
or they may be “ou t” , defining access from the new dom ain to  other domains. Since types 
are passive objects, which cannot themselves access other types or domains, the type access 
rules in a dom ain definition do not include the  “in” or “out” keyword.
Exactly one dom ain definition applied to  a policy must contain the keyword “DE­
FAULT .DO M AIN” . T h a t dom ain will be assigned to  the first process on the system.
<type_def> ::=  type <type_name>
<type_line>+
end
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<typ e_ lin e>  ::=  <path_type> <path_name>+ I
[a b so lu te ] a c c ess  <gen_dom> <type_acc> I
< defau lt_ type>  I
a s s e r t  <policy_name> <data>
< defau lt_ type>  ::=  DEFAULT_ETYPE I DEFAULT_UTYPE I DEFAULT_RTYPE
Type definitions declare a (unique) name for the  type, a set of paths assignment rules, 
and a set of access rules. Clearly, the access rules are only incoming from domains. E ither 
one type m ust also be associated w ith the “DEFAULT_RTYPE” keyword, or bo th  the 
“DEFAULT_ETYPE” and “D E FA U LTJJTY PE” keywords m ust be associated w ith one 
type each, in order to  define default types for the  file system.
Both type and dom ain definitions may contain “assert” statem ents. These are used for 
m aintenance of policy constraints. They are stored w ith the type definition until m odule 
application, bu t their in terpretation  and enforcement is defined by the peps as described in 
Section 8.2. The last line of the f  tpd_xt type definition in the F tp  module is an example of 
an assert statem ent, instructing a m odule loaded as “b lp” to  label this type as protected.
<group_def> ::=  group domain <dom_name>
import <dom_name>+ 
end
<group_def> ::=  group type <type_name>
import <type_name>+
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end
<gen_dom> : :=  a l l  I none I <dom_name>
<gen_type> : :=  a l l  I none I <type_name>
Grouping is accomplished on several levels. F irst, one may simply specify “all” to  refer 
to  all domains or types which are currently known. Second, a group definition in a m odule 
may define a nam ed group of domains or types. For instance, the m odule segment listed 
in Figure‘8.3 defines a dom ain group consisting of several dom ains which are not trusted . 
The m odule segment listed in Figure 8.4 defines a type which is actually called ro o t_ t . 
Since th is is the typenam e which will be used in the final D TE policy, no names w ithin the 
namespace may actually clash. 1 Modules may refer to  this type using any of the following 
names:
1. r o o t_ t
2. b a s e .e x t r a n e o u s .r o o t_ t
3. a l l
4. b a s e .e x t r a n e o u s .*
5. b a s e .e x t r a n e o u s .+
6. b a s e .+
xThis could be worked around by autom atically randomizing the name in the event of a clash, but this 
sim ply was not a great concern for th is prototype.
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In addition, any type groups which have im ported this type can also be used to refer to 
th is type.
The name b a s e . extraneous may be a  real type, or it may simply be a namespace 
placeholder, depending on w hether any module defines a type by th a t name.
<type_name> ::=  [a-zA-Z] [a -zA -Z 0-9_ .]*
<dom_name> ::=  [a-zA-Z] [a-zA -Z 0-9_ .]  *
<path_name> ::=  [ /< file_nam e>  ] +
<policy_name> ::=  [a-zA-Z] [a -zA -Z 0-9_]*
<data> ::=  *
8.1.2.1 Priority of Access Rules
Since dom ains and types can declare conflicting access rules, we m ust clearly define the 
priority of access rules. Much thought has been given to the current priorities, which have 
been somewhat modified following experience w ith an earlier m odule compiler prototype. 
The priority takes the form of an integer between 1 and 8. The priority assigned to  access 
rules is shown in Table 8.2.
If two rules exist pertain ing to  the access perm itted  from a dom ain to another dom ain 
or type, then  the rules w ith the highest priority will be applied. For instance, the base 
m odule’s definition of type base_t specifies th a t all domains have “absolute” access “rxld” 
to  base_t. However, the F tp  m odule’s definition of dom ain ftpd_d contains the statem ent:
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Type of access Priority  level
Absolute in 8
A bsolute out 7
Single destination in 6
Single destination out 5
Group in 4
G roup out 3
Default ("all” ) in 2
Default ("all”) out 1
F igure  8.2: Priorities of access rules 
a b s o lu te  ty p e  a l l  none
Since an “absolute in” access rule has a  higher priority than  “absolute out” , f  tpd_d will 
receive “rxld” access to b ase_ t. W ithout this, it would not be able to  access any other 
types, as it could not descend to  the files of those types. Similarly, the types defined in 
the  F tp  m odule m ust specify access from dom ain ftp d _ d  as “absolute” , as th a t is the only 
access which will override th a t listed in the specification for ftpd_d. On the other hand, the 
specification for type b in _ t includes a  norm al “group in” definition. As this is of a lower 
priority th an  “absolute ou t” , the access rule specified by the F tp  m odule is chosen, denying 
ftp d _ d  all access to  type b in _ t. This is a crucial element of the F tp d  module, preventing 
the  ftp server from providing attackers w ith root shells, for instance.
Note th a t incoming access always overrides outgoing access. More specific rules override 
more general rules, unless the “absolute” keyword is present in one of the rules.
8.1.2.2 Group Expansion
As explained in Section 8.1, the m odule compiler applies sets of modules when directed to 
do so by the control file. Since more modules can be read later, we m ust clearly define the 
behavior of group expansion.
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For nam ed dom ain and type groups, the  group is simply expanded at the tim e of m odule 
application. If the group has not yet been defined, an  error is raised and com pilation fails. 
For namespace globbing, th a t is, * and +, the currently defined descendants and children 
(respectively) of the parent being expanded are used. For instance, assume we applying a 
m odule which contains the rule
domain some_domain
ty p e  b a s e .e x e c .+ rwx
end
If the  only children of b a s e . exec defined thus far are b a s e . e x e c . s b in  and 
b a s e .e x e c .b in ,  then  only these types are included in th is rule. A later m odule may define 
type b a se  .e x e c . ja v a b in , bu t this type will not be added to  the access rule.
The a l l  group behaves differently, however. An access rule directed at a l l  will be 
expanded at the  tim e of m odule application. However, a generic form of the rule is also 
stored. All such generic rules are expanded each tim e a set of m odules is applied. If  the 
rule had not previously been applied, any policy consistency modules will be consulted at 
the  new rule creation, ju st as w ith any other new access rule. For example, the base m odule 
defines default access “rid” to  type b a s e s t  for a l l  domains. This rule is expanded after 
each m odule application, so th a t all dom ains will be granted this access.
8.1.2.3 Inheritance
An issue which may deserve further consideration is th a t of inheritance. It would seem to 
make sense to  construct the type namespace such th a t certain properties, perhaps “absolute”
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access rules, are autom atically inherited by the children of a type. On the other hand, this 
may simply needlessly complicate the process of policy creation, the simplification of which 
is the precise goal of the policy compiler.
8.1.3 P a tch  F ile  Specification
The patch file may specify any access rules, entry  point, or type assignments which m ust, 
or must not, be a  part of the final policy, regardless of the result of m odule application. 
The patch file is read and applied a t the point where the control file instructs dpc to do 
so. Presum ably, th is would usually be the last action prior to  w riting the final policy. A 
sample patch  file is shown in Figure 8.5. The syntax of the patch file follows.
< p a tc h _ f ile >  : :=  < p a tch _ lin e> *
< p a tc h _ lin e >  : :=  [n o t] <patch_cmd>
<patch_cmd> : :=  domain_ep <domain> <type> I
dom ain_type <domain> < type_acc>  " to "  <type> I 
d om ain_ trans  <domain> <x_acc> " to "  <domain> I 
dom ain_sig  <domain> < s ig n a l>  " to "  <domain> I 
ty p e _ a s s ig n  <type> < ta_ o p tio n >  <path_name>
All aspects of the policy can be controlled by the  patch  file. No group expansion of any 
type is performed, so only plain dom ain and type names may be used. The m eaning of 
a statem ent may be inverted by prepending w ith the word “not” . For instance, line 4 of 
Figure 8.5 indicates th a t the dom ain ftpd_d  may not have read access to  type shadow_t. If 
this access was granted by some module, then  the  access will be revoked.
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In the case of a violation of a type assignment assertion, only a  warning is given. This 
is because there is no single correct way to handle the violation. For instance, in the case 
of line 5 of Figure 8.5, if /e tc /p a s s w d  is assigned the  etype u se r_ t as a  result of a rule 
assigning u s e r_ t  recursively to  / e t c ,  it is not clear w hether dpc should revoke the original 
rule, or simply issue a  conflicting rule for only the file /e tc /p a s sw d .
The rem ainder of the  patch  file specification follows.
<x_acc> "auto" | "exec" I "none"
<typ e_acc> : : = "none" I [rw xlcda]+
< sign al> : : = [0-32] | "none"
<ta_option> : : = "_r " | M_u » | M —g •! | » -eu N
<domain> : : = [a -zA -z ][a -zA -Z _ 0 -9 ]*
<type> : : = [a -zA -z ][a -zA -Z _ 0 -9 ]*
<path_name> : : = <file_nam e> [ /  <file_nam e> ]*
<file_nam e> : : = [a -zA -Z ][a -z A -Z \-_ 0 -9 .]+
group domain un tru sted _ d o m ain _ g ro u p
im port f tp d _ d  ta lk d _ d  f in g e rd _ d
end
Figure 8.3: A group declaration combining some untrusted domains
ty p e  b a s e . e x tr a n e o u s .r o o t_ t  
DEFAULT_RTYPE 
[ . . . ]
end
F igure  8.4: A possible definition of type root.t.
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01. domain_type ftpd _d  none to  sb in _ t
02. domain_type ftpd _d  none to  b in _ t
03. domain_type ftpd _d  r id  to  b ase_t
04. not domain_type ftpd _d  r  to  shadow_t
05. not ty p e _ a ss ig n  u se r _ t - e  /e tc /p a ssw d
Figure 8.5: A sample dpc patch file.
8.2 Autom atic M aintenance of Policy Constraints
In  chapter 7, we analyze D T E  policies by using concepts from simpler access control systems 
to  introduce relations on objects and subjects. TIS used this concept to  enforce the m ain­
tenance of specific relations across applications of run-tim e policy changes. We generalize 
th is idea by building into dpc a pluggable architecture to  support m aintenance of policy 
constraints for any policy.
Using the load _p o licy  directive in the control file, the  policy compiler is instructed to  
load a  Policy Consistency Package, or pep. The pep is a generic Perl module. For instance, 
in the line
lo a d _ p o lic y  BLP b lp
‘B L P’ is the name of the file (minus .pm extension) wherein the package is located, and 
‘b lp ’ is the keyword which D TE modules will use to  identify the module.
Recall th a t the dpc applies modules when requested by a  line in the control file such as
apply S e r v ic e .f tp d  U sers .*
All modules specified in the ‘apply’ line will be applied simultaneously. For any type or 
dom ain introduced in some module, the pep will make consistency guarantees for all subse­
quent m odule applications. The pep m ust define two functions, pre_apply and p o st .apply.
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• p re _ a p p ly  is called before the domains and types defined in the modules about to 
be applied are added to  the global lists of domains and types. The pep can there­
fore calculate the security properties, levels, or relations which exist and m ust be 
m aintained.
• p o s t_ a p p ly  is called after the modules have been fully applied. The pep may now 
decide whether any security properties which existed at p re _ a p p ly  have been violated, 
and act accordingly. Since the pep is a full Perl module, it can choose to  simply warn 
of the violation, or stop the  policy compiler altogether.
A pep can thus be w ritten  to  calculate and m aintain any type of relation or property 
found to  exist prior to  m odule application. Obvious examples include the BLP <  relation, 
the Ring policy <  relation, assured pipelines, and the MBLP <  relation. To provide further 
inform ation to  a  pep, modules may use the “assert” keyword as described in Section 8.1.2. 
The m odule syntax specifies th a t  assert statem ents should include the pep name followed by 
any data. The entire assert statem ent is stored w ith the rest of a  m odule’s inform ation for 
the  dom ain or type to  which the  assertion relates, so th a t the  pep may find all assertions 
relevant to  it during p re _ a p p ly  and p o s t_ a p p ly . The BLP pep does not make use of 
“assert” . The pep to  enforce the modified BLP presented in Section 7.3 uses “assert” to 
append s e c r e t  and p r o te c t  statem ents with types and domains.
8.2.1 C orrectness o f  th e  B L P  P C P
We have implem ented a sample pep to enforce the m aintenance of the BLP ^-property. The 
main code of the pep is shown in A ppendix A .3.2, A .3.3, and A.3.4. We now show th a t
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BLP.pm  will in fact detect any violations of the BLP ^-property. Recall th a t the ^-property 
states:
Vx e V  and a,b  G T  : r ( x , a) A w(x, b) => L(a) < L(b)
We define T> and T  as the sets of dom ains and types known before m odule application, 
and V  and T '  as the same sets after m odule application. We m ust show th a t p re_ a p p ly  
correctly calculates the <  partia l relation as defined by the ^-property. T hen we will show 
th a t, for all types in T , any changes to  the <  relations which are introduced by the module 
applications will be detected.
Theorem 8.1 BLP:-.calculateJ)lp correctly computes the B L P  < partial relation.
Proof:
We will show this by contradiction. Let us assume th a t some dom ain y  has read access 
to  a type c, and write access to  a  type d , bu t c a lc u la te _ b lp  does not report c < d.
C a lc u la te _ b lp  iterates over all dom ains in V .  Therefore, the loop spanning lines 04 to 
17 would be entered once w ith $dom set to  y. Since we have said th a t y  has read access 
to  c, the hash table $ d o m a in -> { " re a lta "}  exists, and contains the entry { " y " ," c " } . We 
therefore will enter the loop begun on line 08 w ith $ ty p e l set to  c. $ v a lu e  will contain the 
string representing access from y  to  c, which we have said contains ‘r ’. We therefore begin 
the  loop on line 11. Since we know y  to  have write (‘w ’) access to  “d” , we will reach line 
14, w ith $ ty p e l= c  and $type2=d. This contradicts our assertion. 7,BLP: : l e q  does contain 
{ " y " , "d"}.
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We m ust also show th a t ‘/,BLP: : l e q  does not contain any pairs {"u" , "v"}, where in fact 
it is not the  case th a t L(u) < L(v). Let us assume th a t this did in fact occur. This could only 
happen if there exists a dom ain “y” such th a t ’/.main: :d o m a in s{ "y "} -> { " re a lta "} -> { "u "}  
contains “r ” , and ’/.main: :d o m a in s{ "y "} -> { " re a lta "> -> { "v ">  contains “w” . We will 
claim w ithout proof th a t th is could occur only if in fact domain “y” had read access to 
type “u” , and write access to  type “v” . B ut if th is is the case, then, by the BLP ^-property, 
L(u) < L(v).
I
T h e o re m  8 .2  A t  BLP: :p re_app ly , B L P  calculates the correct < relation 
P ro o f:
BLP: :p re _ a p p ly  is shown in A ppendix A.3.3. Let us assume th a t there exists y  E V  
and c ,d  E T  such th a t r(y, c) A w(y, d), b u t ’/.BLP: : l e q  does not contain { " c " , "d"}.
BLP: :p re _ a p p ly  calls BLP: : c a lc u la te _ b lp .  Therefore, if ’/.BLP: : l e q  does not con­
ta in  {"c"  , "d"}, then  BLP: : c a lc u la te _ b lp  did not correctly calculate the BLP <  partial 
relation. However, we have shown th a t it does in fact correctly calculate <.
We can use the same argument to show that if ’/.BLP: : le q  contains {"c" , "d"}, then it 
must be that L(c) <  L{d).
I
T h e o re m  8 .3  I f  the B L P  < partial relation between the types in T  changes after module 
application, then the changes will be reported in line 13 of  BLP: :post_app ly .
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Proof:
We will prove th is by contradiction. BLP: :post_apply is shown in A ppendix A .3.4. 
Let us assume th a t the  application of a m odule introduces a  new relation e < f  on two 
preexisting types e and / .  We will a ttem pt to  show th a t BLP: :post_apply will not come to 
line 13 w ith ($a="e" ,$ b = " f" ), th a t is, it will not warn of this change in the BLP <  partial 
relation.
Line 04 com putes */„post_leq using BLP:: ca lcu la te_ b lp . As a  consequence of our 
previous proof, we know */,post_leq to  correctly represent the BLP < partial relation. 
Therefore, {" e" , " f "} E 7,post_leq, and the loop beginning at line 05 will be entered w ith 
$a="e". Since e G T , we will pass line 06. Line 07 will set $ b = "f". Again, since /  6 T ,  we 
will pass line 08. Finally, since e ^  / ,  we will pass line 09.
By our previous argum ent, the fact th a t L(e)  ^  L ( f )  a t BLP: :pre_apply means th a t 
("e" , " f ") ^  %BLP: :leq . We state  w ithout proof th a t  the  the function p a th _ ex ists_ o r ig  
shown in A ppendix A.3.1 is correct. It therefore will detect th a t ("e" , " f ") ^ ’/,BLP: :leq , 
and th a t there exists no ( t i , . . . ,  t„) E T  such th a t
(e) l^)> (^ 1) 2^ ); ■ ■ • j {tn—1 ) In)i {tm / )  G %BLP :: le q
T h at is, there exists no set of types related by <  such tha t, by transitivity, e <  / .  The 
function p a th _ ex ists_ o r ig  therefore re tu rn  false. Therefore, line 13 of BLP: :post_apply  
will be reached w ith $a="e" and $ b = "f", generating a warning about the change in the 
BLP <  partia l relation.
I
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8 .2 .2  M o d if ie d  B L P  P C P
The M BLP policy is introduced in section 7.3. We have coded a pep to  implement MBLP. 
Relevant excerpts of the code are shown in A ppendix A.4.
We wish to show th a t this pep correctly detects changes in the  M BLP < relation. As in 
the BLP pep correctness proof, we begin by showing th a t ca lcu la te_ m b lp  in fact computes 
the correct M BLP < relation on all types. A precise specification of the relation is given in 
Equation 7.1.
T h e o re m  8 .4  The c a lc u la te _ ra b lp  function shown in Appendix A .4-1 correctly calculates 
the M B LP  < relation.
P ro o f: Before calling ca lc u la te _ m b lp  on line 5, p re_ ap p ly  calls s e tu p _ a s s e r ts  on line 
4. This function walks through all MBLP assert statem ents which have been read. These 
assert statem ents specify secret types, protected types, tru sted  (ignored) domains and types, 
and secrecy and protection exceptions. As these lists are stored as simple arrays, we sta te  
w ithout proof th a t each of the above functions returns the  appropriate boolean:
1. i s _ ig n o re _ ty p e ( ty p e )
2. is_ igno re_dom ain (dom ain )
3. i s _ s e c r e t_ ty p e ( ty p e )
4. i s _ p r o te c te d _ ty p e ( ty p e )
5. i s _ p r o te c t_ e x c e p t io n ( ty p e , domain)
6. i s _ s e c r e t_ e x c e p t io n ( ty p e ,  domain)
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The M BLP is defined in Equations 7.1 through 7.3. We begin by showing th a t, if the 
relation
t i  < t2
is defined by the ca lc u la te _ m b lp  function, then  it is in fact the case th a t t\  < t 2. The 
definition of this relation occurs a t line 27.
27: append_leq('/0l e q ,  $ ty p e l ,  $ type2 ) ;
At th is point, the variable $dom represents the dom ain d, the variable $ ty p e l represents 
the type t \  to which d  has read access, and the variable $ type2  represents the type d  to 
which d  has write access. To reach line 27 w ith each of these variables so set, each of the 
following m ust be true:
1. d is not a tru sted  dom ain. Else this dom ain would be skipped a t line 07.
2. d  has read access to  t \ .  Else th is type would be skipped at line 11.
3. t \  m ust not be an ignored type. Else this type would be skipped at line 12.
4. d  is not listed as a  secrecy exception for t \ .  Else this type would be skipped a t line 
13.
5. d  has write access to  t 2. Else th is type would be skipped at line 20.
6. t 2 is not an ignored type. Else th is type would be skipped at line 21.
7. d is not a w rite exception for t 2. Else this type would be skipped at line 22.
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Conditions 1-4 satisfy each condition in Equation 7.2, while conditions one and 5-7 sat­
isfy Equation 7.3. This com bination satisfies the left hand side of Equation 7.1. Therefore, 
if c a lc u la te _ m b lp  defines t \  < 12 for some policy, then this relation holds under MBLP.
We next show th a t if it is the  case th a t t \  < t%, then  the c a lc u la te u n b lp  will define 
t \  <  t2. If t \  < t 2 , then  by Equations 7.1 through 7.3, there m ust be some dom ain d such 
th a t m r ( d , t i )  and m w (d , t2 )- By the definitions of m r (d , t i )  and m w (d , t 2 ), the domain 
m ust not be a tru sted  domain, t i  and £2 m ust not be ignored types, and d m ust not be 
a read exception for t \  or a w rite exception for t 2 - Looking back to  the ca lcu la te_ m b lp  
function in A ppendix A.4.1, we see the m ain loop spanning lines 4 to  30 iterates over all 
domains. Lines 6 and 7 skip a  dom ain only if d  is a trusted  dom ain or has no perm itted  
type accesses a t all. Otherwise we reach the nested loop which begins w ith line 9, iterating 
over all types to  which d  has some access. Types to which d does not have read access, or 
which are ignored types, are skipped on lines 11 and 12. Line 13 skips to  the next type if d 
is a secrecy exception for the current type. Lines 18 through 28 iterate  again over all types 
to  which d has access. Line 20 lim its the loop to  types to which d  has write access, and 
line 21 skips types for which d  is a  w rite exception. Note th a t each case where a type has 
been skipped has corresponded to  an exception in Equations 7.2 or 7.3. In  all other cases, 
we reach line 27, which defines the  relation t\ < t 2 -
The function ca lc u la te _ m b lp  therefore correctly calculates the M BLP < relation for 
any D TE policy.
I
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T h e o re m  8.5  I f  a module A4 adds a new M B L P  < relation between two preexisting types, 
then p o s t_ ap p ly  will warn of this new relation.
P ro o f:  We have shown in Theorem  8.4 th a t c a lc u la te  jnb lp  correctly calculates the MBLP 
<  relation. Line 05 of p re_app ly  places the  <  relation into the variable 70le q . As th is is 
called before m odule application, '/.leq  contains exactly the M BLP <  relation prior to 
application of m odule A4. Line 04 of p o s t_ ap p ly  places the result of ca lcu la te_ m b lp  
into the  variable */,post_leq. As this is called after application of m odule A4, */,post_leq 
contains exactly the M BLP <  relation after application of module M ..
Assume m odule M  added a relation a < b ,  where prior to application of M ,  a ^  b. This 
means th a t a t line 09 in post_ ap p ly , */0p o s t_ le q (a )  does contain b, while 7 ,leq (a) does 
not. Through the nested loops spanning lines 07-18 and 09-17, each pair of base types (a, b) 
for which 7 ,p o st_ leq  defines a < b will be checked. Since 70le q  does not also define a < b. 
line 17 will warn of the new relation. Since, again, we have shown 7 ,post_ leq  and 7.1eq to 
be correct, th is will be the case if and only if the m odule M  introduced th is relation, while 
the policy prior to  application of A4 did not contain th is relation. I
In Sections 7.3.1 and 7.3.2 we showed th a t the modified BLP can enforce assured 
pipelines and Clark-W ilson CDIs. Since we have ju st shown th a t the MBLP pep correctly 
enforces the m aintenance of modified BLP properties across m odule application, it follows 
th a t the M BLP pep can be used to  enforce assured pipelines and CDIs. Of course, other 
policy consistency packages can be w ritten  to  enforce any access control policies desired by 
the security adm inistrator. This is the most significant contribution of policy compiler’s 
pep architecture.
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8.3 Sample M odules
Previous sections have argued for the usefulness of modules, and presented their syntax. 
This section will present present several modules which we have used, to  the same ends. We 
begin w ith a base module, which defines types and domains which will be used by all other 
modules. Next we present a  m odule to  introduce a password domain, which can be used 
by ordinary users to  change their passwords, a  task requiring permissions which ordinary 
users lack. Following is an F tp  module, im plem enting protections similar to  those of the 
policy presented in [27]. Finally, we present a  m odule to  implement an assured pipeline for 
the system  log daemon.
8.3.1 B ase  M odule
The feasibility of specifying simple b u t powerful m odules in order to  enhance a D TE pol­
icy will depend on the ability to  specify an appropriate  base module. We desire little  or 
no namespace clashing between modules, b u t also wish to keep modules concise, w ith a 
minimum  num ber of access rules. Therefore we want very few, well thought out domains. 
We want to  avoid having too many types, bu t a t the same tim e we want to  split up files 
which have a  system-wide meaning. For instance, it is not our place to  assign types to  the 
/e tc /s s h d _ c o n f  ig  and related files. However, it is be tte r th a t we take care of / l i b  and 
/ u s r / l i b  now, since there is not one single m odule which can lay claim to those. A base 
m odule which we believe satisfies these subjective criteria is shown in A ppendix A .2.1.
The dom ain groups under Admin are undefined in the base module, b u t are intended to  
be defined in later modules, either as domains or groups of domains. For instance, each
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could be defined as a group containing the ro o t_ d  dom ain, although this would result in a 
far less secure system  th an  this base m odule is attem pting  to produce.
8.3.2 Passw ord  M odule
The base m odule defines types passw _t and shadow _t, and assigns type passw _t to  file 
/e tc /p a s s w d  and shadow_t to  /e tc /sh a d o w . However, it does little  w ith these types. 
Users may not change their passwords, for instance, as they are simply denied all access to  
shadow_t.
The passw ord  m odule shown in A ppendix A .2.2 defines a new domain, passw_d, which 
may be entered through / u s r / b in / p a s  swd by any domains defined in the base module. 
Type passw _t is redefined to  include a lock file and the tem porary file /e tc /p a s sw d .tm p . 
I t may now be read by all domains, since anyone is welcome to  basic user information. 
However, it may be w ritten  only by passw_d. Type shadow_t is also redefined. All domains 
are denied any access to  it. The only exceptions are lo g in _ d , which may read the shadow 
file, in order to  verify users logging in, and passw_d, which may w rite shadow_t in order to 
change passwords. Note th a t, under this policy, a successful a ttack  against most daemons 
running on the  system  will still not allow the attacker to  read even encrypted passwords. 
So long as we w rite a simple, and secure, passw d program , th is m odule affords the same 
flexibility as any current Unix system, combined w ith far greater security.
8.3 .3  F tp  M odule
The f t p  m odule is a  purely restrictive one. It is designed to  allow anonymous ftp  to  be 
offered despite known and unpatched vulnerabilities in the ftp daemon. It first denies all
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domains, except the newly defined f tp d _ d  domain, execute access to  / u s r / s b i n / i n . f t p d .  
It next prevents f tp d _ d  transitioning into any other domains, and denies it execute access 
to  any b u t its own executables, located under /h o m e /f tp /b in , its entry point, and system  
libraries. It is therefore impossible, for instance, to  offer a  root shell, since f tp d _ d  may not 
execute a shell. W rite access is very strictly  guarded as well. Since f tp d _ d  may not execute 
any types which it may modify, there is no possibility of any Trojan horse attacks, The f t p  
m odule is shown in A ppendix A.2.3.
8.3 .4  Syslog
The s y s lo g  module, shown in A ppendix A.2.4, implem ents an  assured pipeline (See C hap­
ter 2.2.5) as an ideal setting  for Bruce Schneier’s secure logging scheme [43]. No logging 
algorithm  can in itself prevent an attacker from forging new log entries. This algorithm , 
however, facilitates the detection of m odification or deletion of log entries which were com­
m itted  before the system  compromise. The hope is th a t one of the com m itted log entries 
will warn of the a ttack  in progress. In combining th is algorithm , an assured pipeline, and 
the enhanced protection of D TE over all system services, we aim  for these approaches to 
complement each other, providing a more secure system  than  either could provide sepa­
rately.
8.3 .5  C ontrol F ile
The m odule compiler m ust be directed by a control file. For the sake of completeness, a 
control file directing dpc to  create a D TE policy from all the modules listed above follows.
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read base.m odule  
apply System .Base 
read passw.mod 
read ftp.m od  
read syslog.m od  
apply S e r v ic e .*  
w rite  std ou t  
w rite  d te .c o n f
8.4 Conclusion
This chapter presented a  m ethod and tools for creating security policies from modules. The 
tool provides support for enforcement of arb itrary  policy assertions or relations between 
domains and types. We believe the  result is a  system which is a t the same tim e simple, 
powerful, and flexible enough to  perm it collaboration in construction of security policies. By 
perm itting  a community to  standardize upon a generic base m odule and type and dom ain 
namespace hierarchies, it becomes possible for a new application to  be d istributed w ith a 
policy m odule which can be integrated into end user policies. The work presented in this 
chapter is therefore essential to  the end goal, sta ted  in C hapter 1, of providing bo th  easy 
to  use and simple to adm inister m andatory  access control for Linux.
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Chapter 9
Im plem entation Extensions
T he current D TE im plem entation is sufficient to  set up a  flexible and secure MAC system. 
However, several extensions would far increase its usability. We discuss these here, and 
provide im plem entation details. However, these extensions have not been implemented.
The first extension copes w ith a new Linux file system  feature, namespaces. The second 
provides a  new m ethod for assigning types to  files, which is useful in particular for the 
/p ro c  file system.
Finally, we describe not a kernel extension, bu t a m ethod for extending D TE protections 
to  network services. We use the trad itional example of an NFS server.
9.1 Namespaces
A new, thus far little  used feature in Linux, is th a t of per-process namespaces [52], a concept 
first introduced in the P lan  9 operating system [40]. Traditionally, all processes in a Unix 
system  see the same file system tree. Initially, the same is true under Linux. A new option 
to  the fork system  call requests the cloning of a new file system tree. The forked process 
then  receives a  copy of the tree, cloned recursively starting  from the  file system root. Any
150
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changes effected by m ount activity in th e  new tree are seen only by the  forked process and 
its descendants. Likewise, changes to  the  old tree are not seen by processes using the new 
tree.
9.1 .1  P rob lem
T he file system  clone is implem ented by a recursive copy of v f smount structures. These 
kernel structures are the glue which holds file system  trees together, and are shown in 
Figure 2.7. For instance, a  m ount of /d e v /h d a 3  under /m n t/m isc  would create a v f smount 
s truc tu re  w ith pointers to  the root dentry  for the  file system stored on /d ev /h d a 3 , as 
well as its superblock, and insert th is struc tu re  a t the  d_vfsmnt pointer of the d e n try  
for /m n t/m isc . If /d ev /h d a 3  is already m ounted under /m n t/d is k , for instance, a m ount 
of / m n t /d i s k l / s c r a t c h / d l  would result in a sim ilar v f smount, bu t w ith its root d e n try  
pointer set to  the s c r a t c h /d l  directory on th a t disk.
In C hapter 3, we show th a t the m alleability introduced by binding is resolved by using 
inform ation stored at the superblock. A “real” m ount location for a file system  points to a 
v f  sm o u n t/d en try  pair, which together specify a single location in the file system  tree. We 
refer the real m ount location of a  file system  as the “real parent” of the root of the m ounted 
file system ’s root directory. W hen using m ultiple namespaces, the real m ount location for 
a file system  may point to  a vfsmount not in the current process’ namespace. At first 
glance th is feature seems safe to  ignore. However, it becomes dangerous when processes 
exit and namespaces are destroyed. The following scenario is not handled by the current 
D TE im plem entation:
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0: P ro c e s s  1 P ro c e ss  2
1: f o r k ( c lo n e ,  . . . )
2 : (b e g in  u n d er new nam espace)
3: mount /d ev /h d a 3  /m n t/b
4: e x i t
5: I s  /m n t/b
At line 5, the lookup of /m n t/b  will cause the  kernel to  dereference the  real parent 
v f smount for /m n t/b , which existed under the namespace for process 2. Since this names­
pace no longer exists, the reference is invalid.
9.1.2 So lu tion
The problem  introduced by per-process namespaces could be dealt w ith in several ways. 
We will m ention two. The first is to  ensure th a t all real parent v f smount structures are 
located in the original namespace, and th a t this namespace is never deleted. The second, 
simpler solution would be to  increase the namespace usage counter each tim e one of its 
v f  smounts is referenced by a superblock’s real parent pointer. This prevents the  namespace 
being deleted until all such superblocks are freed.
Both of these solutions perm it the  crossing of namespaces during a d te_d_path  call, 
which is the  only function using the real parent pointers. However, since throughout all 
m ount activity, D TE m aintains inform ation perm itting  it to recall the original tree struc­
ture, as described in Section 3.3, this will cause no ill effects. The additional code required 
to  cope w ith namespaces is shown in Figures 9.1 through 9.3.
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F ile :  s e c u r ity /d te /r e a d _ p o l ic y .c  
B eginning a t l i n e : 1543
in t  r ea d _ d te_ co n fig (v o id )
{
s tr u c t  d te _ fd a ta  s ta t ;  
char *c; 
in t  l in e  = 0;
in t  err  = 0;
/*  i n i t i a l i z a t i o n  o f v a r ia b le s  and memcaches * /  
num_dte_domains = 0;
+ d te_root_n s = current->nam espace;
+ atom ic_inc(& nam espace->count);
+ d te_root_d en try  = d g e t (c u r r e n t-> fs -> r o o t) ;
+ dte_root_m nt = m n tg et(cu rren t-> fs-> ro o tm n t);
dte_dom ains = kmalloc(8192,GFP_KERNEL);
dte_type_cache = km em _cache_create("dte_type_nam es",4096,
0 , 0 , NULL,NULL); 
dte_path_cache = kmem_cache_create("dte_path_nam es",4096,
0 , 0 , NULL,NULL);
Figure 9.1: Modification to DTE setup to store root namespace and prevent its unloading.
9.2 Accom m odating proc
The policy analysis sections (Sections 6  and 8 ) dem onstrated th a t in order to  allow powerful 
constructs such as CDIs and assured pipelines, it m ust be possible to  segment domains. This 
means th a t they are not forced to  read and w rite types which other domains may access. 
There is nothing inherent in Unix systems to  prevent this. Executables to  be run  by a 
segmented dom ain may be compiled statically, elim inating the need to  access shared library 
types, and may access their own private /tm p directories. Likewise access to  devices need 
only be carefully planned in advance. However, Linux does make it impossible to  segment
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F i l e :  s e c u r i ty /d te /m o u n t . c 
B eg inn ing  a t  l i n e r  188
/*  This fu n c tio n  lo o k s a pathname up much as th e  p la in  path_lookup, 
but always s t a r t s  from th e  root d ir e c to r y  o f th e  roo t namespace * /  
in t  d te_path _looku p(con st char *name, unsigned in t  f l a g s ,  
s tr u c t  nam eidata *nd)
{
n d -> la st_ ty p e  = L A ST _R 00T ; /*  i f  th ere  are on ly  s l a s h e s . . .  * /  
n d -> fla g s  = f la g s ;  
sp in _ lock (& d cach e_ lock );
/*  Because o f how we are c a l le d ,  th e  pathname must 
* always be a b s o lu te ! * /  
nd->mnt = d te_root_m nt; 
nd->dentry = d te_ ro o t_ d en try ; 
nd->old_mnt = NULL; 
nd->old_dentry = NULL; 
c u r r en t-> to ta l_ lin k _ c o u n t = 0; 
retu rn  link_path_w alk(nam e, n d );
Figure 9.2: New DTE function to descend pathname using root namespace.
a dom ain using purely sta tic  policies. The problem  is th a t domains m ust have access to 
files under /p ro c , the  pathnam es to  which cannot be predicted. If a process running under 
dom ain u se r_ d  has process id ( p id ) , then  its p ro c  files will be located under the directory 
/ p r o c / ( p i d ) / .
The only way to  handle th is using purely static policies is to assign a common type 
to  /p ro c , which all dom ains may read and write. However, the introduction of the BLP 
relation (see Section 7.2) on types will expose the problems this introduces. In  brief, it 
provides a venue for dom ains to  leak secret inform ation to each other, as well as a source
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F i l e : se c u r ity /d te /m o u n t . c 
( . . . c o n t in u e d .. . )
vo id  h ie r a r c h ic a l_ s e tu p (s tr u c t  vfsmount *mnt)
{
C . . .  ]
/*  Now g e t  an nd s tr u c t  fo r  th e  g iven  pathname.
* Note we do so u s in g  th e  roo t o f th e  root namespace 
r e tv a l  = d te_path _looku p(r-> path ,
L00KUP_F0LL0W|L00KUP_DIRECT0RY,
&nd2);
[ . . .  ]
i f  ( r e tv a l)  {
[ Log error  m essage ]
} e l s e  i f  (nd2.mnt != mnt) {
[ Log th e  pretend  mount ]
/*  Now we hook th e  pretend  pathname -  w hich, aga in ,
* came from th e  ro o t namespace * /  
sb_sec->m nt_parent = m ntget(nd2.m nt); 
sb_sec->m ountpoint = d g et(n d 2 . d e n tr y );
d te_cop y_ in o_sec(n d 2 .d en try -> d _ in od e, m nt->m nt_root->d_inode); 
p ath _re lease(& n d 2); 
r e tu r n ;
>
[ . . .  ]
>
Figure 9.3: Modification to DTE hierarchical mount information setup.
of inform ation w ith which to  corrupt high integrity data. 1
Most DTE-like im plem entations take a  much more dynamic approach to type-nam e 
binding th an  our im plem entation. Once a file system has been initialized using the type 
assignm ent rules of some policy, any files subsequently created are assigned typenam es 
based upon the dom ain creating the file. Conceptually, this greatly complicates the state  
of a system  after it has run  for some time. One cannot actually predict the type which is
!For instance, the data for a Trojan horse replacement for a critical binary
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assigned to  a file except im m ediately after system  initialization. 2 However, for the p ro c  
file system, th is approach provides a na tu ra l solution.
We are not willing to  give up the  clarity of static  type-nam e binding which our imple­
m entation of D TE uses for perm anent file systems. However, for one-time file systems, the 
more dynam ic approach may often be the right one. Of course, since we currently see a case 
where an  alternative is useful for a  one-time file system, we cannot predict th a t we will not 
find such a case for a persistent file system. We therefore propose the following non-trivial 
enhancem ent to  our im plem entation of DTE.
All dom ains will be associated w ith a  default type, as is the  case in o ther DTE-like 
systems. In  most cases this will be ignored, and type assignment will continue to  be based 
upon pathnam es. However, a new form of m ounting restriction will be allowed. In ad­
dition to  specifying “pretend” m ounting pathnam es by device, as well as m ount location 
restrictions, policies will be able to  specify statem ents of the form
r e s t r i c t  [maj] [min] u se_ d efa u lt_ d o m a in _ ty p e
or
r e s t r i c t  f s ty p e  u se_ d efa u lt_ d o m a in _ ty p e
For instance, specifying
r e s t r i c t  p ro c  u se _ d e fau lt_ d o m ain _ ty p e
will give us our desired result.
2Note that this is not system boot. System initialization is a one-time event.
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It m ust be noted th a t the p roc  deficiency is mainly one of analysis. Actually using 
/p ro c  to  directly leak inform ation is infeasible, as no process is allowed w rite access under 
/ p r o c / ( p i d ) .  Therefore /p ro c  could a t best be used as a sublim inal channel [42].
9.3 Providing Network Security
Most existing T E  and D TE im plem entations have extended their protections by sending 
dom ain and type inform ation along w ith each network packet. We now consider in greater 
detail the  justifications for doing so.
9.3.1 Security
In Section 3.2.5, we claim th a t extending D TE protection to  network packets is not very 
helpful. Consider a dom ain name server. We m ight wish to  assign some type, such as 
auth_dns_t, to  all DNS query responses. This type name would indicate th a t the source 
of the packet was in fact a valid DNS server. In  th is way, any packets not of this type 
could be considered unsafe. However, subsequently claiming th a t packets which are of this 
type are safe, would be fallacious. Simply typing network packets does not provide any 
additional security. Forging th is inform ation is no more complicated th an  forging a packet 
to  come from a different host, which would still be required were we not using D TE over 
the network.
In order to  make the D TE type inform ation worthwhile, it m ust be authenticated  using 
a public key cryptosystem . 3 An example protocol is shown in Figure 9.4. This protocol 
aims to  au thenticate the server, bu t takes no steps to authenticate the client to  the server.
3No existing implementation of TE or DTE has gone to this effort.
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We assume th a t dispensing DNS inform ation does not violate any security policy. The DNS 
server possesses private key P R ,  and all clients have access to  its corresponding public key 
PU.  We use E p r  to  indicate public key encryption, D p u  to indicate public key decryption, 
and Ck  to  indicate sym m etric key encryption and decryption. Q is the DNS query.
Im plem enting th is protocol a t the kernel level would greatly complicate the D TE code, 
bu t would be worthwhile if it in fact provided additional security. In fact, there is no doubt 
th a t this protocol in itself provides a  great deal of security. However, integrating D TE into 
th is protocol gains us nothing. The addition of the auth_dns_t field into the responses by 
the DNS server provides no security beyond th a t afforded by the protocol itself. Therefore, 
the protocol m ight as well be im plem ented a t the application level, or outside the D TE 
subsystem  a t the  kernel level. The private key P R  should, of course, be protected using 
D TE such th a t no service running on the DNS server, except the DNS service itself, is 
allowed to  read, or modify the key. Now the key verifies th a t the DNS server is not being 
spoofed, and nothing bu t a compromised named itself could compromise the key. O f course, 
if named is compromised, nothing can be done, so th is service also m ust be protected using 
DTE.
We have ju st shown th a t D TE cannot protect a client from a malicious server. Likewise, 
D TE cannot protect a server from a malicious client. An obvious example is an NFS server 
which exports file types along w ith the file system. W hile a friendly and DTE-aware system 
may respect the type assignments, a malicious client will simply ignore th is inform ation and 
freely publicize top secret data.
Finally, extending D TE over the network makes the synchronization of policies through­
out the network far more im portant. For instance, an NFS server might export a file of
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type sb in _ t. It would seem prudent for the server to  deny root write access to  th is type, 
which generally contains more im portant, and less frequently updated, types th an  b in _ t. 
However, if any client is configured to  perm it root w rite access to  sb in _ t, perhaps for the 
sake of convenience, then  the server’s policy is im m ediately compromised. Provided th a t 
D TE control of networking does become a reality, policy synchronization may become an 
interesting new area of research, as the question of authenticating the source of updates, 
and minimizing the requisite tru s t placed in the subsystem  performing the updates, appears 
quite complicated.
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Step DNS Server DNS client
1 Create nonce R
2 P\  =  E Kp r (R,  1, ”auth_dns_t”)
3 Send P i Receive P i
4 { R , X , T ) = D Kpu(P)
5 Break unless T  =  ”auth_dns_t” and X  =  1
6 P2 = Cr (Q, 2)
7 Receive P 2 Send P 2
8 ( Q , X , 2 ) = C r (P2)
9 Break unless X  =  2
1 0 Calculate response as V
11 P 3 =  C r (V, 3, ”auth_dns_t” )
1 2 Send P 3 Receive P 3
13 ( V , X , T ) = C R(P3)
14 Break unless T  =  ” auth_dns_t” and X  =  3
15 Use V
Figure 9.4: Protocol to provide server authentication
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9 .3 .2  C onvenience
We have shown above th a t using D TE to protect network d a ta  is not justified. O f course, 
there rem ains the possibility th a t DTE-controlled networking provides convenience. D TE 
would append two pieces of inform ation to  each network packet. The first is the type of the 
data , however th a t is determ ined. The second is the dom ain of the process which generated 
the  data.
For many system services, these provide no additional information. Some services pro­
vide only one type of data , which is uniquely identified by the po rt over which the service 
is accessed. Examples include n tp d , which provides clock synchronization information, and 
f  in g e rd , which provides user information.
The example which TIS provided of a  useful feature supported by the D TE control of 
networking is for exporting D TE types along w ith files from a NFS server. In  this section 
we discuss m ethods of integrating D TE and NFS.
9.3.2.1 Static Type Assignment
NFS can, of course, be used w ith our D TE prototype w ithout any further extension. The 
sim plest, and perhaps safest, m ethod of doing so would be to  assign an untrusted  type, 
e x te r n a l_ t ,  to  a pa th  / n f s ,  under which all file systems im ported over NFS are mounted. 
T he NFS server can be set up so as to  prevent modification of files, while the client forbids 
execution of NFS-m ounted files.
This protocol is not very useful. Files served by NFS need to  appear to  be a more natu ral 
p a rt of the client file system. W ith  a  little  planning, however, static  type assignment 
to  local pathnam es can be used provide adequate support for NFS. For instance, if we
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were to  im port s e r v e r : / e x p o r t / u s r / l o c a l  under / n f s / u s r / l o c a l ,  we could assign an 
appropriate  type, be th a t b in _ t or n fs_ b in _ t, while another file system from the same 
server, s e rv e r : /e x p o r t /h o m e  could be m ounted under /n fs /h o m e 2 , and again assigned an 
appropriate  type. This simple and obvious solution should in fact be sufficient, since NFS 
setups are in most cases very static. A file server may export some binaries in order to  
save space on clients, and some /home and d a ta  directory trees in order bo th  to  facilitate 
centralized backups, and to  allow users access to  their da ta  from any client. Once the 
exports are in place, they rarely change, unless the file server itself undergoes a significant 
change as well, such as the installation of a  new disk.
9.3.2.2 Server-Directed Type Assignment
TIS was not satisfied w ith th is setup. They wanted to  grant the NFS server the ability to 
export typenam es along w ith files. In  th is way, an adm inistrator could decide th a t a new 
directory, s e rv e r  : / e x p o r t / u s r / l o c a l / s b i n ,  should be assigned n fs_ sb in _ t, and make 
the  change only once, a t the server. Perhaps more convincing, types created by users under 
s e rv e r : /e x p o r t /h o m e  would be exported under the appropriate type. TIS therefore typed 
all network packets, and created a  DTE-aware NFS client which used this inform ation to 
assign types to  NFS files. In  addition, it used the source dom ain a ttrib u te  to  file write 
requests from NFS clients in order to  authenticate NFS writes. If we wish to  provide this 
functionality, we have two options. F irst, we can, as TIS did, extend D TE functionality 
into the  kernel networking code. Second, we can modify the NFS server and client code to 
provide this functionality w ith less additional kernel support.
The im plem entation which we propose will alter the  NFS protocol to  explicitly export
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the  type of a file along w ith a file itself. The NFS server now requires no expansion of D TE 
controls. The n f s d  daemon is modified to  add an i n t  d te_ type  field to  the n f s _ f a t t r  
structure, which we append at the end of the  f  s /n f  s d /n f  sx d r . c :e n c o d e j f a t t r  function, 
and decode at the end of the f  s /n f  s /n f  s 2 x d r . c :x d r  .decode J a t t r  function. The NFS 
client sim ply copies the d te_ type  field from the svc_f h  structure  into the LSM inode security 
field. These extensions are shown in Figures 9.5 through 9.8. In  addition, a t the s ta rt of the 
NFS m ount, the  server and client m ust agree on an index to  typenam e conversion, which 
of course predisposes agreement on a set of typenames.
As a further extension of the n f s d  daemon, it could be perm itted  to  set types exported 
to  clients differently th an  those on the server. For instance, the directory served from 
s e r v e r : /ex p o rt/h o m e  may be labeled e x p o rt_ t a t the server, bu t home_t a t the client. 
Since clients and servers frequently view the  same file system differently, th is should be a 
very useful feature.
The adm inistrative convenience afforded by this architecture can be combined with 
increased security by using a two-way version of the public key cryptography protocol 
described in Figure 9.4. In  th a t case the  NFS server can refuse to  serve any files, or only 
files of certain  types, based upon the client’s key, or lack thereof, and clients can be assured 
of the authenticity  of the da ta  they are served. Additionally, since adding the d te .ty p e  
field to  the svc_fh  field am ounts to  a fundam ental NFS incompatibility, the server m ust 
fall back to  the standard  protocol if it is to  be allowed to  serve non-DTE clients. This was 
not a problem  for TIS, as they utilized the IP  options field to share type information, which 
non-D TE machines would simply ignore. 4
4This is not quite true, as some operating systems crashed when presented with nonstandard IP options.
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We have proposed an alternative architecture for NFS servers to  share type inform ation 
with DTE-aware clients. We argue in its favor on account of the simpler im plem entation - 
only a few lines of kernel code need be changed. However, T IS ’ solution is more general. 
Should there in fact tu rn  out to  be many services which benefit from the sharing of D TE 
types, then  T IS ’ solution will be more appropriate. We, however, do not believe this to  be 
the case, and feel th a t  D TE is b e tte r used to  protect binaries, libraries, and cryptographic 
keys, th an  to  directly protect network protocols itself.
9.4 Conclusion
This chapter presented extensions to, and uses of, the D TE m odule whose im plem entation 
we feel would significantly enhance the m odule’s usefulness. These extensions have not yet 
been implem ented, b u t are considered a fruitful area of future work.
DTE network servers therefore did not send DTE information to such hosts.
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F ile :  f s /n f s d /n f s x d r . c 
B eginning a t l in e :  134
s t a t i c  in l in e  u32 *
e n c o d e _ fa ttr (s tr u c t  sv c_ rq st *rq stp , u32 *p, s tr u c t  svc_fh  *fhp)
[ . . .  ]
i f  (rq stp -> rq _ reffh -> fh _ v ers io n  == 1
&& r q stp -> r q _ r e ffh -> fh _ fs id _ ty p e  == 1 
&& (fh p -> fh _ ex p o rt-> ex _ fla g s  & NFSEXP_FSID))
*p++ = h to n l((u 3 2 )  fh p -> fh _ e x p o r t-> e x _ fs id );
e ls e
*p++ = h to n l((u 3 2 )  s ta t .d e v ) ;
*p++ = h to n l((u 3 2 )  s t a t . i n o ) ;
sb_sec = ( s tr u c t  d te_ in od e_sec) s ta t .d e n tr y -> in o d e -> i_ se c u r ity ;  
*p++ = h to n l((u 3 2 )  s b _ se c -> e ty p e );
*p++ = h to n l((u 3 2 )  sb _ se c -> u ty p e );
*p++ = h to n l((u 3 2 )  s ta t .a t im e ) ;
*p++ = 0;
*p++ = h to n l((u 3 2 )  lea se_get_m tim e(d en try -> d _ in od e));
*p++ = 0;
*p++ = h to n l((u 3 2 )  s ta t .c t im e ) ;
*p++ = 0;
retu rn  p;
Figure 9.5: The code to export DTE types from NFS server.
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F ile :  f s /n f s /n f s 2 x d r . c 
B eginning a t l i n e : 98
s t a t i c  u32 *
xdr_d ecod e_fattr(u 32  *p, s tr u c t  n f s _ f a t t r  * f a t t r )
{
[ . . .  ]
fa t t r -> d u .n fs 2 .b lo c k s iz e  = n toh l(*p + + );  
fa ttr -> r d e v  = n toh l(*p + + );  
fa t tr -> d u .n fs 2 .b lo c k s  = n toh l(*p + + );  
f a t t r - > f s id  = n toh l(*p + + );  
f a t t r - > f i l e i d  = n to h l(* p + + );
+ fa t tr -> e ty p e  = n toh l(*p + + );
+ fa ttr -> u ty p e  = n toh l(*p + + );
p = xdr_decode_tim e(p , & fa ttr -> a tim e); 
p = xdr_decode_tim e(p , & fattr->m tim e); 
p = xdr_decode_tim e(p , & fa ttr -> c tim e ); 
f a t t r -> v a l id  |= NFS_ATTR_FATTR;
i f  ( fa t tr -> ty p e  == NFCHR && fa ttr -> r d e v  == NFS2_FIF0_DEV) { 
fa t tr -> ty p e  = NFFIFO;
fattr->m ode = (fattr->m ode & ~S_IFMT) I S_IFIF0; 
fa ttr -> r d e v  = 0;
}
retu rn  p;
>
Figure 9.6: Code to import DTE types into NFS client from the network.
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F ile :  f s / n f s / i n o d e . c 
B eginning at l in e :  645
/ *
* Look up th e  inode by super b lock  and f a t t r - > f i l e i d .
* /
s t a t i c  s tr u c t  inode *
 n f s _ fh g e t (s tr u c t  super_block  *sb , s tr u c t  n fs_ fh  * fh ,
s tr u c t  n f s _ f a t t r  * f a t t r )
{
C . . .  ]
i f  ( in o d e -> i_ s ta te  & I_NEW) {
[ . . .  ]
in o d e -> i_ s iz e  = n ew _ is ize ;  
inode->i_m ode = fattr->m ode;  
in o d e -> i_ n lin k  = fa t tr -> n lin k ;  
in o d e-> i_ u id  = fa t tr -> u id ;  
in o d e -> i_ g id  = fa t tr -> g id ;
+ i_ s e c  = ( s tr u c t  d te_ in od e_sec  * ) in o d e -> i_ se c u r ity ;
+ i_ se c -> e ty p e  = n fs_ co n v _ d te ty p e(sb , f a t t r - > e t y p e ) ;
+ i_ sec -> u ty p e  = n fs_ co n v _ d te ty p e(sb , f a t t r -> u t y p e ) ;
} e ls e
[ . . .  ]
n fs_ r e fr e sh _ in o d e (in o d e , f a t t r ) ;
[ . . .  ]
o u t :
retu rn  inode;
out_no_inode:
p r in tk ("  n fs_ fh g e t:  ig e t  f a i le d \n " ) ;
goto  out;
>
Figure 9.7: NFS client code to copy DTE types into inodes at first read.
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F ile :  f s / n f s / i n o d e . c 
Beginning a t l i n e : 997
in t
 n fs_ r e fr e sh _ in o d e (s tr u c t  inode * in od e, s tr u c t  n f s _ f a t t r  * fa t t r )
{
[ . . .  ]
inode->i_m ode = fattr->m ode; 
in o d e -> i_ n lin k  = fa t tr -> n lin k ;  
in o d e-> i_ u id  = fa t tr -> u id ;  
in o d e -> i_ g id  = fa t t r -> g id ;
+ i_ s e c  = ( s tr u c t  d te_ in od e_sec  * ) in o d e -> i_ s e c u r ity ;
+ i_ se c -> e ty p e  = n fs_ co n v _ d te ty p e (sb , f a t t r - > e t y p e ) ;
+ i_ sec -> u ty p e  = n fs_ co n v _ d te ty p e (sb , f a t t r -> u ty p e ) ;
i f  ( fa t t r - > v a l id  & NFS_ATTE_FATTR_V3) {
/ *
* rep ort th e  b lock s in  512byte u n its  
* /
in o d e-> i_ b lo ck s = n fs _ c a lc _ b lo c k _ s iz e ( fa t tr -> d u .n fs 3 .u s e d ) ; 
in o d e -> i_ b lk s iz e  = in o d e -> i_ sb -> s_ b lo c k s iz e ;
C . . .  ]
Figure 9.8: NFS client code to insert DTE types into inodes on refresh.
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Conclusion
This work has presented an efficient, non intrusive im plem entation of Domain and Type 
Enforcement for the  Linux kernel. I t  also presented user-level tools for the creation, analysis, 
and m aintenance of D TE policies.
Parallel to  th is effort, a few other projects have also implemented various security ex­
tensions and m andatory  access control system s for Linux. The most popular of these is the 
National Security A dm inistration (NSA)’s SELinux. At the moment, SELinux supports 
Type Enforcement, on which D TE was based, as well as RBAC. Its RBAC im plem entation, 
however, is designed as a  bridge between the  Unix user concept, and T E  domains. Most 
SELinux work is taking two forms. F irst, the  security m odule itself is continually being 
improved. As it benefits from NSA employees being paid for working on SELinux full time, 
it has consistently been fastest out of all LSM m odules to  keep up w ith changes to  the Linux 
kernel. Second, much work is being done to  develop useful SELinux policies. Note th a t this 
is distinct from the work presented here. We provide tools and processes for analyzing and 
building policies. The SELinux project, w ithout the  benefit of such tools, is a ttem pting  
to  develop policies which bo th  secure a Linux system, and minimize user im pact. In other 
words, the work presented here should benefit the SELinux policy developers.
169
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Clearly, a useful next step for this project would be to join efforts w ith the SELinux 
community. Extending the D TE Policy Composer (dpc) to  ou tpu t bo th  D TE and SELinux 
T E  policies should be straightforward. Further modifications to  support SELinux RBAC 
could easily be implem ented as a post-processing filter, such as dpc’s “patch” . We would 
also like to  consider merging the two, such th a t a  m odule can specify bo th  T E  and RBAC 
rules.
Another direction in which we plan to  take th is work, is to  study and implement more 
peps for dpc. A pep can implement any type of algorithm  which involves attaching infor­
m ation to a type or dom ain in a m odule definition, and using this information to  observe 
and record properties before and after all subsequent m odule applications. The pep could 
therefore enforce m aintenance of powerful access control policies such as assured pipelines, 
or the modified BLP which our pep enforces. It can also enforce arb itrary  assertions, such 
as “No dom ain which may read type a_t, should ever be allowed to  reach dom ain b_d.” 
Further possibilities should emerge as we continue to  study properties of bo th  safe and 
unsafe policies.
Despite adapting our tools to  work w ith SELinux policies, the D TE kernel m odule will 
continue to  be m aintained. There are several reasons for this. F irst, we feel the D TE module, 
by using hierarchical assignment rules and not typing network packets, is a lightweight LSM 
m odule ideal for use in many situations. Second, as the LSM project is not yet complete, 
it will benefit from the availability of several modules. This availability will continue to 
dem onstrate the  value of LSM to critics, as well as help to keep LSM true  to  its goal of 
providing generic support for m ultiple policies.
We would also like to  complete im plem entation of the extensions listed in C hapter 9.
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Addressing the problem  of namespaces will soon not be optional. Providing additional 
m ethods for specifying file-type resolution will greatly extend the usefulness of DTE. Finally, 
we would like to  im plem ent the  protocol shown in Figure 9.4. Following the example of 
the key server provided by P lan  9 [12], the service would be provided to  local servers 
over a pseudo file system. It would also be loaded as a separate kernel module, for two 
im portant reasons. F irst, it allows us to  keep im plem entations of complicated secret and 
public key cryptographic functions outside the D TE module. Second, as flaws are found 
in the im plem entation, or even the protocol itself, addressing these flaws will not require 
distribution of a  whole new D TE module. This extension would not be required to  protect 
a stand-alone system  using D TE, and such a system  should therefore not be slowed down 
or complicated by the  extensions, nor be forced to  upgrade due to  flaws in the extension.
A more dangerous, b u t promising, endeavor would be to  enhance the D TE kernel module 
such th a t it can process peps. A D TE policy could load a set of peps a t boot tim e, and 
perm it application of m odules which do not violate the  pep at run-tim e. This would be 
similar to  T IS ’ run-tim e dynam ic policy modification, bu t w ith several advantages. The 
use of arb itra ry  peps would enhance b o th  its power and usefulness. The use of modules, 
ra ther th an  policy excerpts, would encourage the application of complete, well thought out 
modules, ra ther th an  the piecemeal application of policy rules. Finally, as a m odule is 
considered one entity, its application or refusal would be one atom ic action. The question 
of whether a subset of the  subm itted  rules should be retained if another rule is rejected is 
moot.
As the num ber of people using the internet for financial transactions, email, and enter­
tainm ent purposes continues to  increase, com puter security is becoming a common topic of
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m ainstream  media. As a result, most people are aware of the  inadequate security offered 
by current operating systems. In  th is work we presented bo th  a m odule which significantly 
enhances the security of the  Linux operating system, and tools aimed at simplifying its 
configuration.
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A ppendix A
D TE Policy, M odules, and PC P  
Listings
A .l Sample DTE Policies 
A .1.1 B ase P o licy
ty p es b ase_ t b in _ t b oo t_ t co n f_ t dev_t d isk _ t g e tty _ x t  i n i t _ t  \
l ib _ t  lo g _ t  lo g in _ e t  mnt_t o s h e l l_ t  package_t proc_t r o o t_ t  sb in _ t \  
s h e l l_ t  tmp_t t t y _ t  u se r _ t varrun_t wdev_t 
domains boot_d daemon_d lo g in _ d  root_d  user_d  
d e fa u lt_ d  boot_d
d e fa u lt_ e t  b ase_t  
d e fa u lt_ u t  b ase_t
spec_domain boot_d (0) (17 rx ld -> b a se_ t rx ld -> b in _ t rw xlcd->boot_t \
rw xlcd ->conf_t rw xlcd->dev_t r x ld -> in it _ t  r w x lcd -> lib _ t rw xlcd -> log_t \  
rwxlcd->m nt_t r x ld -> o s h e ll_ t  rw xlcd->proc_t r x ld -> sb in _ t  r x ld -> s h e l l_ t  \  
rwxlcd->tm p_t r w lc d -> tty _ t rw xlcd->varrun_t rwlcd->wdev_t) \
(2 auto->daemon_d au to -> log in _d ) (1 0->0) 
spec_domain daemon_d (1 g e tty _ x t )  (18 r ld -> b a se_ t \
rx ld -> b in _ t r x ld -> co n f_ t rx lcd -> d ev _ t r x ld -> g e tty _ x t  r x ld -> l ib _ t  \  
ra x ld -> lo g _ t rwxlcd->m nt_t r x ld -> o s h e ll_ t  rx ld ->package_t \  
rw xlcd->proc_t r x ld -> sb in _ t  r x ld -> s h e l l_ t  rwxlcd->tm p_t r w lc d -> tty _ t \  
r ld -> u se r _ t  rw xlcd->varrun_t rwlcd->wdev_t) (1 au to -> log in _d ) (1 0->0) 
spec_domain lo g in _ d  (1 lo g in _ e t )  \
(16 r ld -> b a se_ t rx ld -> b in _ t r ld -> c o n f_ t r x ld -> lib _ t  rw xlcd -> log_t \  
r x -> lo g in _ e t  r x -> o s h e ll_ t  rw xlcd->proc_t r ld -> r o o t_ t  r x ld -> sb in _ t  \
173
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r x -> s h e l l_ t  rwxlcd->tm p_t r w lc d -> tty _ t r ld -> u se r _ t rw xlcd->varrun_t \  
rw lcd->w dev_t) (2 exec-> root_d  exec-> user_d ) (1 0->0) 
spec_domain root_d  (1 s h e l l_ t )  \
(19 r ld -> b a se _ t rw xlcd->b in_t rw xlcd -> conf_t rw xlcd->dev_t r x ld -> d isk _ t  \  
rw x lc d -> lib _ t rw xlcd -> log_t rwxlcd->m nt_t rw x lc d -> o sh e ll_ t  \  
rw xlcd->package_t rw xlcd->proc_t rw xlcd -> root_t r x ld -> sb in _ t  \  
r x -> s h e l l_ t  rwxlcd->tm p_t r w lc d -> tty _ t rw xlcd->user_t rw xlcd->varrun_t \  
rwlcd->w dev_t) (1 au to -> log in _d ) (1 0->0) 
spec_domain user_d (2 s h e l l_ t  o s h e l l_ t )  (16 r ld -> b a se_ t rx ld -> b in _ t \  
r x ld -> c o n f_ t r ld -> d ev_ t r x ld -> l ib _ t  rwxlcd->m nt_t r x -> o s h e ll_ t  \  
rxld ->package_t rw xlcd->proc_t r x ld -> sb in _ t  r x -> s h e ll_ t  rwxlcd->tm p_t \  
r w lc d -> tty _ t rw xlcd ->u ser_t rw xlcd->varrun_t rwlcd->wdev_t) \
(1 auto­-> login_d) (2 14->0 17->0)
a ss ig n  -e b in _ t /b in
a s s ig n  -e o s h e l l_ t  /b in /a s h
a s s ig n  -e o s h e l l_ t  /b in /b a sh
a ss ig n  -e o s h e l l_ t  /b in /c s h
a ss ig n  - e o s h e l l_ t  /b in /s h
a s s ig n  -e o s h e l l_ t  /b in / t c s h
a s s ig n  -e s h e l l_ t  / s b in /s h
a s s ig n  -e lo g in _ e t  / s b in / lo g in
a s s ig n  -e b oo t_ t /b o o t
a s s ig n  -e dev_t /d ev
a s s ig n  -e t t y _ t  /d e v /t ty d ir
a s s ig n  -e wdev_t /dev/w devs
a s s ig n  -e con f_ t / e t c
a s s ig n  -e l ib _ t  / l i b
a s s ig n  -e lo g _ t  / lo g
a s s ig n  -e d isk _ t  /lo s t+ fo u n d
a ss ig n  -e mnt_t /rant
a s s ig n  -e package_t /o p t
a ss ig n  -e p roc_t /p roc
a ss ig n  -e r o o t_ t  /r o o t
a s s ig n  -e sb in _ t /s b in
a s s ig n  -e i n i t _ t  / s b i n / i n i t
a s s ig n  -e g e tty _ x t  /sb in /m in g e tty
a s s ig n  -e tmp_t /tmp
a s s ig n  -e b in _ t /u s r /b in
a s s ig n  -e l ib _ t  /u s r / i4 8 6 - l in u x - l ib c 5
a s s ig n  -e l ib _ t  / u s r / l i b
a s s ig n  -e l ib _ t  /u s r / l ib e x e c
a s s ig n  -e sb in _ t /u s r /s b in
a s s ig n  -e tmp_t /u sr/tm p
a s s ig n  -e l ib _ t  / v a r / l i b
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a s s ig n  - e  lo g _ t  /v a r / lo g
a s s ig n  - e  package_t /v a r /o p t
a s s ig n  - e  varrun_t /v a r /r u n
a ss ig n  - e  tmp_t /var/tm p
a ss ig n  -u  b in _ t /b in
a s s ig n  -u  b o o t_ t /b oo t
a s s ig n  -u  dev_t /d ev
a s s ig n  -u  t t y _ t  /d e v /t ty d ir
a s s ig n  -u  wdev_t /dev/w devs
a ss ig n  -u  con f_ t / e t c
a ss ig n  -u  i n i t _ t  / e t c / r c .d
a ss ig n  -u  u se r _ t /home
a ss ig n  -u  l ib _ t  / l i b
a ss ig n  -u  lo g _ t  / lo g
a ss ig n  -u  d isk _ t  /lo s t+ fo u n d
a ss ig n  -u  mnt_t /mnt
a ss ig n  -u  package_t /o p t
a ss ig n  -u  proc_t /p roc
a ss ig n  -u  r o o t_ t  /r o o t
a ss ig n  -u  sb in _ t / s b in
a ss ig n  -u  tmp_t /tmp
a ss ig n  -u  b in _ t /u s r /b in
a ss ig n  -u  l ib _ t  /u s r / i4 8 6 - l in u x - l ib c 5
a s s ig n  -u  l ib _ t  / u s r / l i b
a ss ig n  -u  l ib _ t  /u s r / l ib e x e c
a ss ig n  -u  sb in _ t /u s r /s b in
a ss ig n  -u  tmp_t /u sr/tm p
a ss ig n  -u  l ib _ t  / v a r / l i b
a ss ig n  -u  lo g _ t  /v a r / lo g
a ss ig n  -u  package_t /v a r /o p t
a ss ig n  -u  varrun_t /v a r /r u n
a ss ig n  -u  tmp_t /var/tm p
A . 1.2 Passw ord  P o licy
typ es b ase_ t b in _ t b oo t_ t con f_ t dev_t d isk _ t  g e tty _ x t  i n i t _ t  \
l ib _ t  lo g _ t  lo g in _ e t  mnt_t o s h e ll_ t  package_t proc_t r o o t_ t  sb in _ t \  
s h e l l_ t  tmp_t t t y _ t  u ser_ t varrun_t wdev_t passw_et passw_t shadow_t 
domains boot_d daemon_d lo g in _ d  root_d  user_d passw_d 
d e fa u lt_ d  boot_d
d e fa u lt_ e t  b ase_t  
d e fa u lt_ u t b ase_ t
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spec_domain boot_d (0) (17 rx ld -> b a se_ t rx ld -> b in _ t rw xlcd->boot_t \
rw xlcd -> conf_t rw xlcd->dev_t r x ld -> in it _ t  r w x lcd -> lib _ t rw xlcd -> log_t \  
rwxlcd->m nt_t r x ld -> o s h e ll_ t  rw xlcd->proc_t r x ld -> sb in _ t r x ld -> s h e l l_ t  \  
rwxlcd->tm p_t r w lc d -> tty _ t rw xlcd->varrun_t rwlcd->wdev_t) \
(2 auto->daemon_d au to -> log in _d ) (1 0->0) 
spec_domain daemon_d (1 g e tty _ x t)  (18 r ld -> b a se _ t \
r x ld -> b in _ t rx ld -> c o n f_ t rx lcd -> d ev_ t r x ld -> g e tty _ x t  r x ld -> lib _ t  \  
r a x ld -> lo g _ t  rwxlcd->m nt_t r x ld -> o s h e ll_ t  rx ld ->package_t \  
rw xlcd->proc_t r x ld -> sb in _ t r x ld -> s h e l l_ t  rwxlcd->tm p_t r w lc d -> tty _ t \  
r ld -> u se r _ t  rw xlcd->varrun_t rwlcd->w dev_t) (1 au to -> log in _d ) (1 0->0) 
spec_domain lo g in _ d  (1 lo g in _ e t )  \
(18 r ld -> b a se _ t rx ld -> b in _ t r ld -> c o n f_ t r x ld -> l ib _ t  rw xlcd -> log_t \  
r x -> lo g in _ e t  r x -> o s h e ll_ t  rw xlcd->proc_t r ld -> r o o t_ t  r x ld -> sb in _ t \  
r x -> s h e l l_ t  rwxlcd->tm p_t rw lc d -> tty _ t r ld -> u se r _ t rw xlcd->varrun_t \  
rwlcd->wdev_t r->shadow_t r->passw _t) (2 exec-> root_d  exec->user_d) \
(1 0- > 0 )
spec_domain root_d  (1 s h e l l_ t )  \
(21 r ld -> b a se _ t rw xlcd->b in_t rw xlcd ->conf_t rw xlcd->dev_t r x ld -> d isk _ t  \  
r w x lc d -> lib _ t rw xlcd -> log_t rwxlcd->m nt_t rw x lc d -> o sh e ll_ t  \  
rw xlcd->package_t rw xlcd->proc_t rw xlcd -> root_t r x ld -> sb in _ t \  
r x -> s h e l l_ t  rwxlcd->tm p_t r w lc d -> tty _ t rw xlcd ->u ser_t rw xlcd->varrun_t \  
rwlcd->wdev_t r->passw _et r->passw _t) \
(2 a u to -> log in _d  auto->passw_d) (1 0->0) 
spec_domain user_d  (2 s h e l l_ t  o s h e l l_ t )  (18 r ld -> b a se_ t rx ld -> b in _ t \  
r x ld -> co n f_ t r ld -> d ev _ t r x ld -> l ib _ t  rwxlcd->m nt_t r x -> o s h e ll_ t  \  
rxld ->package_t rw xlcd->proc_t r x ld -> sb in _ t  r x -> s h e l l_ t  rwxlcd->tm p_t \  
rw lc d -> tty _ t rw xlcd ->u ser_t rw xlcd->varrun_t rwlcd->wdev_t r->passw _et \  
r->passw _t) \
(2 a u to -> lo g in _ d  auto->passw_d) (2 14->0 17->0) 
spec_domain passw_d (1 passw _et) (7 r ld -> b a se_ t r ld -> u se r _ t rx->passw _et \  
rw lcd->passw _t rwlcd->shadow_t r ld -> l ib _ t  rw lcd -> lo g _ t) \
(0) (14->0 17->0)
a ss ig n  - e  b in _ t /b in  
a ss ig n  - e  o s h e l l_ t  /b in /a s h  
a ss ig n  - e  o s h e l l_ t  /b in /b a sh  
a ss ig n  - e  o s h e l l_ t  /b in /c s h  
a ss ig n  - e  o s h e l l_ t  /b in /s h  
a ss ig n  - e  o s h e l l_ t  /b in / t c s h  
a ss ig n  - e  s h e l l_ t  / s b in /s h  
a s s ig n  -e  lo g in _ e t  / s b in / lo g in  
a ss ig n  - e  b oo t_ t /b o o t  
a ss ig n  -e  dev_t /d ev  
a s s ig n  - e  t t y _ t  /d e v /t t y d ir
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a ss ig n  - e  wdev_t /dev/w devs
a ss ig n  -e  con f_ t / e t c
a ss ig n  - e  l ib _ t  / l i b
a ss ig n  - e  lo g _ t  / l o g
a ss ig n  - e  d isk _ t /lo s t+ fo u n d
a ss ig n  - e  mnt_t /mnt
a ss ig n  - e  package_t /o p t
a ss ig n  - e  proc_t /p roc
a ss ig n  - e  r o o t_ t  /r o o t
a ss ig n  - e  sb in _ t / s b in
a ss ig n  - e  i n i t _ t  / s b i n / i n i t
a ss ig n  - e  g e tty _ x t  /sb in /m in g e tty
a ss ig n  - e  tmp_t /tmp
a ss ig n  -e  b in _ t /u s r /b in
a ss ig n  - e  l ib _ t  /u s r / i4 8 6 - l in u x - l ib c 5
a ss ig n  - e  l ib _ t  / u s r / l i b
a ss ig n  -e  l ib _ t  /u s r / l ib e x e c
a ss ig n  -e  sb in _ t /u s r /s b in
a ss ig n  - e  tmp_t /u sr/tm p
a ss ig n  -e  l ib _ t  / v a r / l i b
a ss ig n  -e  lo g _ t  /v a r / lo g
a ss ig n  - e  package_t /v a r /o p t
a ss ig n  -e  varrun_t /v a r /r u n
a ss ig n  - e  tmp_t /var/tm p
a ss ig n  -u  b in _ t /b in
a ss ig n  -u  b oo t_ t /b o o t
a ss ig n  -u  dev_t /d ev
a ss ig n  -u  t t y _ t  /d e v / t t y d ir
a ss ig n  -u  wdev_t /dev/w devs
a ss ig n  -u  con f_ t / e t c
a ss ig n  -u  i n i t _ t  / e t c / r c .d
a ss ig n  -u  u se r _ t /home
a ss ig n  -u  l ib _ t  / l i b
a ss ig n  -u  lo g _ t  / l o g
a ss ig n  -u  d isk _ t /lo s t+ fo u n d
a ss ig n  -u  mnt_t /mnt
a ss ig n  -u  package_t /o p t
a ss ig n  -u  proc_t /p roc
a ss ig n  -u  r o o t_ t  /r o o t
a ss ig n  -u  sb in _ t / s b in
a ss ig n  -u  tmp_t /tmp
a ss ig n  -u  b in _ t /u s r /b in
a ss ig n  -u  l ib _ t  /u s r / i4 8 6 - l in u x - l ib c 5
a ss ig n  -u  l ib _ t  / u s r / l i b
a ss ig n  -u  l ib _ t  /u s r / l ib e x e c
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
APPEND IX A. D TE POLICY, MODULES, AND PCP LISTINGS
a s s ig n  -u  sb in _ t /u s r / s b in  
a s s ig n  -u  tmp_t /u sr/tm p  
a ss ig n  -u  l ib _ t  / v a r / l i b  
a s s ig n  -u  lo g _ t  /v a r / lo g  
a ss ig n  -u  package_t /v a r /o p t  
a s s ig n  -u  varrun_t /v a r /r u n  
a ss ig n  -u  tmp_t /var/tm p  
a ss ig n  -e  shadow_t /pwd/shadow
a ss ig n  - e  passw_t /pwd/passwd /pwd/passwd.tmp /pw d /.p w d .lock  
a ss ig n  - e  passw _et /sb in /p a ssw d
A .2 Sample DTE M odules
A .2.1 B ase M odule
Module System .Base
type b ase_t
DEFAULT.RTYPE
a b so lu te  a c c ess  a l l  r id
a b so lu te  a c c ess  boot_d rx ld
end
type b in _ t
upath /b in  
upath /u s r /b in  
upath /u s r / lo c a l /b in  
a b so lu te  a c c ess  a l l  r x ld  
a c c ess  A d m in .serv ices .+ rwxlcd
end
type b oot_t
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rpath  /b oo t
a b so lu te  a c c ess  a l l  none 
a c c ess  boot_d rwxlcd  
a c c ess  Adm in.kernel rw lcd
end
type con f_ t
a c c ess  boot_d r x lc d  
a c c ess  A dm in.config rwxlcd  
a b so lu te  a c c ess  a l l  r x ld  
rpath  / e t c
end
type dev_t
rpath  /d ev
a b so lu te  a c c ess  g e tty _ d  r x ld  
a c c ess  boot_d rwxlcd  
a c c ess  lo g in _ d  rwlcd  
a c c ess  Adm in.config rwxlcd  
a b so lu te  a c c ess  a l l  r id
end
type d isk _ t
a b so lu te  a c c ess  a l l  none 
a c c ess  A d m in .serv ices .+ rwxlcd  
rpath  /lo s t+ fo u n d
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end
typ e g e tty _ x t
epath /sb in /m in g e tty  
a c c ess  g e tty _ d  rx
end
type in i t _ t
a b so lu te  a c c ess  boot_d r x ld  
epath / s b i n / i n i t  
upath / e t c / r c .d
end
type l ib _ t
a b so lu te  a c c ess  a l l  r x ld
a c c ess  boot_d rwxlcd
a c c ess  A d m in .serv ices .+ rwxlcd
rpath  / l i b  / u s r / l i b  / u s r / l o c a l / l i b  /u s r / l ib e x e c  / v a r / l i b  
rpath  /u s r / i4 8 6 - l in u x - l ib c 5
end
type lo g _ t
a c c ess  boot_d rwxlcd  
a c c ess  g e tty _ d  rax ld  
a c c ess  log in _d  rwxlcd  
a c c ess  root_d  rwxlcd  
a c c ess  Admin.+ r id
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
APPEN D IX A. D TE  POLICY, MODULES, AND  PCP LISTINGS
ab so lu te  a ccess  a l l  none 
rpath / l o g  
rpath / v a r / lo g
end
type lo g in _ e t
epath / b i n / l o g i n  
epath / b in / s u  
ab so lu te  a c c ess  log in _d  rx  
ab so lu te  a c c ess  a l l  none 
a c c ess  A d m in .serv ices .+ rwxlcd
end
type o s h e l l_ t
epath /b in /a s h  
epath / b in /c s h  
epath / b i n / t c s h  
a c c ess  a l l  rx 
a c c e ss  Admin.* rwxlcd
end
type proc_t
rpath /proc  
a c c ess  a l l  rwxlcda
end
type r o o t_ t
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rpath / r o o t
ab so lu te  a c c es s  a l l  none 
a c c ess  root_d  rwxlcd
end
type sb in _ t
rpath / s b i n  / u s r / s b i n  / u s r / l o c a l / s b i n  
a b so lu te  a c c es s  a l l  r x ld  
a c c ess  Admin.sbin rwxlcd
end
type s h e l l _ t
epath /b in /b a s h  
epath /b in / s h  
a c c e ss  a l l  rx
end
type tmp_t
a c c ess  a l l  rwxlcd
rpath /tmp /usr/tm p /var/tm p
end
type t t y _ t
a c c es s  a l l  rwlcd  
rpath / d e v / t t y d ir
end
type u ser_ t
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a ccess  g e tty _ d  r id  
a ccess  lo g in _ d  r id  
a c c ess  Admin.* r id  
a c c ess  user_d rwxlcd  
upath /home
end
type varrun_t
a ccess  a l l  rwxlcd  
rpath /v a r /r u n
end
type wdev_t
rpath /dev/w devs  
a b so lu te  a c c e s s  a l l  rwlcd
end
domain System.boot_d  
DEFAULT_DOMAIN 
domain out g e tty _ d  auto 
s ig n a l  out a l l  0
end
domain S e r v ic e .g e t ty _ d  
e n t r i e s  g e t ty _ x t  
domain out lo g in _d  auto
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domain in  boot_d auto
domain in  A d m in .serv ices .+ exec
s ig n a l  out a l l  0
end
domain S e r v ic e . lo g in _ d  
e n t r i e s  lo g in _ e t  
domain in  A d m in .serv ices .+ exec  
domain in  log in _d  auto  
domain out U s e r s .* exec  
s ig n a l  out a l l  0
end
domain U s e r s . root_d  
e n t r i e s  s h e l l _ t  
domain in  log in _d  auto  
domain out a l l  none 
s ig n a l  out a l l  0
end
domain U sers .user_d
e n t r i e s  s h e l l _ t  o s h e l l _ t  
domain in  log in _d  auto  
a b so lu te  domain out U s e r s .* none 
s ig n a l  out a l l  14,17
end
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end
A .2.2 Passw ord M odule
Module Serv i c e .pas sword
domain passw_d
e n t r i e s  passw_et  
domain in  U s e r s .* auto  
a b so lu te  domain out a l l  none 
type a l l  none 
type u ser_ t  r id  
s ig n a l  out a l l  14,17  
s ig n a l  in  a l l  none
end
type passw_et
a b so lu te  a ccess  a l l  r
a ccess  passw_d rx
epath /b in /passw d  /u sr /b in /p a ssw d
end
type passw_t override
ab so lu te  a c c es s  a l l  r id  
a ccess  passw_d rwlcd  
epath /e tc /p a ssw d
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epath /etc /p assw d .tm p /e t c / .p w d . lo c k
end
type shadow_t
a b so lu te  a c c ess  a l l  none 
a c c ess  passw_d rwlcd  
a c c ess  log in _d  r id  
epath /e tc /sh ad ow  /etc /shadow .tm p
end
end
A .2.3 F tp  M odule
Module S e r v ic e . f t p
domain ftpd_d
e n t r i e s  f tp d _ e t
domain in  a l l  none
domain out a l l  none
domain in  boot_d auto
domain in  A d m in .se rv ic e s .+ exec
a b so lu te  type a l l  none
s ig n a l  out boot_d 14,17
s ig n a l  out A d m in .serv ices .+ 14,17
end
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type f t p _ t
aaccess  a l l  none 
a b so lu te  a ccess  ftpd_d r id  
rpath /hom e/ftp
end
type f tp d _ e t
a c c es s  a l l  r
a b so lu te  a ccess  ftpd_d rx  
epath / u s r / s b i n / i n . f t p d
end
type f tp d _xt
a c c e s s  a l l  none 
a b so lu te  a ccess  ftpd_d r x ld  
a c c ess  root_d rwcld  
rpath /h o m e /ftp /b in  
a s s e r t  b lp  p r o tec t
end
type ftpd_wt
a c c ess  a l l  none
ab so lu te  a ccess  ftpd_d rwcld
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rpath /hom e/ftp /incom ing
end
end
A .2.4 Syslog  M od u le
Module S e r v ic e . s y s lo g
domain sy s log_d
e n t r i e s  sy s lo g _ x t  # /u s r / s b in /s e c u r e _ s y s lo g _ d
domain in  a l l  none
domain in  boot_d auto
domain out a l l  none
type urandom_t r
type dev_t r  # in  case no urandom type  
s ig n a l  in  a l l  none 
s ig n a l  out boot_d 14,17
end
type sy s lo g _ x t
a c c e s s  a l l  none
a c c e ss  boot_d r
a c c e s s  sys log_d  rx
epath /u s r / s b in /s e c u r e _ s y s lo g _ d
end
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type s y s lo g _ in _ t
a c c ess  a l l  a
a c c es s  sy s lo g _ d  r
epath /v a r / lo g / s e c u r e _ lo g _ in
end
type sy s lo g _ o u t_ t
a c c es s  a l l  none
a ccess  root_d  r
a ccess  sy s log_d  ra
epath /v a r / lo g /s e c u r e _ lo g _ o u t
end
end
A .3 Excerpts of BLP PC P
Following are exceprts of the code for the BLP pep.
A .3.1 F inding P ath s
The following code finds paths w ithin the <  graph.
00: sub p a th _ e x is t s _ o r ig  {
01: my ($search_leq ) = s h i f t
02: my ($a, $b) =
03: my ( $ t i ,  $ t 2 ) ;
04: my (*/,leq2) ;
05:
06: foreach  $ t l  (keys (7,$search_leq)) {
07: next u n le s s  $ t l  eq $a;
08: return  "true" i f  leq _ co n ta in s ($ $ se a r c h _ le q {$ a } ,  $ b ) ;
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09:
10: w h ile  (d e f in e d ($ $ se a r c h _ le q {$ t l} )  and $ $ se a r c h _ le q { $ t l}  ne ’ ’ ) {
11: ($ t2 ,  $ $ se a rc h _ le q {$ t l> )  = s p l i t  ’ $ $ s e a r c h _ le q { $ t l } , 2;
12: */.leq2 = '/,$search_leq;
13: i f  (p a th _ ex is ts_ o r ig ( \° / . le q 2 ,  $ t2 ,  $b)) {
14: return  "true";
15: >
16: >
17: >
18: return
19: >
A .3.2 R ela tion  C alcu lation
This is the code to compute BLP relation resulting from a DTE policy. 
00: sub c a lc u la te _ b lp  {
01: my C/,leq);
02: my ($dom, $domain, % hlist ,  $ t y p e l ,  $type2, $va lu e , $ v a lu e 2 ) ;
03:
04: foreach  $dom (keys (‘/,main: :domains)) {
05: $domain = $main::domains{$dom};
06: next u n le s s  e x i s t s  $dom ain->{"realta"};
07: ’/ .h l i s t  = 7,-($domain->{"realta"}};
08: foreach  $ ty p e l  (keys (7,h l i s t ) )  {
09: $value = $ h l i s t { $ t y p e l } - > [0] ;
10: next u n le s s  in d e x ($ v a lu e , "r") != -1 ;
11: foreach  $type2 (keys ( 7 .h l i s t ) )  {
12: $value2 = $ h l i s t { $ t y p e 2 } - > [0];
13: next u n le s s  has_modify_acc($domain, $ t y p e 2 ) ;
14: append_leq(\7.1eq, $ t y p e l ,  $type2) ;
15: }
16: }
17: }
18: return  7.1eq;
19:}
A .3.3 P re-A p p ly
This is the BLP pre_apply function. 
00: sub pre_apply {
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01: my ( $ s e l f )  =
02: my ($ ty p e , $domain);
03: ’/.baset = '/.main: :typ es;
04: y.leq = c a lc u la t e _ b lp ( )  ;
05: p r in t  "Pre-apply
06: p r in t_ b lp ( ‘/,leq) ;
07: >
A .3.4 P ost-A p p ly
This is the BLP post_apply function.
00: sub post_apply  {
01: my ( $ s e l f )  =
02: my ($a, $b, $ p a t h _ e x i s t s ) ;
03:
04: ’/ .post_ leq  = c a lc u la t e _ b lp ( )  ;
05: foreach  $a (keys ( ‘/ ,p o s t_ leq ))  {
06: next u n le s s  d e f in e d  $baset{$a};
07: foreach  $b ( s p l i t  $p ost_ leq {$ a } )  {
08: next u n le s s  d e f in e d  $baset{$b>;
09: next i f  $a eq $b;
10: */,search_leq = ‘/.leq;
11: $ p a th _ e x is ts  = p a t h _ e x i s t s _ o r i g ( \ ‘/ ,search_leq , $a, $b) ;
12: i f  (not $ p a th _ e x is t s )  {
13: p r in t  "BLP VIOLATION: $a newly <= $ b . \n " ;
14: >
15: }
16: >
17: }
A .4 Excerpts of M BLP PC P
Following are excerpts of the code for the  M BLP pep.
A .4.1 R ela tion  C alcu lation
00: sub calcu late_m blp  {
01: my (‘/ . leq );
02: my ($dom, $domain, ‘/ . h l i s t ,  $ t y p e l ,  $ type2, $va lu e , $ v a lu e 2 ) ;
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03:
04: foreach  $dom (keys (‘/.main: :dom ains)) {
05: $domain = $main::domains{$dom};
06: next u n le s s  e x i s t s  $domain->{"realta">;
07: next i f  is_ignore_dom ain($dom );
08: '/ .h list  = ’/ ,{$dom ain->{"realta"}};
09: foreach  $ ty p e l  (keys ( ' / .h l is t ) )  {
10: $value = $ h l i s t { $ t y p e l } - >  [0];
11: next u n le s s  in d e x ($ v a lu e , "r") != -1;
12: next i f  i s _ ig n o r e _ t y p e ( $ t y p e l ) ;
13: next i f  i s _ s e c r e t _ e x c e p t io n ( $ t y p e l , $dom);
14: # Now, s in c e  dom i s  not a se cr e c y  excep tion :
15: i f  ( i s _ s e c r e t _ t y p e ( $ t y p e l ) )  {
16: p r in t  "M0D_BLP: $dom should NOT read type $ ty p e l . \n " ;
17: >
18: foreach  $type2 (keys (‘/ .h l i s t ) )  {
19: $value2 = $ h l i s t { $ ty p e 2 } - >  [0];
20: next u n le s s  has_modify_acc(Sdomain, $ ty p e 2 ) ;
21: next i f  i s _ ig n o r e _ ty p e ($ ty p e 2 ) ;
22: next i f  i s_ p r o te c t_ e x c e p t io n ($ ty p e 2 , $dom);
23: # Now, s in c e  dom i s  not a p r o t e c t io n  exception:
24: i f  ( is_ p r o te c te d _ ty p e ($ ty p e 2 ))  {
25: p r in t  MM0D_BLP: $dom should NOT w r ite  type $type2 .\n"
26: }
27: append_leq(\‘/ , leq , $ t y p e l ,  $ ty p e 2 ) ;
28: }
29: >
30: >
31:
32: re tu rn  ’/.leq;
33: }
A .4.2 P re-A p p ly
00: sub pre_apply {
01: my ( $ s e l f )  =
02: my ($ typ e , $domain);
03: ’/.baset = ’/.main: :types;
04: s e t u p _ a s s e r t s ( ) ;
05: ’/.leq  = c a lc u la te _ m b lp ( ) ;
06: >
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A .4.3 P o st-A p p ly
00: sub post_apply  {
01: my ( $ s e l f )  =
02: my ($a , $b, $ p a t h _ e x i s t s ) ;
03:
04: '/,post_leq = c a lc u la te _ m b lp ( ) ;
05: # f o r  each a ,b ,  p o s t_ le q {$ a }  =b, and a ,b  both in  b ase_ typ es ,  make sure  
06: # leq{$a> = $b;
07: foreach  $a (keys (7.post_leq) ) {
08: next u n le s s  d e f in ed  $b aset{$a};
09: foreach  $b ( s p l i t  $post_ leq{$a>) {
10: next u n le s s  d e f in ed  $baset{$b};
11: next i f  $a eq $b;
12: ’/.search_leq  = 7,leq;
13: $ p a th _ e x is ts  = p a th _ ex is ts_or ig ( \7»search _ leq , $a, $b) ;
14: i f  (not $ p a th _ e x is ts )  {
15: p r in t  "MBLP VIOLATION: $a newly <= $b .\n";
16: }
17: >
18: }
19: }
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LM Bench Results
LMBench [36] was used to  m easure the performance of the stock 2 .5 .6  linux kernel, as 
well as the LSM 2 .5 .6  kernel. The LSM kernel was tested using the dum my module, the 
capabilities module, the  D TE module, and the capabilities m odule stacked on top of the 
DTE module. The results are listed here. For the sake of brevity and readability, we report 
only the m ean and deviation of 1 0  runs.
B .l  Stock Kernel
Host OS D e sc r ip t io n Mhz
s k u l l - s p l  Linux 2 .5 .6 i6 8 6 -p c - l in u x -g n u  398
P rocessor ,  P rocesses  -  t im es in  microseconds -  sm aller  i s  b e t t e r
Mhz n u l l  n u l l  open s e l c t  s i g  s i g  fork  exec
c a l l  I/O s t a t  c lo s  TCP i n s t  hndl proc proc
mean 
sigma 
95°/. Cl
0 .9 0  1 .61 9 .1 5  11 .9  62 .5  2 .23  6 .9 9  475 1846
0 .01  0 .0 3  .09 0 .2  2 .4  .02 .03 5 16
.008 .023 .068 .151 1.81 .015 .023 3 .7 7  12
Context sw itch in g  -  t im es in  microseconds -  sm aller  i s  b e t t e r
2p/0K 2p/16K 2p/64K 8p/16K 8p/64K 16p/16K 16p/64K 
ctxsw ctxsw ctxsw ctxsw ctxsw ctxsw ctxsw
194
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mean 2.338 18.8  55 .7 19 .9  :132.0 26 .5  205 .4
sigma 0 .140 0 .3  5 .6 0 .8 9 3 .0  2 .0
957. Cl .106 .226 4. 22 .603 6 .7 9  2 .26  1 .51
♦Local* Communication l a t e n c i e s  in  microseconds -  sm aller  i s  b e t t e r
2p/0K Pipe AF UDP RPC/ TCP RPC/ TCP
ctxsw UNIX UDP TCP conn
mean 2.338 13.2  26 .0 4 7 .8  112.7 73 .3  158.3  255
sigma 0 .140 0 .4  0 .3 0 .6 0  0 .5 1 .1  1 .9  1
957. Cl .106 .302 .226 .452 .377 .829 1 .43  .754
F i l e  & VM system l a t e n c i e s  in microseconds -  sm aller i s  b e t te r
OK F i l e  10K F i l e  Mmap Prot Page
Create D ele te Create D e le te Latency Fault Fault
mean 123.6 15.6 259 .0 3 8 .9 1301.5 1.702 5.70000
sigma 0 .2 0 .1 0 .2 0 .1 23 .9 0 .022 0.45826
957. Cl .151 .075 .151 .075 18.0 .017 .346
♦Local* Communication bandwidths in  MB/s -  b igger  i s  b e t t e r
Pipe AF TCP F i l e  Mmap Bcopy Bcopy Mem Mem 
UNIX reread reread ( l i b c )  (hand) read w rite
mean 177 115 122 149.3  277 .8  135.7 142.4  277 170.11
sigma 11 5 47 0 .2  0 .0  0 .7  1 .1  0 0 .03
957. Cl 8 .2 9  3 .7 7  3 5 .4  .151 .000 .528 .829 .000 .023
B.2 LSM Kernel Using Dummy M odule
P rocessor ,  P rocesses  -  t im es  in  microseconds -  sm aller  i s  b e t te r
Mhz n u l l  n u l l  open s e l c t  s i g  s i g  fork  exec
c a l l  1 /0  s t a t  c lo s  TCP i n s t  hndl proc proc
0 .859  1 .61 9 .4 9  12 .0  64 .8  2 .20  7 .1 0  474 1870
0 .003  0 .0 2  0 .1 0  0 .1  3 .0  0 .0 6  0 .01  3 16
.002 .015 .075 .075 2 .2 6  .045 .008 2 .26  12.1
mean 
sigma 
957, Cl
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Context sw itch in g  -  t im es  in  microseconds -  sm aller  i s  b e t t e r
2p/0K 2p/16K 2p/64K 8p/16K 8p/64K 16p/16K 16p/64K
ctxsw ctxsw ctxsw ctxsw ctxsw ctxsw ctxsw
mean 2.558 19.2 54 .6 21 .4 150.2 27 .4 202 .6
sigma 0.172 0 .1 1 .3 3 .9 12.1 2 .8 2 .6
957. Cl .130 .075 .980 2 .94 9 .12 2.11 1.96
♦Local* Communication l a t e n c i e s  in  microseconds -  sm aller  i s  b e t te r
2p/0K
ctxsw
Pipe AF UDP RPC/ 
UNIX UDP
TCP RPC/ TCP 
TCP conn
mean 2.558 13 .4  25 .6  4 5 .2  114.0 76 .5  157.3 :257
sigma 0.172 0 .4  0 .4  0 .7  0 .5 0 .6  7 .8 2
957, Cl .130 .302 .302 .528 .377 .452 5 .88  1 .51
F i l e  & VM system l a t e n c i e s  in  microseconds -  sm aller i s  b e t t e r
OK F i l e  10K F i le Mmap Prot Page
Create D e le te  Create D e lete Latency Fault Fault
mean 126.3 17 .4  260 .7  41 .8 1295.3  1.689 5 .40
sigma 0 .3 0 .1  0 .4  0 .2 20 0 .024 0 .49
957. Cl .226 .075 .302 .151 15.1 .018 .369
♦Local* Communication bandwidths in  MB/s -  b igger  i s  b e t t e r
Pipe AF 
UNIX
TCP F i le
reread
Mmap
reread
Bcopy
( l i b c )
Bcopy
(hand)
Mem
read
Mem
w rite
mean 187 118 80 .8 149.4 277.8 135.6 142.3 277 170.2
sigma 3 3 3 .1 0 .1 0 .04 0 .7 1.1 0 0 .1
957. Cl 2 .2 6  2 .26 2 .34 .075 .030 .528 .829 .000 .075
B.3 LSM Kernel Using Capabilities M odule
P rocessor ,  P rocesses  -  t im es in  microseconds -  sm aller  i s  b e t t e r
Mhz n u l l  n u l l  open s e l c t  s i g  s i g  fork  exec
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c a l l  I/O s t a t  c lo s  TCP i n s t  hndl proc proc
mean 0 .859  1 .62  9 .52  12.1 64 .5  2 .1 8  7 .1 0  475 1870
sigma 0 .003  0 .0 3  0 .13  0 .2  2 .3  0 .0 0  0 .01  3 20
957. Cl .002 .023 .098 .151 1 .73  .000 .008 2 .26  15.1
Context sw itch in g  -  t im es in  m icroseconds -  sm aller  i s  b e t t e r
2p/0K 2p/16K 2p/64K 8p/16K 8p/64K 16p/16K 16p/64K 
ctxsw ctxsw ctxsw ctxsw ctxsw ctxsw ctxsw
mean 2 .55 19 .3 56 .2 21.0 143.5 30 .2 205.5
sigma 0 .11 0 .2 5 .6 1.7 7 .5 4 .9 2 .3
957, Cl .081 .151 4 .22 1.28 5 .66 3 .69 1.73
♦Local* Communication l a t e n c i e s  in  microseconds -  sm aller  i s  b e t t e r
2p/0K Pipe AF UDP RPC/ TCP RPC/ TCP 
ctxsw UNIX UDP TCP conn
mean 2 .55  13 .7  25 .8  4 5 .8  113.8 7 6 .2  161.8 256
sigma 0 .11  0 .3  0 .3  0 .6  1 .2  1 .1  1 .6  1 .4
957, Cl .083 .226 .226 .452 .905 .829 1.21 1 .06
F i l e  & VM system l a t e n c i e s  in  microseconds -  sm aller  i s  b e t t e r
OK F i l e  10K F i le  Mmap Prot Page
Create D e le te  Create D e le te  Latency Fault Fault
mean 126.0  17 .0  260 .6  41 .9  1298 1.730 5 .60
sigma 0 .2  0 .1  0 .3  0 .1  18 0 .031  0 .49
957, Cl -151 .075 .226 .075 13 .6  .023 .369
♦Local* Communication bandwidths in  MB/s -  b igger  i s  b e t t e r
Pipe AF 
UNIX
TCP F i le
reread
Mmap
reread
Bcopy
( l i b c )
Bcopy
(hand)
Mem
read
mean 181 117 80 .8 148.6 277.8 136.4 143.4 277
sigma 9 4 7 .3 1 .9 0 .05 0 .2 0 .3 0
957. Cl 6 .7 9  3 .02 5 .5 0 1.43 .038 .151 .226 .000
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B.4 LSM Kernel Using D TE M odule
P rocessor ,  P rocesses  -  t im es in  m icroseconds -  sm aller  i s  b e t t e r
Mhz n u l l  n u l l  open s e l c t  s i g  s i g  fork  exec
c a l l  I/O s t a t  c lo s  TCP i n s t  hndl proc proc
mean 0 .8 6  1 .62  12 .2  15 .4  6 7 .0  2 .1 8  7 .2 0  480 1885
sigma 0 0 .0 1  0 .1  0 .1  3 .6  0 0 .01  4 18
957. Cl .000 .008 .075 .075 2 .71  .000 .008 3 .0 2  13.6
Context sw itch in g  -  t im es in  m icroseconds -  sm aller  i s  b e t t e r
2p/0K 2p/16K 2p/64K 8p/16K 8p/64K 16p/16K 16p/64K
ctxsw ctxsw ctxsw ctxsw ctxsw ctxsw ctxsw
mean 2.424 19.5 54 .2 20.7 145.0 28 .9 206.6
sigma 0.136 0 .1 0 .4 0 .9 15.8 4 .3 1.5
957. Cl .103 .075 .302 .679 12.0 3 .24 1 .13
♦Local* Communication l a t e n c i e s  in  microseconds -  sm aller  i s  b e t t e r
2p/0K Pipe AF UDP RPC/ TCP RPC/ TCP 
ctxsw UNIX UDP TCP conn
mean 2 .424  13 .7  2 5 .8  4 5 .0  113.3 77 .7  162.6 260 .6
sigma 0 .136  0 .2  0 .4  0 .6  0 .9  1 .8  1 .5  2 .498
957, Cl .103 .151 .302 .452 .679 1 .36  1 .13  1 .88
F i le  & VM system l a t e n c i e s  in  m icroseconds -  sm aller  i s  b e t t e r
OK F i l e  10K F i l e  Mmap Prot Page
Create D e le te  Create D e le te  Latency Fault Fault
mean 131.6  19 .4  268 .3  44 .8  1295 1 .640 5 .80
sigma 0 .3  0 .1  0 .3  0 .1  24 0 .033  0 .40
957. Cl .226 .075 .226 .075 18.1  .025 .302
♦Local* Communication bandwidths in  MB/s -  b igger  i s  b e t t e r
Pipe AF TCP F i l e  Mmap Bcopy Bcopy Mem Mem 
UNIX reread  reread ( l i b c )  (hand) read w rite
mean 182 118 8 8 .8  149 .3  277 .8  136.5 143.7 277 170.16
sigma 2 2 2 8 .3  0 .1  0 .03  0 .11  0 .3  0 0 .05
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95% Cl 1.51 1.51 2 1 .3  .075 .023 .083 .226 .000 .038
B.5 LSM Kernel Using DTE and Capabilities M odule
P rocessor ,  P rocesses  -  t im es in  m icroseconds -  sm aller  i s  b e t te r
Mhz n u l l  n u l l  open s e l c t  s i g  s i g  fork  exec
c a l l  1 /0  s t a t  c lo s  TCP in s t  hndl proc proc
mean 0 .859  1 .62  12 .2  15 .5  68 .0  2 .183  7 .20  479 1903
sigma 0 .003  0 .01  0 .1  0 .3  4 .7  .004 0 .01  4 37
95% Cl .002 .008 .075 .226 3 .5 4  .003 .008 3 .0 2  27 .9
Context sw itch in g  -  t im es in  m icroseconds -  sm aller  i s  b e t t e r
2p/0K 2p/16K 2p/64K 8p/16K 8p/64K 16p/16K 16p/64K
ctxsw ctxsw ctxsw ctxsw ctxsw ctxsw ctxsw
mean 2.531 19.4 54 .4 20 .7 147.5 29 .3 203.3
sigma 0.167 0 .28 0 .7 0 .7 20 .7 3 .3 5 .3
95% Cl .126 .211 .528 .528 15.6 2 .49 4 .0 0
*Local* Communication l a t e n c i e s  in  m icroseconds -  sm aller  i s  b e t t e r
2p/0K Pipe AF UDP RPC/ TCP RPC/ TCP 
ctxsw UNIX UDP TCP conn
mean 2 .531 13 .8  2 5 .8  4 5 .0  113.4  76 .7  162.8 260
sigma 0 .167  0 .4  0 .3  0 .4  0 .5  1 .1  1 .7  2
95% Cl .126 .302 .226 .302 .377 .829 1 .28  1.51
F i le  & VM system l a t e n c i e s  in  microseconds -  sm aller  i s  b e t t e r
OK F i l e  10K F i l e  Mmap Prot Page
Create D e le te Create D elete Latency Fault Fault
mean 131.6 19.3 268.3 44 .9 1296.3 1.613 5 .40
sigma 0 .3 0 .1 0 .4 0 .1 22 0.019 0 .49
95% Cl .226 .075 .302 .075 16.6 .014 .369
♦Local* Communication bandwidths in  MB/s -  b igger  i s  b e t t e r
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Pipe AF TCP F i l e  Mmap Bcopy Bcopy Mem Mem
UNIX reread reread ( l i b c ) (hand) read
mean 183 118 103 149.3 277.79  136.6 143.7 277
sigma 5 2 40 0 .1 0 .0 3  0 .1 0 .1 0
95'/, Cl 3 .77 1.51 30 .2 .075 .023 .075 .075 .000
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